

**Emigrants/Muhacir from Xinjiang  
to Middle East during 1940-60s**

**Edited by  
Jin NODA and Ryosuke ONO**



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(ILCAA)**

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**Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA)**  
**Tokyo University of Foreign Studies**

**Fuchu, Tokyo**

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Edited by Jin NODA and Ryosuke ONO  
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## Foreword

*Emigrants/Muhacir from Xinjiang to Middle East during 1940–60s* is the first volume of the new series of works titled “MEIS-NIHU” by our research group, Middle East and Islamic Studies at the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), which is being supported by the NIHU Area Studies Project for the Modern Middle East. The National Institute for the Humanities (NIHU) initiated this six-year nationwide project in 2016 under the theme “Towards a Pluralistic and Multi-Valued Society: People and Cultures of the Middle East in the Age of Global Change.” The National Museum of Ethnology, Akita University, Sophia University, Kyoto University, and ILCAA collaborated for this project. This group is conducting research under the topic “Human Mobility, Network Building, and Transformation of States, Societies, and Religions.” Through this project, we have been able to send research missions to the Middle East, host foreign researchers, conduct international symposia, and develop learning skills.

This series aims to publish the results of our research for a national and international audience. We hope that through this series Middle East and Islamic Studies can be expanded all over the world and that colleagues can recognize our research.

My thanks go out to Mr. Ryosuke Ono and Dr. Jin Noda for the hard work that went into crafting this fascinating document.

Professor Nobuaki KONDO

Group Leader, Middle East and Islamic Studies at ILCAA  
NIHU Area Studies Project for the Modern Middle East

March 2019



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## Preface

On March 3, 2018, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies held an international workshop to examine modern migratory connections between Xinjiang, a northwest province in China, and the Middle East, especially from the 1940s to 1960s. Following the Republic of China's defeat in 1949 and the subsequent transfer of the authority over Xinjiang to the People's Republic of China, several Turkic minority ethnic groups living in the Xinjiang province, mostly Uyghurs and Kazakhs, were forced to migrate to Middle East, particularly to Turkey. This workshop, entitled "Emigrants/Muhacir from Central Asia to the Middle East: The Case of Xinjiang (1940s–1950s)," looked to explore the international context of Uyghur and Kazakh migration to the Middle East.

Understanding the international dimensions of this topic requires diverse approaches from a variety of regional perspectives, including that of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Taiwan. Thus, the workshop included a number of scholars from across the globe. The involvement of a such a diversity of perspectives on issues of Central Asian migration enabled workshop participants to examine ties between Turkic ethnic groups in Turkey and Central Asia, particularly in Xinjiang, from an interdisciplinary perspective. Participation in this workshop by a unique cadre of international scholars furthered existing knowledge of the migratory histories of Turkic migrants from Xinjiang, shedding light on the drivers of migration and the nature of these migrant communities in the Middle East. Together, the research presented by workshop participants has helped to establish a historical foundation of the multiethnic communities living in the Middle East today, providing a necessary foundation from which contemporary instability of Middle East can be further explored. In doing so, the workshop contributed to the development of a new comparative approach to the study of multiethnic societies in the Middle East.

This volume of proceedings is based on the research of five international scholars who took part in the workshop, as well as one scholar, Dr. TUNCER, who was unfortunately unable to attend. Chapter 1 by Abdulvahap KARA provides an overview of the general history of Kazakh migration from Xinjiang to Turkey. In

Chapter 2, Ömer KUL discusses the push by Uyghur migrants in Turkey to integrate Turkish people into the Uyghur nationalist movement and the integration of Uyghur migrants within modern Turkey. Chapter 3 by Jin NODA analyzes the influence of the Soviet Union on Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang, with special focus on the role of a Kazakh leader, Ospan Batur in driving Kazakh migration. In Chapter 4, Ryosuke ONO examines the activity of American diplomat J.H. Paxton and the US-sponsored Escapee Program for Kazakh migrants in Kashmir. Justin JACOBS, in Chapter 5, touches on relations between Xinjiang refugees and Yolbars Khan, an Uyghur politician and president of the Xinjiang government exiled in Taiwan, with special focus on the impact of Cold War politics on the relationship between these refugees and Khan. Finally, in Chapter 6, Tekin TUNCER explores the account of Mehmet Cantürk, shedding light on the migratory processes of those who immigrated to Turkey via Afghanistan.

We would like to express our gratitude to all participants in the workshop, including Mr. Ryosuke ONO, the co-editor of this volume who led the organization of this workshop. We would like to extend special gratitude to Professors Nobuaki KONDO and Masato IZUKA of Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA) as well as Dr. Akira MATSUNAGA for his invaluable comments on workshop presentations.

The workshop, an outgrowth of a research project undertaken by the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, was sponsored by the National Institute for the Humanities Area Studies Project for the Modern Middle East, a project concerned with issues of human mobility across the globe. This volume is also supported by the Middle East and Islamic Studies (MEIS) of the Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Waseda University's publication aid, and JSPS Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (17H07174). All opinions expressed by the authors in this volume are solely authors' opinions and do not reflect the opinions of the ILCAA.

Tokyo, February, 2019

Jin NODA

## Transliteration System

In this volume, we use the following transliteration system for the Cyrillic Kazakh.

Alphabet	Romanization	Alphabet	Romanization
А	A	П	P
Ә	Ä	Р	R
Б	B	С	S
В	V	Т	T
Г	G	У	U
Ғ	GH	Ү	Ü
Д	D	Ф	F
Е	E	Х	KH
Ё	YO	Һ	H
Ж	ZH	Ц	TS
З	Z	Ч	CH
И	I	Ш	SH
Й	Y	Щ	SHCH
К	K	Ъ	''
Қ	Q	Ы	Ï
Л	L	І	İ
М	M	Ь	`
Н	N	Э	É
Ң	NG	Ю	YU
О	O	Я	YA
Ө	Ö		

**Chapter 1**  
**Causes and Consequences of Kazakh Migration**  
**from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey: 1930s–1950s**

**Abdolvahap Kara\***  
Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University

**Abstract**

In this paper, we address reasons for and results of the Kazakhs' migration from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey from the 1930s to the 1950s. The migration's main cause was closely related to Sun Yat-sen's 1911 Chinese revolution, which ended the four-century Manchu Empire and created a void of authority in Eastern Turkestan. The difficult and oppressive administration of Eastern Turkestan's governors during the republican era forced the Kazakhs both to rebel against the governors and to emigrate to countries living more freely. Thus, two waves of exodus occurred, the first in the late 1930s and the second in the early 1950s. The Kazakh rebellion led by Osman Batur, which erupted between 1940 and 1950, before the second migration, is beyond this discussion.<sup>1</sup> Two migratory movements occurred at intervals of approximately ten years, both ending in Turkey from 1952 to 1954. As a result, the Kazakh diaspora and culture has emerged in Turkey and various European countries.

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<sup>1</sup> For the rebellion of Osman Batur, see Äbdüuaqap Qara, *Azattıqting öshpes rukhi Nürghozhay Batırdıng estelikteri zhäne Ospan Batır* (Almaty: Sardar, 2008); Benson Linda, *The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); David D. Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident; Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944–1949* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1999).

## 1. Governors of Eastern Turkestan in the Republican Era

Chinese governors who served as governors in Eastern Turkestan in the first half of the 20th century were the following:

1. Yang Zengxin (1912–28)
2. Jin Shuren (1928–33)
3. Sheng Shicai (1933–44) was the most bloody and cruel.

During these three governors' administrations, Kazakhs in Eastern Turkestan were increasingly subjected to atrocities, and they lost their previously peaceful environment as a result of these Chinese rulers' repressive regimes, through taxation and political and military politics. Kazakhs who opposed persecution by these oppressive rulers were savagely punished.

## 2. Reasons for Migration

Previous to migration, the nomadic Kazakhs lived by animal husbandry. Although Eastern Turkestan was under the Beijing government's dominion, the Kazakhs lived an autonomous life in their pastoral region. During the Manchu administration, they had their own rulers with titles of *uang* or *güng*, *beysi*, *täyzhı*, *ükırday*, *zalıng* and *zänggı*, *zhüzbası* and *auılbası*.<sup>2</sup> And it cannot be said that Beijing fully controlled the area. Especially after Sun Yat-sen's revolution overthrew the Manchu Dynasty in 1911, Chinese governors appointed from the center acted independently, and sometimes they entered close relations with Soviet Russia, then ruled by Stalin, who wanted to dominate the region.<sup>3</sup> Pressure and persecution increased because the governors wanted to strengthen their dominance over the Uyghurs and Kazakhs in

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<sup>2</sup> Zhaqsılıq Sämitüli, *Qitaydaghi Qazaqtar* (Almaty: Düniezhüzi Qazaqtarınıng qauımdastıghı, 2000), 47, 69–70; Linda Benson and Ingvar Svanberg, *China's Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China's Kazaks* (Armonk, NY and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 43; Ingvar Svanberg, "The Nomadism of Orta žüz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949," in *The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, ed. Linda Bergson and Ingvar Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1988), 119; Zardıkhān Qınayatüli, "Monggholiya Qazaqtarı," in *Qazaq diasporası: bügüni men ertengı* (Astana: Elorda, 2005), 99–102; Konstantin L. Syroezhkin, ed., *Sovremennyyı Sin'tsyan i ego mesto v kazakhstansko-kitaiskikh otnosheniyyakh* (Almaty: Fond Evrazii, 1997), 96–109.

<sup>3</sup> Hans Bräker, "Çin-Sovyet İlişkilerinde Milliyet Hareketleri," *Stratejik Açıdan Sovyet Müslümanları ve Diğer Azınlıklar*, haz., S. Enders Wimbush, çev., Yuluğ Tekin Kurat (Ankara: Yeni Forum Yayınları, 1988), 183–98; Nábizhan Müqametkhanüli, "Qıtaydaghi Qazaq qauımdastıghınıng qalıptastıı," in *Qazaq diasporası*, 132–39.

the region. Finally, this situation exceeded the limits of tolerance, especially during the rule of the Chinese governors Jin Shuren (1928–33) and Sheng Shicai (1933–44).<sup>4</sup>

During this period, education in the Kazakh language was restricted, and the native people were increasingly taxed. Indigenous people's lands were confiscated and divided among Chinese immigrants. People were executed for even the smallest of crimes. After prominent community leaders were arrested, the Uyghurs and Kazakhs in the region revolted. Although these rebellions led to short-term success, they could not continue to confront the Governor's forces that were so superior in numbers and equipment. This led the nomadic Kazakh people to decide to migrate to areas where they could live freely.

### 3. Stages of Migration

The Kazakhs did not directly emigrate from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey; instead, their migration took place over a long 17 years from 1935 to 1952. The first stage was the migration of Kazakhs from the repression of Sheng Shicai, the Governor of Eastern Turkestan, to the Gansu Province under the control of Dungan or Hui, Chinese Muslims.

