Postponed care: a historical critique of care from the existentialist perspectives of Heidegger and Arendt

Abstract

In almost all cultures, intriguingly, care has both positive and negative connotations as in taking care of something or somebody and, at the same time, carrying the burden of something or somebody. This article claims that this contradictory use of care is a result of the historical development of the meaning of care and that this is a hindrance to understand the meaning of care in our lives. In the course of its historical development, care has been understood as a means to an end; either as care for the self or for others, or as a transition to a higher end. Only in the phenomenological-existential rehabilitation of care in the twentieth century, it has been examined beyond this instrumental conception and placed at the center of who we are. To explain these claims, the article has two sections: the first section offers a historical outline of some of the main theories of care that have been developed; the second section explains the novelty of Heidegger's and Arendt's theories of care. The latter section aims to demonstrate the necessity of understanding care as the source of our existence, and why care cannot be postponed.