When school education in the Kazakh language was halted and the leading Kazakhs were arrested in 1935, the Kazakhs living in the Qumul and Barköl regions started looking for an escape from oppression. Some Kazakh leaders, for instance, Mäzhen Shanya [Ch. *Xiangyue*: administrative chief], Erenkhan, Eliskhan Täyzhı, and Zäyıp Täyzhı, held a secret congress in Qoysu in August 1935. They decided to seek help from the Chinese Muslim General Ma Bufang, warlord of Gansu and Qinghai provinces, against the forces of Sheng Shicai, Governor of Eastern Turkestan.<sup>5</sup>

However, there was no way to obtain such aid. Thereupon a group of Kazakhs led by Eliskhan Täyzhı emigrated to Gansu in the spring of 1936. However, this first phase of migration was not easy because of a clash with Chinese soldiers dispatched by Governor Sheng Shicai. Still, the migrants succeeded in reaching Gansu, where they were well received and shown hospitality by the Dungans. Three

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<sup>4</sup> Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Doğu Türkistan'daki Harp Beyleri: Doğu Türkistan'ının 1911–1949 Arası Siyasi Tarihi* çev. Enver Can (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Vakfı, 1991), 62–296; Gul'nara M. Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud'by Kazakhskoi diaspori: Proiskhozhdenie i razvitie* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1997), 113–22; Dälelkhan Zhanaltay, *Qili zaman – Qiin künder* (Almaty: Düniezhüzi Qazaqtarining qauimdistighi, 2000), 25–58.

<sup>5</sup> Hızır Bek Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler* (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977), 26.



months later, the second group of Kazakhs headed by Zäyıp Täyzhǐ emigrated from Barköl to Gansu.<sup>6</sup>

Migration of Kazakhs from Barköl and surroundings to Gansu created great excitement among the Kazakhs in Altay since they were also oppressed under Sheng Shicai. This oppression further increased after the Barköl Kazakhs migrated to Gansu. Therefore, in November 1938, Kazakh leaders of Altay held a meeting in the house of Nürghali Bi, with leaders Äyǐmbet, Qūsayǐn Täyzhǐ [Hüseyin Teyci], and Sültanshärıp [Sultan Şerif] attending. At this meeting, they also decided to immigrate to Gansu. However, Governor Sheng Shicai, who was aware of and opposed this decision, sent troops with air support. Despite fierce fighting, the Kazakhs were able to reach Gansu, where the Altay Kazakhs met with Kazakhs under the leadership of Elǐskhan and Zäyıp Täyzhǐ, who had previously emigrated to the Yu'erhun region of Gansu.<sup>7</sup> This convergence caused rejoicing and excitement. Thus, Kazakhs from Barköl, Qumul, and Altay regions gathered in Gansu where, for the time being, they were safe from Sheng Shicai's oppression.<sup>8</sup>

Thus did the Kazakhs begin their peaceful days in Gansu, but this calm did not last more than two years. In Nanjing, Chiang Kai-shek's government had begun to pressure Chinese Muslim General Ma to send the Kazakhs back to their homeland. Still Ma did not follow the government's instructions because, on one hand, China was experiencing internal disturbances, and on the other, it was at war with Japan. When the Nanjing government could not influence Ma, it turned to Ma Bukang, the commander of the Suzhou region where the Kazakhs lived. Then, through Ma Bukang, Nanjing put pressure on the Kazakhs. Using various excuses, Ma Bukang began to confiscate the Kazakhs' horses and guns. Observing Ma Bukang's increasing pressure, Kazakh leaders held a meeting in Elǐskhan Täyzhǐ's house and decided to emigrate from Qinghai to the free world because of the commander's unfriendly behavior.<sup>9</sup>

So began a second phase, with the Kazakhs emigrating from Qinghai to India. This migration faced many obstacles. First of all, Ma Bukang wanted to stop them, so he sent troops, commanded by Han Jinbao, to Elǐskhan's convoy already on

<sup>6</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 27–34.

<sup>7</sup> Khalifa Altay, *Altaydan aughan el* (Almaty, 2000), 15–28.

<sup>8</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 37–40.

<sup>9</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 47–49.

its way to Tibet and, with various promises, convinced them to return in May 1939. The Kazakhs were told that if they returned to Yu'erhun, they would live comfortably without pressure, as in the old days. But the Kazakhs were required to hand over their weapons. On the way back to Yu'erhun, Han Jinbao arrested Eliskhan Täyzhǐ and others, who had given up their guns, when the convoy was taking a break in the plain of Balong. During the night, however, when the soldiers fell asleep, the Kazakhs rescued Eliskhan and his friends, attacking and killing Commander Han Jinbao and his soldiers with axes, shovels, stones, and sticks. Again, they began to emigrate toward Tibet.<sup>10</sup>

After this event, other Kazakhs in Qinghai could not stay there. Zäyïp Täyzhǐ and his friends met and decided to migrate to India via Tibet following Eliskhan Täyzhǐ. The group left in September 1939, and after difficulties getting there, the two groups met in the Nagqu district of Tibet. On the way, they clashed from time to time with Chinese and Tibetan soldiers who wanted to block them. The Kazakhs ability to fight and use weapons has played an important role in overcoming such obstacles. Besides human opposition, the Kazakhs had to deal with severe natural conditions. Many people including, notably, Zäyïp Täyzhǐ, a prominent immigration leader died from lack of oxygen in the high-altitude peaks of Tibet. They also battled winter conditions of extreme cold, heavy snow, and bad storms. The most difficult for them was digging graves in the frozen, rocky soil. After all these difficulties, the Kazakh convoy reached the Indian border in September 1941.<sup>11</sup>

The third phase of immigration began in India and Pakistan. Unfortunately, the Kazakhs' problems were not resolved by crossing the Tibetan border into India. They faced very different conditions in the new country. Specifically, the Kazakhs were subjected to unprecedented hostile practices at the Muzaffarabad refugee camp, where they were first settled in India. Camp administrators treated them like prisoners. Food and beverage were inadequate, and even bathing facilities were not provided. When tropical conditions with which the Kazakhs were unfamiliar were added to these problems, diseases and epidemics emerged in the camp, and about a thousand Kazakhs passed away. Indian Muslims had to intervene in this severe situ-

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<sup>10</sup> Äbdüuaqap Qara, *Qazaqtardıń Türkiyağa köshi: Qozhan Uäzir Aqsaqaldıń auızsha dereqteri* (Almaty: Orkhon, 2016), 72–74; Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 51–57; Altay, *Altaydan*, 28–31.

<sup>11</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 57–66; Altay, *Altaydan*, 32–57.

ation. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, a leader of Kashmir Muslims, Nawabzada Rashid Ali Khan, a leader of Punjab Muslims, and Muhammad Aslam Khan, a leader of Garhi Habibullah town Muslims were able to free the Kazakhs from the Muzaffarabad camp with the British authorities' support.<sup>12</sup>

After six months of troubled life, and deaths, in Muzaffarabad, Kazakh immigrants were transferred to the Khanpur camp near the town of Tarnawa in the Hazara division. The transfer was so exciting and emotional that the Kazakhs forgot all their troubles. Learning that Kazakh immigrants would be transferred to Khanpur, indigenous people lined the streets and cheered the migrants. They competed to throw flowers and to give the Kazakhs food and drink. The Khanpur camp provided relative relief. But here, too, epidemic diseases appeared, and dozens died every day. A year later, the British administration gave the Kazakhs refugee identities, with which anyone could leave the camp to settle anywhere. However, the Kazakhs had neither professions nor sufficient money. Where would they go? What would they subsist on outside the camp?

In the meantime, the indigenous people, who noticed the Kazakhs' discomfort, appealed to the authorities to allow them to travel freely on public transport. They also launched campaigns, supported by Muslim leaders in the region, for mass housing construction for the Kazakhs. The Nizam of Hyderabad, Mir Osman Ali Khan married to Durrushehvar Sultan, the daughter of the last Ottoman Caliph, Abdülmecit II, came to the Khanpur camp and promised to give the Kazakhs homes and work.<sup>13</sup> But as one of the hottest parts of India, Hyderabad was not suitable as a residence for the Kazakhs. The Nizam of Bhopal, Hamidullah Khan, who came to the camp after the Nizam of Hyderabad, made a similar, but more favorable offer. Bhopal was cooler and had more woodland area than Hyderabad, so a group of 500 people led by Qūsmān Täyžhī [Osman Taştan] settled in the Matar region of Bhopal. Some Kazakhs built mass housing in an outlying Bhopal district, naming it "Kazakabad." Other groups of Kazakhs gradually began to trade in such towns as Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Taxila.<sup>14</sup> After the division of British India in 1947, the Kazakhs settled in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 69–78; Altay, *Altaydan*, 58–63.

<sup>13</sup> Äbdüuaqap Qara, "Altaydan Anatoliyagha azap keshu," *Egemen Qazaqstan*, 15 Qazan 1996.

<sup>14</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 79–81; Altay, *Altaydan*, 63–67.

<sup>15</sup> Altay, *Altaydan*, 74–78.

From 1940 to 1950, the Kazakhs became accustomed to living in India and Pakistan. They also received support from indigenous Muslims.<sup>16</sup> However, they did not feel comfortable because of lingual and cultural differences. Therefore, they wanted to emigrate to Turkey, whose people have the same roots and history.

Turkey comprises the fourth phase of the Kazakh migration. Kazakhs had recourse to the Turkish Embassy in India in 1946, after World War II had ended. However, Turkey was not ready to accept new refugees because, despite not entering the war, the country had not overcome national difficulties caused by the war.<sup>17</sup> After a few years, prominent Kazakhs gathered and agreed to reiterate their demand for emigration to Turkey and the necessity of organizing an association to establish unity and solidarity. Thus, the Eastern Turkistani Qaziq [sic] Refugees Association was established in Peshawar in 1949.<sup>18</sup>

As soon as the Association was established, its first task was to list Kazakhs living in various Pakistani cities. Later, this list was delivered to Nebil Batı, the Turkish Ambassador to Pakistan, and the request to migrate to Turkey was forwarded in February 1950. A year later, the response from Ankara reported that Kazakhs would be accepted as immigrants, but that people would have to wait a while for completion of bureaucratic paperwork had to be completed jobs.<sup>19</sup>

Meanwhile, the second Kazakh immigration group from Eastern Turkestan came to Kashmir in 1951. This group of Kazakhs was led by Qalibek Äkim [Alibek Hakim], Dälelkhan Zhanaltay [Delilhan Canaltay], Hüseyin Teyci,<sup>20</sup> Sultan Şerif Teyci, and Uyghurs under the leadership of İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra. These people left for the free world because they did not want to submit to Mao Zedong's new regime instituted by the Communist Revolution in 1949.

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<sup>16</sup> The Kazakhs of Turkey can never forget the helpfulness of the Pakistani people. Therefore, they sincerely participated in international aid campaigns for the people of Pakistan when the country was affected by a major earthquake of 7.6 magnitude on October 8, 2005.

<sup>17</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 83.

<sup>18</sup> Altay, *Altaydan*, 109–10.

<sup>19</sup> Altay, *Altaydan*, 112–14.

<sup>20</sup> For this migration, see Saadet Çağatay, *Kazakça Metinler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1961), 1–4; Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayımları Vakfı, 1976); Khasan Oraltay, *ElİM-aylap ötken ömür* (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999); Godfrey Lias, *Kazak Exodus* (London: Evans Brothers, 1956). For details on how these migrants assisted a vice-consul of the United States in Urumqi to reach Tibet, see also Thomas Laird, *Into Tibet: The CIA's First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa* (New York: Grove Press, 2002).

Kazakhs in Pakistan got in touch with this group and advised them to emigrate together to Turkey.<sup>21</sup> Alptekin and Buğra went to Ankara and accelerated Turkey's acceptance of these migrants in 1951.<sup>22</sup> The Council of Ministers, chaired by Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, took the decision on Kazakhs in Pakistan, India, and Kashmir on March 13, 1952. The Turkish government officially recognized them as refugees in Turkey.<sup>23</sup> Kazakhs arrived group after group in Turkey from September 1952 until April 1954. First, they settled in Zeytinburnu, Tuzla, and Sirkeci immigrant guesthouses in Istanbul. Two years later, they were settled in Manisa Salihli, Kayseri Develi, Niğde Altay Köyü, Nevşehir Aksaray, and Konya İsmil. Over time, livelihood difficulties in rural areas caused them to migrate again to Istanbul, especially to the town of Zeytinburnu, their first settlement area.<sup>24</sup>

An accurate accounting of Kazakh migration to the free world from the base of the Altay mountains is unknown. Various estimates range from 18 to 50 thousand. But the number of those who survived to reach Turkey was only 1,850, meaning that only one person of every ten Kazakhs who wanted to live freely could reach that goal. This immigration for the sake of freedom and the preservation of Kazakh and Muslim identity cost tens of thousands of martyrs.

As a result, we can say that the Kazakh exodus from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey took place in two waves. The first wave was the Kazakhs in Barköl, Qumul, and Altay regions during the period of Sheng Shicai, the Governor of Eastern Turkestan. This migration, starting in the mid-1930s, lasted 17 years and ranged over Gansu, Tibet, India, and Pakistan. In the second wave, Kazakhs emigrated because they did not accept the new regime in China after the Mao Revolution in 1949.

These two immigration movements were certainly not conducted randomly. On the premise of Kazakh leaders, they were carried out in a disciplined and collective manner according to characteristics of Turkic nomadic societies. In this respect, this migration is the latest in mass migration of Turks from Central Asia to the west, beginning from earlier B.C. periods. Kazakh migration leaders' determination of Turkey as the ultimate destination was not accidental but a conscious choice. With

<sup>21</sup> Qara, "Altaydan Anatóliyağa." For the text of the letter written by Ateyhan Bilgin, the secretary of the association, to the Kazakhs in Kashmir, see Oraltay, *Elim-aylap*, 187–88.

<sup>22</sup> M. Rıza Bekin, *Doğu Türkistan Vakfı Başkanı M. Rıza Bekin'in Anıları* (İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi, 2005), 46.

<sup>23</sup> Gayretullah, *Altaylarda*, 85.

<sup>24</sup> Qara, "Altaydan Anatóliyağa."

its common language, religion, culture, and history, Turkey was the only country where the Kazakhs did not feel themselves to be foreigners and where their future generations would not lose their national identity.

Consequent to these migrations, Kazakh diasporas emerged in several countries: Turkey, Austria, England, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Now, after Kazakhstan's independence, some Kazakh families are returning to their homeland. Their estimated number is about ten thousand. Kazakhstan's private immigrant policy is gradually following the order of five million inhabitants abroad. In about 40 countries is the world's scattered Kazakh diaspora,<sup>25</sup> among which those in Turkey consider themselves the happiest because they feel peaceful in all material and spiritual aspects.

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**Chapter 2**  
**Uyghur Immigrations from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey**  
**between 1949 and 1954**

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**Abstract**

This study addresses one of the most dramatic migration incidents that occurred after 1949. After the communist Chinese regime invaded Eastern Turkestan in 1949, prominent Eastern Turkestan leaders decided at various meetings to quit their homeland to talk about their cause in the free world and to get their voices heard. Many people lost their lives, froze to death, or had to return because of the difficult immigration conditions they encountered during the course of their journey. Those who were able to escape to India feverishly worked to enter Turkey. Although tens of thousands of people departed Eastern Turkestan, only 1,850 immigrants could overcome difficulties and were granted residence permits by Turkey. Those who were able to enter Turkey were placed in Istanbul, and subsequently in Manisa, Kayseri, and Niğde.

**Key Words:** Uyghur, migration, refugee, Eastern Turkestan, Turkey.

**Özet**

Bu çalışma ile; 1949 sonrası yaşanan tarihin en dramatik göç hadiseleri ele alınmıştır. 1949 yılında Doğu Türkistan'da Komünist Çin istilasının gerçekleşmesi üzerine, Doğu Türkistanlı ileri gelen liderler yaptıkları birkaç toplantıdan sonra davalarını hür dünyada anlatmak ve seslerini duyurabilmek için vatanlarından hicret etmeye karar vermişlerdi. Tarihin en dramatik göç hadisesi olarak

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nitelendirilebilecek bu yolculuk sırasında birçok insan hayatını kaybetmiş, birçok insan donarak ölmüş, birçoğu zorlu göç şartlarına dayanamayarak geri dönmek zorunda kalmıştır. Hindistan'a ulaşabilenler ise Türkiye'ye gidebilmek için hummalı bir çalışma içerisinde girmiştir. 10 binlerce kişi ile başlanan göç hadisesi Türkiye'ye 1,850 Doğu Türkistanlı'nın iskânlı göçmen olarak kabul edilmesiyle son bulmuştur. Türkiye'ye gelebilenler ise başta İstanbul olmak üzere, Manisa, Kayseri ve Niğde illerine yerleştirilmiştir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Uyghur, göç, mülteci, Doğu Türkistan, Türkiye

## 1. Introduction

Attacks by the Kyrgyz around the mid 800's forced the Uyghurs to leave their homeland in large numbers and to migrate to major trade centers of Asia. They established two states named Eastern Turkestan (Turfan) Uyghur State and Gansu (Yellow Uyghur) Uyghur State in the places where they migrated. Thirteen Uyghur tribes initially scattered to the west of the Yellow River and then to the border of China after being defeated by the Kyrgyz. The Uyghurs, who could not remain in that area because of Chinese and Kyrgyz repression, established the longest-lasting state of Eastern Turkestan around Turfan and Beshbalik.<sup>1</sup> Led by rulers titled *Idikut*, Eastern Turkestan Uyghur State was established on the Silk Road route, a location that enabled the economic progress of the Uyghurs and also assisted in the community's development in agriculture, art, trade, state administration, and literature. However, the Eastern Turkestan Uyghur State was demolished in 1209 by the Mongols, which was then broken into various branches.<sup>2</sup> The Uyghurs have since established various nationhoods: the Saidiye National State (Yarkand Khanate) was instituted in 1514; the Kashgar State was established in 1863 by Sadık Beg, and with Yaqub Beg's leadership it became a united regional state; and independent Eastern Turkestan states came into being in 1933 and 1944. Uyghurs living in various countries have been obliged to live through numerous immigration incidents in this long period as other Turkish tribes.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Özkan İzgi, "Kao-Chang (Turfan) Uygurları," *Tarihte Türk Devletleri* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü Yayınları, 1987), 1: 235.

<sup>2</sup> Mehmet Emin Buğra, *Şarkî Türkistan Tarihi* (Ankara: Ofset Matbaacılık, 1987), 238 vd.

<sup>3</sup> Ömer Kul, "Osman Batur ve Doğu Türkistan Millî Mücadelesi (1911-1955)" (doktora tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2009), 23.

## 2. Great Migration from Eastern Turkestan in 1949

Burhan Shahidi, the President of the government of Eastern Turkestan, surrendered when the Chinese People's Liberation Army invaded Eastern Turkestan in October 1949 and the nationhood's leaders were forced to disperse to various corners of the world. The country was once again exposed to Chinese occupation<sup>4</sup> and Eastern Turkestan encountered many difficulties in this period, which marked a return to the circumstances faced for centuries: migration, exile, and struggle.<sup>5</sup>

At various meetings organized to evaluate the political climate, Muslim-Turkish leaders living in Eastern Turkestan decided collectively in September 1949 to move to foreign countries. Mehmet Emin Buğra, Canımhan Hacı, İsa Yusuf Alptekin, Nurgocay Batur, and Adil Bey, a deputy of Osman Batur, attended the meeting.<sup>6</sup> Two opinions were put forward with regard to the proposed migration. Buğra and Alptekin pointed out that motorized vehicles could be used up to the borderline to India or Pakistan. After crossing the borders, the journey would have to continue on horses so that the movement would be faster on the difficult mountain terrain. According to the opinions of this group, the elderly and the children would not be able to endure the hardships of a passage accomplished entirely on horses, and that more casualties were certain if the mountain route was chosen. The group headed by Canımhan Hacı defended the idea of migration on horses and argued that if the motorized vehicles were employed on the plains, the communists would be better placed to catch up with the migrants.<sup>7</sup> The discussions on the migration route did not take long and soon, the Muslim-Turkish leaders of Eastern Turkestan reached a consensus on taking two different routes: the mountains, and the plains. Accordingly, they began to prepare for migration in the shortest time possible.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Gülçin Çandaroğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu: Nurgocay Batur'un Anlarıyla Osman Batur* (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006), 14; Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Millî Mücadeleleri Tarihi*, 2. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), 329; Hızırбек Gayretullah, "Osman Batur ve Millî Mücadelesi," *Altay Kartalı Osman Batur*, haz., Hızırбек Gayretullah, Ahmet Türköz ve M. Ali Engin (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği, 2003), 43.

<sup>5</sup> Kul, "Osman Batur," 342.

<sup>6</sup> Altan Deliorman, Abdülkadir Donuk ve İsa Kocakaplan, haz., *Türklük Mücahidi İsa Yusuf* (İstanbul: Bayrak Basımevi, 1991), 52; Erkin Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan Hicretimizin 40. Yılı* (Kayseri: Erciyes Dergisi Doğu Türkistan Yayınları, 1992), 6; Kul, "Osman Batur," 361.

<sup>7</sup> Tekin Tuncer, "1949-1964 Yılları Arasında Doğu Türkistan'da İstiklal Mücadelesi ve Türkiye'ye Yapılan Göçler" (doktora tezi, Celal Bayar Üniversitesi, 2015), 224.

<sup>8</sup> Dälelkhan Zhanaltay, *Qili Zaman – Qiin Kunder* (Almaty: Düniezhüzi Qazaqtarınıng Qauımdastıghı, 2000), 85 vd.; Çandaroğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu*, 141; Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan*, 6.

It is understood from this information that the Muslim-Turkish leaders of Eastern Turkestan commanded no force to fight against Tao Zhiyue and his supporters, the nationalist Chinese, the Soviet Union, and the Red Chinese communists. Hence, they decided to migrate and to struggle in foreign countries by means of alliances. After the decision to migrate was taken, Mehmet Emin Buğra left Urumqi on September 17, 1949 and İsa Yusuf Alptekin followed three days later.<sup>9</sup>

As the immigration movement occurred, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949, and the Red Chinese troops completed its invasion of Eastern Turkestan on October 13, 1949.<sup>10</sup>

As already mentioned, the immigration determination had already been taken and it was decided that the cause of Turkestan would be continued in the free world when the Communist occupation began in Eastern Turkestan in 1949. Two routes were set for the movement. The group led by Buğra and Alptekin made their way through the plains, and the followers led by Osman Batur, Canımhan Hacı, and Alibek Rahimbek Hâkim used mountain roads.<sup>11</sup> An essential period of exile began for the salvation of people. Buğra and Alptekin's troop achieved the aim of leaving their country after grueling experiences, but the migration of Osman Batur and his followers faced even more difficult events and armed conflicts. Although the right-wing opposition to Chinese communists was controlled by the capture of Osman Batur and the immigration of Mehmet Emin Buğra, İsa Yusuf Alptekin, Delilhan Canalay, Yolbars Beg, Alibek Hâkim and Hüseyin Teyci, rebellions against the Chinese continued in the country.<sup>12</sup> Unlike the previous uprising against communism, these revolts were characteristically against Chinese administration.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Ömer Kul, haz., *Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin: İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2010), 1: 539 vd.; Tuncer, "1949-1964 Yılları Arasında," 225.

<sup>10</sup> Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Cemiyeti, *Türkistan Şehitleri* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1969), 44. Başaran claims that Communists began to poison the water resources to capture the Turks; however, information about this is not available in other sources. Mustafa Başaran, "Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Kahramanı Osman Batur İslamoğlu (1899-1951)," (bitirme tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Umumi Türk Tarihi Kürsüsü, 1972), 22.

<sup>11</sup> Tuncer, "1949-1964 Yılları Arasında," 225.

<sup>12</sup> Çandaroğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu*, 203.

<sup>13</sup> George Moseley, *A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 15; *Moslem Unrest in China* (Kowloon [Hong Kong]: Union Press, 1958), 51-52; Oleh S. Fedysyn, "Soviet Retreat in Sinkiang?: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and Cooperation, 1950-1955," *American Slavonic and East European Review* 16, no. 2 (1957): 127-45.

After departing from Urumqi, Mehmet Emin Buğra, and İsa Yusuf Alptekin arrived at Ladak via Kashgar, Kök-Art, Körlen, and Sanju road. They faced many difficulties on the way: Buğra and Alptekin were arrested by the border police station and were hung with bound hands and feet for the whole night. Buğra and Alptekin had planned to leave Eastern Turkestan with official permission, but despite all their efforts, their passports were deemed invalid and they were subjected to great pressure to return. Many died on the road in the course of the migration; numerous people contracted frost-bite and gangrene; several could not stand the difficult conditions of the journey and returned. Alptekin's eldest daughter Yalkın, had gangrene from the cold, and although she was operated and her left foot was amputated after to the group's arrival in India, she could not be saved.<sup>14</sup>

In 1949, after the communist Chinese troops reached Gansu and the Chinese General Tao surrendered to the communist Chinese without even shooting a single bullet, the balance of power in Eastern Turkestan underwent a sea change. Eastern Turkestanies held several meetings to discuss what action to take under these circumstances. They ultimately decided collectively to migrate from the country. Hence, Eastern Turkestanies began the process of seeking asylum in India under the leadership of prominent Eastern Turkestan leaders. Osman Batur, Canımhan Hacı, Nurgocay Batur, and Delilhan Canaltay formed one group, and Alibek Hâkim assembled another unit. The migration movement started after this immigration decision was taken in 1949. The goal of these groups was to reach the Gasköl region in northwest Qinghai and to mobilize by joining Hüseyin Teyci who had settled in the region in the course of the 1937–1938 migration movement.<sup>15</sup> Yet another branch of migration was the faction headed by İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra.<sup>16</sup> Troops that completed their preparations began the journey to India as their first destination.

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on these issues, see Ömer Kul, haz., *Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin: İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları* (Ankara: Berikan yayınevi, 2010), 1: 550 vs.

<sup>15</sup> Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1975), 202; Godfrey Lias, *Kazak Türklerinin Destanı* (İstanbul: Kuşak Ofset, 1992), 90; Orhan Türkdoğan, "Bir Kazak Halk Kahramanı: Ali Beg Hâkim," *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi*, sy. 133 (1998): 9; Godfrey Lias, *Göç*, çev., Mehmet Çağrı (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1973), 207.

<sup>16</sup> Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 1: 554; Mehmet Emin Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan: Tarihi, Coğrafi ve Şimdiki Durumu* (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1952), 68; Abdullah Bakır, *Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketi ve Mehmet Emin Buğra* (İstanbul: Özrenk Matbaası, 2005), 92; Lias, *Göç*, 210; Hacı Yakup Anat, *Hayatım ve Mücadelem*, haz., Soner Yalçın (Ankara: Özkan Matbaacılık, 2003), 89; Hızırбек Gayretullah, *Uzaklara Balam* (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 2009), 105.

The routes taken by the migrants were filled with distressing encounters that challenged both the human body and mind. Superhuman effort was required to overcome the Himalayas, the world's tallest and longest mountain range, with the baggage, mounts, children as well as elderly people. The roads comprised mostly of high mountains, deep cliffs, and intermittent valleys. Sometimes, the temperatures were inhuman and decreased to -45 degrees. Many people died by reasons such as stenocardia, shortness of breath, etc. when passing the high terrains of the Himalayas. Since there was no food or drink available on the way, animals nibbled rope, canvas, rugs, and comforters.

Even though it was so difficult, many of the groups arrived in India.<sup>17</sup> The greatest help in reaching India was made by Kazakh brethren who had previously settled in India. The Indian Government, the Indian Red Cross Society, the Kashmir Government, and the World Council of Churches also provided food and accommodation to immigrants arriving in Kashmir.<sup>18</sup> For example, the expenses of 400 immigrants who arrived in 1949 were covered by the Kashmir Government from the border of India to Srinagar, by the Indian Government from Kashmir to Bombay, and by the World Council of Churches from Bombay to the border of Turkey as the immigrants were finally intent on reaching Turkey.<sup>19</sup>

The Indian state liberated itself from British colonial rule and proclaimed its independence in 1947. Subsequently, the country was divided into India and Pakistan.<sup>20</sup> The Turks in India moved to the Pakistan side because they were Muslims and a Hindu-Muslim conflict followed the partition. The Eastern Turkestan migrants arrived in India in 1949 and met with Kazakh groups. İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra, who were arriving through Kashmir, received a message from the other leaders that they should apply for permission to go to Turkey because others before them had done so.

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<sup>17</sup> Orhan Türkdoğan, *Salihli'de Türkistan Göçmenlerinin Yerleşmeleri* (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969), 32; Lias, *Göç*, 317; Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan*, 98; Hızır Bek Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler* (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977), 218; Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 1: 598-599; Gayretullah, *Uzaklara Balam*, 134.

<sup>18</sup> A. Kayyum Kesici, "Doğu Türkistanlı Kazak Türklerinin Türkiye'ye Göçünün 50. Yılı Münasebetiyle-II," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Tarih Dergisi*, sy. 195 (2003): 21; "Doğu Türkistan'dan Kanlı Göçler," *Türk Dünyası*, sy. 7 (1967): 7.

<sup>19</sup> "Doğu Türkistan'dan," 8.

<sup>20</sup> Halife Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu'ya*, 2. bs. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1998), 406.

The former Chief Deputy Governor Mehmet Emin Buğra and the former General Secretary of Eastern Turkestan İsa Yusuf Alptekin escaped persecution by the communists by traveling to Kashmir and finally entered Turkey. They discussed the possibility of residence permits for the 1,850 Eastern Turkestan immigrants, who had found asylum in India and Pakistan, with the authorities of the Republic of Turkey. These migrants expected to enter Turkey on January 7, 1952.<sup>21</sup> The Eastern Turkestan committee visited Refik Koraltan, the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey; Fuat Köprülü, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the Minister of Finance, Hasan Polatkan; the Minister of Interior, Fevzi Lütüfi Karaosmanoğlu; the Minister of National Education, Tevfik İleri; and Haşım İşcan, the Director-General for Land and Settlement Affairs to inform them about the committee's intentions. The leaders of Eastern Turkestan also sent their requests in writing to the authorities on the recommendation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result of Fuat Köprülü's efforts, Eastern Turkestan refugees living in India and Pakistan were accepted and granted residence permits to Turkey by means of enactment of No. 3/14595, dated March 13, 1952, and necessary allowances were allocated for them.<sup>22</sup>

Many news reports were published in Turkish periodicals about the incoming immigrants from Kashmir. For example, the newspaper *Milliyet* reported that 103 immigrants who followed Hüseyin Teyci would soon arrive in Turkey. The same newspaper published that these 103 people set off under Hüseyin Teyci's leadership on October 28, 1952. The first immigrant group was placed in a house prepared for refugees on November 12.<sup>23</sup> A flood of other groups similarly continued to arrive and resettle. Eastern Turkestan immigrants brought to Istanbul were temporarily placed in immigrant guesthouses in Zeytinburnu, Sirkeci, and Tuzla. The dispatch of immigrants to the determined settlement areas was resolved and accomplished gradually between 1953 and 1958. In this period, the Directorate-General for Land and Settlement Affairs covered the expenses for the immigrants' needs. Later, Eastern Turke-

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<sup>21</sup> *Son Telgraf*, 7 Ocak 1952; Ömer Kul, haz., *Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin: İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2007), 2: 57; Bakır, *Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketi*, 104.

<sup>22</sup> Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 75; Zafer Selvi, Mansur Teyci ve Abdülvahap Kara, *Kazakların Doğu Türkistan'dan Anadolu'ya Göçü ve Osman Taştan* (İstanbul: Kazak Türkleri Vakfı, 1996), 55; Altay, *Anayurttan*, 420; Ahmet Fethi Ahmet Yüksel, "Peşaver Doğu Türkistanlı Kazak Muhacirler Derneği ve Yahya Kemal Beyatlı," *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Tarih Dergisi*, sy. 296 (2011): 23; Bakır, *Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketi*, 202.

<sup>23</sup> Altay, *Anayurttan*, 426; *Milliyet*, 2 Ağustos 1952; 28 Ekim 1952; 29 Kasım 1952.



stan migrants living in guesthouses were placed in various settlements. To detail the rehabilitation:

1. 201 people belonging to 59 families were sent to the Sultanah sub-district of Aksaray district of the Niğde Province.
2. 146 families comprising 468 people were settled in Salihli district of the Manisa Province.
3. A group of 104 families consisting of 344 people were housed in Sindelhöyük and Karacaviran villages of Develi district of the Kayseri Province and in Kopçu and Kocahacılı villages of Yahyalı district.
4. 545 people belonging to 160 families were rehabilitated in Altay village of Ulukışla district in the Niğde Province which thereafter came to be known as the homeland of the Eastern Turkestan immigrants.
5. 60 families comprising 238 people were placed in İsmil village in Karatay district of the Konya Province.
6. 35 people belonging to 11 families were rehoused in Ereğli district in Konya.
7. 10 people belonging to 2 families were placed in down-town Adapazarı.<sup>24</sup>

The Turkish administration decided that residence permits would be provided to 1,850 immigrants and 542 families, totaling 1,841 people who finally arrived in Turkey over the course of the migration. As of 1967, this number increased to 3,075 with the birth of 1,243 babies since the arrival of the migrants to Turkey.

### 3. Conclusion

When the migration incidents generally discussed in this paper are contemplated with respect to humanitarian concerns and to the conscientious responsibility of international political relations, catastrophic memories of thousands of people may be evaluated compassionately. All details of the negative results of migration have not been included in this paper in order to remain firmly on the stated topic. Whether or not the migration from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey should be named one of the most dramatic events of history should be sociologically assessed.

Briefly, the first group of immigrants moved to Turkey with great difficulty and effort on October 20, 1952. Generally, the mass exit from Eastern Turkestan is evaluated from the aspect of patriotism, as people were forced to leave their home-

<sup>24</sup> Tuncer, "1949-1964 Yılları Arasında," 303-4.

land and were obliged to deal with the negative consequences of their migration to Turkey. Even if this exodus is regarded to be the result of individual decision-making, the exile of human beings has not seen its final chapter. If international organizations fail to tackle such issues, there will probably be new waves of migration in the near future. Perhaps this study will enable a new point of view for researchers investing Eastern Turkestan since the migrations of 1965 and 1967 were assessed as a combined whole. Finally, future research initiatives must take into consideration the reasons why people quit their homeland, leaving properties, relatives, friends, and full lives without knowing whether or not they would ever get the opportunity to return to the country of their birth. Thus, urgent steps must be taken to find solutions to such socio-political issues.

**ATTACHMENTS (Please refer to pages 141–150)**

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Chapter 3  
**Kazakh Migrants and Soviet-Chinese Relations during the 1940s:  
A Background of Xinjiang Refugees to the Middle East**

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**Abstract**

This chapter discusses the influence of the Soviet Union on Kazakh emigration from the Xinjiang province of China during the 1940s–1950s, with a focus on those who immigrated to Turkey. The research presented here, based on archival research that centers the narratives of those in the Kazakh diaspora, considers the impact of the relationship between Ospan Batur, a renown Kazakh chieftain, and the Soviets, demonstrating the impact of Ospan-Soviet relations on driving Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang. In addition, this chapter examines Kazakh migrant networks and their self-identification as Kazakhs, Turks, Muslims, and Chinese. This chapter contributes to existing understandings of Kazakh migration during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century by establishing the regional and international conditions driving Kazakh emigration during this time.

**1. Introduction**

Turkey currently has several populations of Turkic migrants from Xinjiang, a northwest province in China, with such migrants primarily of Uyghur and Kazakh decent. Chapters 2 of this volume details the current state and activities of Uyghur migrants in Turkey. Building on such research, this chapter pays particular to the historical background of Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang, providing a historiographical survey of the factors that drove and shaped their migration during the 1940s and 1950s. These decades were characterized by a period of upheaval in Xinjiang, with

the emergence of the “second” Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the province bringing a degree of instability and foreign involvement to the region.

The considerable degree of multi-state involvement in the region – by the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Outer Mongolia, and China – suggests that any analysis of Kazakh migration during this period must consider the foreign policies of and relationships between actors both inside and outside of Xinjiang. Exploring the ever-evolving relationships between external actors and Kazakh migrants in Xinjiang also allows the changing political positions of Kazakh migrants much clearer.

This chapter focuses on the migration of Kazakh nomads, in part, because their nomadic lifestyle enabled cross-border migration of great distances. As this study is highly connected with modern Kazakhstan, the analysis presented here excludes the migration of other groups from consideration, such as the Uyghurs. This chapter considers the international context driving the migration of Kazakhs from the Altay region, in the north of Xinjiang, to Turkey. The research presented here focuses significantly on Ospan Islamüli (Osman Batur), a famous leader of the Altay Kazakhs who was executed by China’s People’s Liberation Army. As there is already significant research on his military activities,<sup>1</sup> this chapter makes clear the international context in which his activities took place, considering the impact of Soviet and the Republic of China’s governmental policies on Kazakh migration. This chapter argues that the Ospan-led Kazakh revolt against the Xinjiang local government in 1944–45 eventually prompted a second wave Kazakh emigration from Xinjiang that began in the early 1950s.<sup>2</sup>

Existing research on Kazakh migration during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century is lacking, in part, because of a large gap between Chinese and Russian accounts on the issue, divergent perspectives rooted in a narrow approach to archival analysis. This gap suggests the need for further integrative research on Kazakh migration during this period. To fill this gap in the literature, this study pays particular attention to viewpoints from the Kazakh diaspora, such as those found in the works of such

<sup>1</sup> For example, Linda Benson, “Osman Batur: The Kazak’s Golden Legend,” in *The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, eds. L. Benson; I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala University), 141–87. Details will be shown later.

<sup>2</sup> This group includes the Kazakhs led by Qūsayīn (Hüseýin) Taiji, who began to move earlier in 1930s. Also see Chapter 1. Roughly saying, the first migratory group includes those who began to migrate in the 1930s through Qinghai and Tibet into Kashmir in 1941, and they finally left for Turkey in 1953, while the second group fled into Kashmir in 1951, and moved to Turkey in 1952.

scholars like G. Mendikulova and N. Ablazhei.<sup>3</sup> The narratives of Kazakh migrants are worth analyzing because they touch on Kazakh migration to places outside of the Middle East, such as migration to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Above all, H. Altay and H. Gayretulla are the most famous figures who published their memoirs.<sup>4</sup>

After reviewing the perspectives found in existing archival research on the history of Kazakh migration, this chapter examines 1) the development of Kazakh troops as an initiative military power; 2) the Kazakhs' relations with various authorities including the Eastern Turkestan Republic, the Soviet Union, and the Guomindang Government of China (GMD) led by the Nationalist Party; and 3) the reason why Kazakhs emigrated from Xinjiang to places outside of Central Asia such as Taiwan, India, and Turkey.

## 2. Existing Archival Research on Kazakh Migration

Earlier archival studies on Kazakh migration have been conducted from the perspectives of the Republic of China (ROC) and Xinjiang provincial governments. Such research includes the work of L. Benson and D. Wang, both of whom relied on Chinese archival sources in their analyses.<sup>5</sup> The latest study by J. Jacobs similarly relies on Chinese archival material.<sup>6</sup> Other research from the Chinese perspective in-

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<sup>3</sup> G.M. Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspori: Proiskhozhdenie i razvitie* (Almaty: Ghilim, 1997); N.N. Ablazhei, *Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik "Kazakhstan-Sin'tsian": emigratsiia, repatriatsiia, integratsiia* (Novosibirsk: Izd-vo SO RAN, 2015), 16–17. For a different discourse, we can refer to the following: Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu ed. *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi* (Urumqi: Xinjiang daxue chubanshe, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> Halife Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu'ya* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1981); Hızırбек Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler* (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977). Matsubara well used the former, conducting the interviews with other migrants, see Masatake Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō: arutai sanmyaku kara toruko e 1934–1953* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2011). The work of Zhanaltay (Canaltay) can be included here, Dälelkhan Zhanaltay, *Qili zaman – Qiin künder* (Almaty: Düniezhüzi Qazaqtarining qauımdastighi, 2000). For the overview of Kazakh migration, see Äbdüuaqap Qara, *Qazaqtarding Türkiyagha köshı* (Almaty: Orkhon, 2016) and his Chpater 1 of this volume. Also see the Svanberg's discussion on the adaptation of Kazakhs in Turkey, Ingvar Svanberg, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey: A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> Linda Benson, *The Ili Rebellion the Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990); David Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow: The Yining Incident Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang 1944–1949* (Hong Kong, the Chinese University Press, 1999).

<sup>6</sup> Justin Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016). Also see his Chapter 5 of this volume.



cludes the study “A History of Migration of Xinjiang Kazakh People” published within China.<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, in such studies, the Eastern Turkestan Republic during 1940s was less evaluated. Importantly, the archival documents kept in the Academia Historica of Taiwan (*Guoshiguan*) still offer possibilities for further research.<sup>8</sup> The research presented in this chapter uses parts of political and administrative documents housed in this archive, including the writings of Kazakhs themselves regarding their migration. It is necessary to note, however, that such archival documents lack the correspondences of local Muslim populations.

In contrast, research from the Soviet perspective offers a viewpoint of the Soviet policy. Examples of such studies include those by Russian researcher A. Barmin and the recent scholarship of Azerbaijani scholar Dzh. Gasanli. Both scholars based their investigations on Soviet archival documents. Japanese scholar K. Terayama has also analyzed Soviet-Xinjiang relations in detail, utilizing Soviet archives, particularly those related to Stalin. He has also closely focused on the economic ties between USSR and Xinjiang.<sup>9</sup> Recent studies clearly indicate that Stalin had great interest in Xinjiang and that he changed USSR policies to withdraw government support to the Eastern Turkestan government and other Muslim polities. Research based on Mongolian archives, such as that of S. Rakhmetüli similarly reflects the Soviet perspective.<sup>10</sup>

Finally, Japanese scholars demonstrate several interesting tendencies in their research on Kazakh migration that are worth noting. Although the number of studies is sparse, their scholarly contributions are significant. For instance, A. Matsunaga’s earliest survey on the Kazakhs in Istanbul.<sup>11</sup> K. Higa’s interview with an Osipan Batur’s colleague explores the life history of the famous Kazakh leader. H. Abe’s fieldwork research offers another point of view on the eastward migration of Kazakhs from Xinjiang into the Qinghai province.<sup>12</sup> The important and comprehensive work by M. Matsubara follows the migratory route from Altay to Turkey beginning in 1934, featuring interviews from migrants themselves, including that of Kulanbay

<sup>7</sup> Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu ed. *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi*.

<sup>8</sup> It contains a lot of documents related with the policies of the Republicans of ROC.

<sup>9</sup> Dzhamil’ Gasanly, *Sin’ tshian v orbite sovetskoi politiki: Stalin i musul’ manskoe dvizhenie v Vostochnom Turkestane 1931–1949* (Moscow: FLINTA, 2015); Kyōsuke Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō: 1931–1949-nen* (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2015).

<sup>10</sup> Süraghan Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Osipan – Choybalsan: 1912–1949 zhzh*. (Astana: REGIS-ST poligraf, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> He conducted the interviews with the famous Kazakh migrant, Khalife Altay and others, see Akira Matsunaga, “Isutanbulu no kazafu jin,” *Isuramu sekai* 46 (1996), 17–33.

<sup>12</sup> Kiyota Higa, “Intabyū Osupan isuramu shōshi: bukadatta kazafujin eno intabyū,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 9 (2002), 34–45; Haruhira Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku,” *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 1 (2002), 21–36.

Nazır (Qūlanbay Nāzır). His monograph contains ethnographic descriptions and stories about Kazakh migration toward Turkey, drawing on information from British and Turkish archives as well.<sup>13</sup> Lastly, R. Ono, part of a younger generation of scholars, supplements existing Japanese research with an analysis of this issue from the viewpoint of the American diplomacy (see his Chapter 4).

A review of existing literature on Kazakh migration suggests that previous research has paid less attention to the fact that many states were involved in shaping Kazakh migration. Therefore, it is necessary to put historical discussions of this migration within the context of international relations and diplomacy taking place at the time. As this chapter shows, international pressure from outside entities was significantly responsible for the second wave of Kazakhs emigration during the 1940s and 1950s.

### 3. Kazakh Society in Xinjiang Prior to Mid-20<sup>th</sup> century Migration

In 19<sup>th</sup> century Xinjiang, each Kazakh tribe was led by members of the Kazakh Chinggisid nobility,<sup>14</sup> hereditary aristocrats who held the title of *Taiji* (Kaz: täyzhī) under the Qing rule. Despite the leadership of the Taiji nobility, each tribal division was administered by a Chief of thousand (*qianhu zhang*). While such social structure was mandatorily altered within the Russian territory, Kazakhs situated within the Qing Empire kept this social structure<sup>15</sup> even after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the subsequent fall of the Qing empire. Several scholars argue that these chiefs gradually replaced the hereditary *Taiji*,<sup>16</sup> pointing to, for example, chiefs such as Eliskhan, the Chief of Thousand who led later an emigrating group of Kazakhs out of Barköl. Nevertheless, even Chiang Kai-shek's government regarded the structure of Kazakh social groups as led by Taiji aristocrats.<sup>17</sup>

As Table 1 indicates, by 1945, there were approximately 438,575 Kazakh people living in the Xinjiang province. Part of this population had kinship ties not only

<sup>13</sup> Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*.

<sup>14</sup> Jin Noda, *The Kazakh Khanates between the Russian and Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2016).

<sup>15</sup> Jin Noda, "Crossing the Border, Transformation of Belonging, and "International" Conflict Resolution between the Russian and Qing Empires," in T. Onuma; D. Brophy; Y. Shinmen eds., *Xinjiang in the Context of Central Eurasian Transformations* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 2018), 59–77.

<sup>16</sup> Svanberg indicated the example of Kazakhs in the Northern Xinjiang, see Ingvar Svanberg, "The Nomadism of Orta žuz Kazaks in Xinjiang 1911–1949," in *The Kazaks of China: Essays on an Ethnic Minority*, eds. L. Benson and I. Svanberg (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1988), 120.

<sup>17</sup> Ma Lingyun reported that the several groups of Kazakhs were headed by *Taijis* (September, 1948), AH, 002-080200-00333-092.

within Xinjiang, but also with those living on the Soviet side of the region. Importantly, the Xinjiang border was never completely sealed, with gaps in the border allowing many Kazakh migrants to easily move beyond the Chinese border.

Nationality	Population
Uyghurs	2,988,528
Taranchi	79,296
Kazakhs	438,575
Hui	99,607
Kirghiz	69,923
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,675,929</b>

**Table 1:** Population of Muslim Minority Groups in Xinjiang in 1945<sup>18</sup>

After the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and the overthrow of the Qing empire in 1912, the Xinjiang province became a semi-independent territory under Republic of China (ROC) rule. While under ROC administration, Xinjiang experienced two national movements. The creation of the first Eastern Turkestan Republic (ETR) (1933–1934) represented an initial attempt to secure independence for those of Turkic descent. While this movement did not have serious effects on Kazakhs living in Xinjiang, the oppressive provincial government lead by Sheng Shicai subsequently established policies that were highly anti-Kazakh in nature.<sup>19</sup> As a result, a portion of the nomadic Kazakh population were forced to move out of the province during the 1930s.<sup>20</sup>

This cohort of Kazakh emigrants is referred to here as the “first migratory group.” This first group of migrants began emigrating from Barköl, undertaking a series of treks around the Gansu and Qinghai provinces that ultimately led them on a perilous journey from Tibet to India. In contrast, the second Kazakh migratory group began of its journey out of Qinghai at the end of 1950. It is this group that is of chief concern for this study. The following sections attempt to illuminate the international and local factors that prompted the emergence of the second migratory group and shaped the nature of the migration that occurred.

<sup>18</sup> Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, 30.

<sup>19</sup> Ō Ka [Wang Ke], *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū: Chūgoku no isuramu to minzoku mondai* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1999), 179.

<sup>20</sup> For instance, the criticism to Sheng Shicai, governor of the Province, by Dälekhan Haji (Zhanımkanūli) on June 1, 1948 (from Social Ministry to Ministry of Foreign Affairs), AH: 020-012600-0018, 154.

## 4. The Soviet Factor

### *Soviet Influence on Kazakh Migration*

In addition to pressure to emigrate from Republic of China authorities, the Soviet Union also influenced Kazakh migration significantly, an influence made clear from a review of archival documents. Since access to Soviet political archives are frequently limited, and documents issued by Stalin are kept under careful control, examining Soviet diplomatic relations with China during the 1940s and 1950s must be approached in an eclectic manner. While research by Azerbaijani scholar Gasanly has established the validity of previously opened Soviet archival material, this study addresses any deficiencies in Soviet archival documents through the study of Chinese documents that consider Soviet policies from additional viewpoints.

In 1945, soon after the establishment of the second Eastern Turkestan Republic (1944–1946), the Guomindang Government of China (GMD) tried to conciliate the Soviet authority for the stability in Xinjiang.<sup>21</sup> The Soviets declared that they did not have any interests in Xinjiang, a declaration that may have been related to the pro-Western sentiments of the GMD. Despite Soviet government suspicions of the pro-American and pro-British attitude of the GMD,<sup>22</sup> the Chinese government was rather optimistic about Soviet interest in Xinjiang.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the Soviet's professed lack of interest in the province,<sup>24</sup> recent historical scholarship has revealed that the second Eastern Turkestan Republic was under the full control of the Soviets, control driven partly by the Soviet's economic interests in Xinjiang.<sup>25</sup> A review of archival material suggests that the emergence of a second migratory group of Kazakhs was caused by the collapse of the second ETR, with their migration indirectly caused by the Soviet Union's influence in the province. That is, it generated anti-Soviet group of Kazakhs. This indirect impact can be seen through an analysis of the role of Ospan Batur in Xinjiang during the 1940s.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 225.

<sup>22</sup> Xue Xiantian, *Zhongguo guanxi shi: 1945–1949* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2003), 272.

<sup>23</sup> Suspicion and optimistic comment shown by a US diplomat Harry Hopkins, June 13, 1945, AH, 002-020300-00048-025.

<sup>24</sup> Ō, *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū*, 206.

<sup>25</sup> Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō*, 561. While the official Soviet-Xinjiang trade was suspended, the border trade in Northern Xinjiang still continued. It is also inevitable to consider the Soviet interest in Xinjiang's natural resource.

<sup>26</sup> For his activity in this time, see Benson, "Osman Batur"; Ömer Kul, *Osman İslamoğlu'ndan Osman Batur Han'a 1941–1951: On Yıla Sığan Efsanevi Ömür* (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği, 2011).

### *Soviet Influence on the Leadership of Ospan Batur*

Ospan was from the Altay region and, importantly, was of non-Chinggisid origin. Despite his lack of noble status, he led a group of Kazakhs in Altay to rebel against the Sheng Shicai-led government of Xinjiang. By 1948, an estimated 3,700 Kazakh households were under Ospan's authority.<sup>27</sup> In August, 1945, he joined the second ETR, a movement that was part of the first phase of the Three Districts Revolution (*Sanqu geming*). During negotiations between the ETR and GMD, Ospan defected from the ETR side and began fighting against the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Mao Zedong, a party that would go on to establish the People's Republic of China (PRC). Towards the end of his life, Ospan was caught by the CPC's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and executed on April 29, 1951.

Ospan's influence is important to consider when examining Kazakh migration to the Middle East, as it was his fight against the PLA that led directly to the mass emigration of Kazakhs from places in northern Xinjiang such as Barköl, the Altay region, and elsewhere. Many Kazakh migrants ended up in Indian territory (i.e. Kashmir), while Ospan himself was not authorized leave the region.

Previous research, especially research from the Soviet perspective, has emphasized the negative influence of Ospan for the ETR and his refusal to support the Communist position. In contrast, this study demonstrates how Soviet policy greatly influenced the activity of Ospan and, by extension, Kazakh migration.<sup>28</sup>

It is important to recognize that the Soviets initially supported Ospan's anti-GMD actions.<sup>29</sup> After Sheng Shicai's government shifted toward anti-Soviet policies

<sup>27</sup> Ma Lingyun's report mentions the 3,700 tents under Ospan, AH, 002-080200-00333-092. The figure of the other source is 1,200 tents in 1947, Benson, *The Ili Rebellion*, 135.

<sup>28</sup> Personal sides of Ospan were already examined by following works, Benson, "Osman Batur"; Justin Jacobs, "The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned: Osman Batur, Chinese Decolonization, and the Nationalization of a Nomad," *American Historical Review*, 115, no. 5 (2010): 1291–1314; Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*. Contrastively, this paper will try to locate the activity of Ospan in the contemporary international relations.

<sup>29</sup> The report by Sheng Shicai in 1950 mentioned the support from the Soviet side in 1943, see Waijiaobu ed., *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu-jiewu lei: Xinjiang juan* (Taipei: Waijiaobu, 2001), 1: 46. Also see Sergey Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," *Inner Asia* 11, no. 2 (2009): 252–53. There were frequent meetings between Choibalsan and Ospan, which meant the seduction from the Soviets via Mongolia, see Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Bold and Kh. Bat-Ochiryn Tuiaa, *Ospan khén baiv: Mongol barimt yuu ögüülév* (Ulaanbaatar: Nikel' Dekel' KhKhK, 2011). For relations between Ospan and Choibalsan in 1945, see V.A. Barmin, *Sin'tsian v sovetsko-kitaiskikh otnosheniakh 1941–1949 gg.* (Barnaul: Barnaul'skii gosudarstvennyi pedagogicheskii universitet, 1999), 106. In addition, the GMD and the Soviets simultaneously tried to induce Ospan to their own side in 1945, Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State*, 160. Ospan regarded himself as a khan and behaved as if independent (in around 1945), Terayama, *Sutārin to Shinkyō*, 555.

in 1942, the Soviets attempted to seek the support of Kazakhs, by way of Mongolia, for anti-GMD government action. After the second ETR government was created in 1944, the Xinjiang provincial coalition government was born in 1946. At that time, Ospan took part in the newly established coalition government as a minister without a portfolio.<sup>30</sup> Ospan then aligned with Dälelkhan Sügürbaev, another Kazakh leader who was pro-Communist and based in Outer Mongolia. The Soviets reformulated their foreign policy, shifting their support from Ospan to Sügürbaev. As a result, Ospan developed a hostile attitude towards the Soviets. According to Soviet archives housed at the Wilson Center, the shift in Soviet policy away from Ospan was the result of a decision made within the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.<sup>31</sup>

### *The Impact of Soviet-Chinese Relations*

Soviet relations with Xinjiang during this period were challenged by what became known as the Beitashan Incident of June 1947, a border conflict in the northern part of Xinjiang between the Outer Mongolian government and the GMD.<sup>32</sup> Frequently referenced in historical writings, this incident was viewed as a border invasion initiated by Outer Mongolia and supported by Soviet authorities,<sup>33</sup> although both sides claimed the incident was based on the opponent's initiative. While the Soviet government officially denied its involvement in the incident almost immediately,<sup>34</sup> documentation from the Soviet Consulate in Nanjing also suggests that the Soviets believed that Ospan and his troops had crossed over the border from Xinjiang side.<sup>35</sup> Thus, the incident occurred on the delicate balance among the GMD government, pro-ETR groups, the Soviet Union, and the Kazakhs led by Ospan.<sup>36</sup>

The GMD embraced the interpretation of the Beitashan Incident as a Soviet-

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<sup>30</sup> Benson, "Osman Batur," 175.

<sup>31</sup> The decision of the Politburo, TsK KPSS in 24<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1947 (originally in RGASPI: f. 17, op. 162, d. 38, ll. 154–55, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121809>, accessed February 1, 2019). Also see Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 273 and 297.

<sup>32</sup> The earliest detailed research was conducted by Forbes, see Andrew D.W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 214. The Soviet historiography much insisted on the US and GMD's initiative, Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 277.

<sup>33</sup> For example, Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*, 254–55.

<sup>34</sup> For example, FRUS, 571.

<sup>35</sup> June 12, AH, 002-080200-00317-035. Also see Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 277.

<sup>36</sup> The confidential telegram of Song Xilian, the Xinjiang Garrison Commander, explained Ospan's relations with other powers, mentioning Kazakhs' anti-communism attitude on June 9, 1947, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu*, 2: 318.

supported border invasion by Outer Mongolia, and thus took a firm stance in subsequent diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets and Mongolia.<sup>37</sup> Chiang Kai-shek went as far as to recommend that the GMD should assist the Kazakh army led by Ospan through weapons procurement and other assistance. The ex-Chairman of the Government of Xinjiang Province, Zhang Zhizhong, reported from Urumqi (*Dihua*) that GMD troops in Beitashan were sent specifically to aid Ospan's army. He highly suspected that the Soviets drove the Mongol army to invade Chinese territory.<sup>38</sup> As T. Yoshida explains, the GMD intended to internationalize the incident, forcing the United States to understand it was a violation by the Soviet Union of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.<sup>39</sup> While further consideration of the complex background of the Beitashan Incident is beyond the scope of this chapter, the incident demonstrates the interest of the Xinjiang provincial government at the time in using Ospan and his military power against the USSR, creating an obstacle for Soviet involvement in the Altay region and thus prompting a shift in relations between Choibalsan, the Prime Minister of the Mongol People's Republic, and Ospan.<sup>40</sup>

It is clear that the GMD intended to offer assistance to Ospan, despite lacking an official coalition with him.<sup>41</sup> According to S. Rakhmetüli, a Kazakh scholar from Mongolia, analysis of Mongolian archival material indicates that the GMD, led by Zhang Zhizhong, was significantly concerned about the power and initiative of Ospan's army, which might pose a threat to the GMD.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, the GMD,

<sup>37</sup> The policy of Chiang Kai-shek, June 13, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00317-019. Besides, Chiang required the avoidance of the head-on clash. Shortly before the incident, Chiang indicated his will to support Ospan, May 3, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-040.

<sup>38</sup> June 12, AH, 002-090400-00009-417. The GMD side always tried to collect the information on the reaction of the Soviet side, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an*, 2: 260.

<sup>39</sup> Toyoko Yoshida, "Tenkanki kokuminseifu no taiso seisaku to amerika: 1947nen nakaba," in *Chūgoku shakai shugi bunka no kenkyū*, ed. by Y. Ishikawa (Kyoto: Kyoto Univ. Institute for Research in Humanities, 2010), 481. In this regard, D. Wang previously regarded, "The Beitashan Incident provided the GMD government a basis for an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist campaign," Wang, *Under the Soviet Shadow*, 275.

<sup>40</sup> Meeting of Choibalsan and Molotov was held on September 30, 1947 to discuss even the murder of Ospan, see Radchenko, "Choibalsan's Great Mongolia Dream," 253; Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 297.

<sup>41</sup> The involvement of the GMD is still under discussion, see V.A. Barmin, "Sobytiia Mongolo-Kitaiskogo voozruzhionnogo konflikta 2–8 iunia 1947 goda v zapadnoi istoriografii i istochnikakh tsentral'nykh arkhivov Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Vestnik Altaiskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta* 18 (2014): 19–24; Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 295. See also FRUS, 573.

<sup>42</sup> Rakhmetüli, *XX ghasir. Ospan – Choybalsan*, 246. Here, Dälekhan Sügürbaev highly warned to Zhang Zhizhong the menace of Ospan. Zhang Zhizhong's pro-Soviet attitude should be considered as well, A.M. Ledovskii et al. eds., *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, Vol. 5 book 1 (1946–fevral' 1950) (Moscow: Pamiatniki istoricheskoi mysli, 2000), 336.

from Zhang Zhizhong's perspective, expected the military abilities of Ospan's troops to present a formidable obstacle to the ETR and USSR.<sup>43</sup> An anonymous report on the situation in Xinjiang suggests that not only did the GMD authority recognize the significance of the Ospan's military force, but the American consul at Urumqi, John Hall Paxton,<sup>44</sup> did as well.<sup>45</sup> The former-ETR side, especially Sūgırbaev, also expected to use Ospan's force.<sup>46</sup>

As relations worsened between Ospan and the Soviets, Ospan became politically independent from any established authority involved in the region.<sup>47</sup> Consequently, he could accept various groups including Dälelkhan, Sūltanshärıp, Nurghozhay, Yolbaris Khan from Uyghurs.<sup>48</sup> Those who joined his army as well as those following his leadership began emigrating out of Xinjiang.

In summation, the Soviet Union exercised both positive and negative effects for Kazakh migrants. On the one hand, the Soviet authority through the ETR indirectly pushed the Kazakhs from northern Xinjiang, which the case of Ospan well reflected. On the other hand, a portion of the Kazakh migrants after the establishment

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<sup>43</sup> Telegram from Zhang to Chiang Kai-shek, October 30, 1948, AH, 002-080-101-00054-011, 7. Zhang mentioned the usage of the army of Ospan to confront with the ETR group.

<sup>44</sup> For his later activity, see Chapter 4 by Ono. Ospan's anti-communist stance motivated American diplomats to stay in contact with Ospan, and these diplomats tried to support Kazakh groups to fight against the ETR authorities. U.S. diplomat D. Mackiernan played a significant role in structuralizing relations with Ospan, see A.K. Kamalov, "Amerikanskaia diplomatiia v Sin'tsziane: Zakrytie konsul'stva i sud'ba poslednikh predstavitelei SSHa v Urumchi Dzh. Pakstona i D. Makirmana," *Izvestiia Natsional'noi Akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan*, no. 1 (2012): 61–69; Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler*, 96. As a well-known fact, on June 19, 1947, Paxton dispatched Mackiernan to Ospan, FRUS, 567. Later in 1948, Mackiernan again met with Ospan and Zhanımkan (Canımhan), Higa, "Intabyū Osupan isulamu shōshi," 42.

<sup>45</sup> In 1947, AH, 002-080101-00054-010.

<sup>46</sup> His letter to Ospan, August 20, 1949, Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shi bianxuezu, *Xinjiang hasake zu qianxi shiqianxi shi*, 267.

<sup>47</sup> Barmin, "Sobytiia Mongolo-Kitaiskogo vooruzhyonnogo konflikta," 10. According to Barmin, General Song Xilian mentioned that the troops of Ospan were not under the full-control of the GMD. In other words, Ospan and his army were in a distance from the GMD, while previous researchers considered that Ospan was fully in the pro-GMD side by the Beitashan incident.

<sup>48</sup> Gasanly, *Sin'tszian v orbite sovetskoi politiki*, 329. Since October, 1949, people from various standpoints like Sūltanshärıp (Sultan Şerif), Nurghozhay, Yolbaris, Russian White Armirs, and some Dungan groups, gathered to Barköl where Ospan and Zhanımkan stationed, see G.M. Mendikulova, *Istoricheskoe i sovremennoe razvitie kazakhskoi diaspori i irredenty* (Almaty: Qazaq universiteti, 2016), 162–63. A part of them, on May 17, 1950, left for the lake Gasköl (Today's *Gasikule*), located at the west of Qinghai bordering the Xinjiang province. Among them were Dälelkhan Zhanaltay and Qalibek, who finally joined Hüseysin Täyzhı there. See Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud'by kazakhskoi diaspori*, 150. Also see Chapter 1.



of the second ETR fled into the United Soviet Socialist Republic with the approval of the Soviet government.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the Soviet Union both caused the second wave of Kazakh emigration as well as sought to assist Kazakh refugees.

## 5. Chinese Influence on Kazakh Migration

Other factors than Soviet Union influence shaped the second wave of Kazakh migration as well. The Republic of China also played a role in shaping Kazakh migration, particularly through the activity of the Chinese Muslim Association, which was under GMD authority.<sup>50</sup> The Nationalist Party took responsibility and care for Kazakh refugees in Pakistan, as their homeland had to be China. Even after the ROC was expelled from the Chinese mainland and fled to Taiwan after Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China, the GMD tried to maintain relations with Kazakh migrants in Pakistan and Turkey through the China Mainland Relief Organization.<sup>51</sup> The GMD was concerned with the first migrant group too with payment to India for Kazakh migrant debt which occurred during their stay in India, expressing such concerns through the Overseas Community Affairs Council based in Taiwan. Here, it is important to note that the GMD authority in Taiwan aimed to recover its lost power at the hands of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>52</sup> As a result, the GMD government in Taiwan continuously kept contact with the Kazakh migrants out of Xinjiang and tried to position them on the pro-GMD side.

## 6. Ethno-nationalist Networks and Kazakh Migration

In addition to Soviet and Chinese influence on Kazakh migration, migrant networks also played a role in shaping the history of Kazakh migration. After 1949, as Kazakh migrants gradually migrated out of Xinjiang, these migrants engaged significantly with the cultural networks of the region. These networks had various dimensions, including an ethno-nationalist one.

During the Sheng Shicai era, particularly during the 1940s, Kazakhs struggled for cultural autonomy. In 1934, the Kazakh-Kyrgyz Association for the promotion of

<sup>49</sup> Ablazhei, *Kazakhskii migratsionnyi maiatnik*, 63–69. Also see Ledovskii, *Sovetsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia*, 359. For the 1,400 Kazakhs who moved into the Soviet territory through Tarbaghatay in 1945, see AH, 020-021904-0001.

<sup>50</sup> The president of the Association visited Peshawar to the Xinjiang refugees in 1943, AH, 020-011908-0037, 077. The name of All-Turkestan Muslim Union was also found in a document (May, 1951), AH, 020-011908-0040.

<sup>51</sup> Request and aid regarding Kalibek and others in 1952, AH, 020-069911-0008. For the invitation from Taiwan, see Chapter 5.

<sup>52</sup> In 1946–47, AH, 020-012600-0017, 99 and 103. Request for aid by the first migrant group of Kazakhs at Bhopal, AH, 020-012600-0018.

the culture was established under the instruction of Burhan Shahidi (*Bao'erhan*).<sup>53</sup> Importantly, the Association did not always consider the needs of all Kazakhs living in Xinjiang. For example, when discussing the rights of Kazakhs, the discourse of Aqit Ülemji was often restricted to the rights of Kazakhs within the Altay region.<sup>54</sup> Nonetheless, on February 25, 1947, under the rule of the coalition government, Kazakh, Hui Muslims, and Han Chinese associations demonstrated in Urumqi for their rights.<sup>55</sup>

Such demonstrations increased incrementally. According to a telegram to Chiang Kai-shek, a conference of the Kazakh Association promoting the advancement of Kazakh rights was held at Urumqi in October 1947, led by Kazakh politician Salishi (Salis Ermeküli).<sup>56</sup> During this time, according to Zhang Zhizhong, conflict between Kazakhs and Uyghurs escalated.<sup>57</sup> There existed a clear ethnic distinction between Kazakhs and Uyghurs and the ethno-nationalist movements during this time period solidified Kazakhs ethnic identity more firmly than ever. One researcher even stated the Uyghur chauvinism during the second ETR.<sup>58</sup> Such a situation might be one of the reasons of corruption within the ETR regime and the subsequent fall of the coalition government.

In the context of such movements for cultural autonomy, Kazakh ethno-nationalism served as a contributing factor of Kazakh migration. Emigration from

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<sup>53</sup> Asaiyin Jiakesileke, "Wo suo zhidao de yili ha, ke wenhua zujinhui," *Yili wenshi ziliao* (Yining: Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Yili hasake zizhizhou weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, 2009) 6–10: 344–7. Practically, it was established in 1935 Sep. The Association had its divisions in the various area of Xinjiang, playing the role to develop the education for Kazakhs.

<sup>54</sup> Jin Noda, "The Scope of the Kazakh Intellectuals in Xinjiang: A Case of Aqit Ulemjiuli," paper presented in the Workshop "Mobility of Central Asian Intellectuals: Scholarly and Religious Networks between Xinjiang and Middle East" (21 July, 2018, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies).

<sup>55</sup> Bao'erhan, *Xinjiang wushi nian: Bao'erhan huiyi lu*, (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1994), 308. Zhanaltay, paying attention to the Feb. 25 incident, mentioned that his father Zhanımkhan was confronting with the ETR members and Burhan, see Zhanaltay, *Qili Zaman*, 61. According to the telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau under the Ministry of National Defense to Chiang Kai-shek, Akhmetzhan and other ETR members wanted to dismiss Zhanımkhan claiming his support for Ospan, January 26, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00313-051. The other telegram from the Counterintelligence Bureau revealed that Zhanımkhan played a role on the election of Masud Sabri as a next governor of the province, April 28, 1947, AH, 002-080200-00316-029.

<sup>56</sup> AH, 002-080200-00322-015. In it, for example, Kazakhs requested the more frequent usage of the language in the administrative documentation.

<sup>57</sup> Zhang's opinion of March, 1947, AH, 001-059300-0007, 117. For the increase of the confrontation of the second half of 1946, see Waijiaobu, *Waijiaobu dang'an conshu*, 2: 296.

<sup>58</sup> O, *Higashitorukisutan kyōwakoku kenkyū*, 264.

Xinjiang thus provided Kazakhs an alternative way to achieve cultural autonomy, with a number of Kazakh migrants choosing to flee to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic where they had kinship ties.

Considering the role of Kazakh ethnic identity on Kazakh migration also requires attention to the existence of countrymen in the Gansu-Qinghai regions who were forced to migrate from Xinjiang in the 1930s.<sup>59</sup> After the retirement of Sheng Shicai, a few groups of Kazakh migrants returned to Xinjiang.<sup>60</sup> Thereafter, some groups of Kazakhs still moved to and from between Xinjiang and Gansu-Qinghai regions.

Kazakh migration was also influenced by Turkic ethno-nationalist networks. The existence of the Eastern Turkestan Association<sup>61</sup> and the Kashmir Association for Those Who Are from Xinjiang clearly shows that these groups shared an identity of Xinjiang origin.<sup>62</sup> The first migratory group of Kazakhs living in Pakistan had their own association, the Eastern Turkestan Kazakh Refugees Association.<sup>63</sup>

In addition, according to Matsubara, Turkish documents described the Kazakh refugees in Pakistan as “Turks.” Here, pan-Turkism from the viewpoint of Turkey has to be considered.<sup>64</sup> According to the reports of Isa Alptekin and Muhammad Emin Boghra who, in 1951, were in Kashmir traveling alongside the Kazakh second wave of migrants, Yulbars Khan, the later governor of Xinjiang based in Taiwan, and Ospan aimed to meet in Kashmir.<sup>65</sup> In the end, Yulbars moved to Taipei and witnessed Ospan’s arrest by PRC troops in February 1951.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Abe, “Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku.”

<sup>60</sup> A report on Kazakhs who returned to Xinjiang from Gansu (1949), AH, 020-021905-0002. Also see the above mentioned Ma’s report, AH, 002-080200-00333-092.

<sup>61</sup> It worked in 1940s in Kashmir, AH, 020-012600-0019, 71–72.

<sup>62</sup> In Chinese, “Xinji tongxianghui,” AH, 020-069911-0008.

<sup>63</sup> It was created on October 17, 1951, see Altay, *Anayurttan Anadolu’ya*, 375; Mendikulova, *Istoricheskie sud’by kazakhskoi diaspori*, 157; Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 325.

<sup>64</sup> Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 348.

<sup>65</sup> For the involvement by Alptekin, see AH, 020-069911-0008. Matsubara pays attention to their role in the relations with the Turkish government, Matsubara, *Kazafu yūbokumin no idō*, 348. For instance, Polat Qadiri’s work mentioned “Turk,” including Kazakhs, Ondřej Klimeš, *Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900–1949*. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 216. In spite of the famous claim by Alptekin to unify all of the Turkic populations in Xinjiang, it is suspicious that the Kazakhs had the sympathy with the Pan-Turkism thought.

<sup>66</sup> Alptekin’s report on the arrival of Hüseyin teiji (200 people at Ladaq) in 1951, AH, 020-011908-0040.

## 7. Conclusion

This chapter examined the historical context of the second migratory movement of Kazakhs, focusing the period of the second half of 1940s, from the end of World War II to the consolidation of power by the Communist Party of China in 1949. It is clear that the Soviet's exerted significant influence on the history of Xinjiang, and Kazakh migration in particular, during this time.

Cultural networks surrounding Kazakh migrants influenced the second wave of Kazakh migration as well. Evidently, such networks were far from the influence of the Soviet Union. Considering the impact of Turkic ethno-nationalist networks enabled an exploration of the issue of Kazakh migration within the broader context of international relations. It is clear that these networks shaped the migrations of Kazakhs from Xinjiang. Despite the fact that Kazakhs in Xinjiang had ethnic ties with those living in the neighboring Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, these ties did not automatically translate into pro-Soviet sentiment. Consequently, Kazakhs aimed to immigrate to places other than the Soviet Union, such as Taiwan, India, and Turkey.

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## Chapter 4

# Beyond Humanitarian Interest: America's Aid, Inclusion, and Investment in Xinjiang Kazakh Refugees in Kashmir

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### Abstract

This article focuses on the manner in which Kazakh refugees who had fled from Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 attracted American interest. These refugees were housed in refugee camps in Srinagar and finally immigrated to Turkey. American aid was extended to them through missionaries and by an anthropologist. Simultaneously, however, the involvement of the Americans caused the politicization of the Kazakh refugees with respect to Kashmir-related issues. American interests at the local level were highlighted by Adlai Stevenson's visit.

J. Hall Paxton, the ex-American consul to Urumqi, maintained his attention on the Xinjiang refugees. This article considers the correspondence exchanged between Paxton and the Uyghur refugees who arrived in Srinagar earlier as a model of his efforts to include Kazakh migrants within America's favor. This attention stemmed from both humanitarian interest and, more importantly, the strategic value of the refugees.

Paxton's appeal to Washington resulted in the adaption of the United States Escapee Program to incorporate Kazakh refugees, enabling their migration to Turkey. However, this program intended to utilize qualified escapees in covert operations. For the Americans, the Kazakh refugees represented the possibility of fulfilling their "political, psychological and intelligence" purposes, and could be considered as candidates for "Phase B" of America's operations against Soviet Russia.



## 1. Introduction

As Kara and Kul have argued in their chapters, the second wave of Kazakh refugees from Xinjiang included prominent personalities such as Alibek Hakim, Delilhan Canaltay, Hüseyin Teyci, and Sultan Şerif. These refugees, except Hüseyin Teyci's group, were forced to leave northern Xinjiang in 1949 and 1950 due to the advance of the People's Liberation Army into Xinjiang. They suffered from thirst, altitude sickness, and extremely cold temperatures as they crossed the Taklamakan Desert, Tibet, and the Himalaya Mountains. Moreover, they feared that the Chinese communist soldiers would catch up with them. Most of the refugees managed to reach Ladakh in August 1951 despite the serious loss of their livestock, their households, and even the lives of many of their peers. They were finally permitted to enter Indian territory,<sup>1</sup> and moved to Srinagar, where they were settled in two refugee camps, Serai Safa Kadal and Kak Serai, used for the caravanserai of Yarkandi merchants. It is estimated that around 340 refugees stayed at these camps.<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, the refugees immigrated to Turkey between 1952 and 1954 and were settled in various cities of Anatolia such as Salihli (Manisa) and Ulukışla (Niğde).

The story of their escape from communist rule has been told by scholars, travelers, journalists, and by other migrants. Some remarkable narratives apart from Ingvar Svanberg's survey, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey* (1989) include: Godfrey Lias's *Kazak Exodus* (1956), Milton Clark's article in *National Geographic Magazine* (1954), and Frank Bessac's autobiography titled *Death on the Chang Tang* (2006). In particular, a color photo of Alibek on horseback published with Clark's *National Geographic* article<sup>3</sup> has served as a symbol for freedom seekers who escaped communist pressure to settle in Turkey along with the Kazakh refugees.

The texts mentioned above focus on the process of the exodus of Kazakh refugees from their homeland to the "free world" and narrate the tragic experiences they encountered on the way. In fact, the value they offered to American interests have not been accorded much attention. The mere attribution of a longing for free-

<sup>1</sup> *The Times* (London), Aug. 8, 1951; Oct. 6, 1951; Oct. 22, 1951; Nov. 3, 1951; Nov. 17, 1951.

<sup>2</sup> Kali Beg [Alibek Hakim] and Hamza [Uçar] to John Hall Paxton, Mar. 13, 1952, John Hall Paxton Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT; John Stanwell-Fletcher, *Pattern of the Tiger* (Boston: Little Brown, 1954), 138.

<sup>3</sup> Milton J. Clark, "How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom: Decimated by Chinese Reds and the Hazards of a Hostile Land, Nomads of the Steppes Trekged 3,000 Miles to Kashmir," *National Geographic Magazine* 106, no. 5 (1954): 629.

dom as the motive for a people's migration to Turkey would be boring and ethnocentric. The issues of these refugees, who were tiny in number, were finally forwarded to Washington, enabling the refugees to emigrate to Turkey. This paper refers to documents and to several contemporary texts that have not been adequately referenced in previous studies to focus on the American aid extended to Kazakh refugees both from the local and diplomatic perspective. By examining the motivations of those who provided the support, the paper elucidates that the Americans viewed the Kazakh refugees as potential "political, psychological and intelligence" resources that could be utilized for covert operations against their communist enemies.

## **2. Approaches to Kazakh Refugees in Srinagar: Aiding and Politicizing Them and Their Acquisition of American Favors**

### *Florence Percy*

The American Embassy in New Delhi was first to pay attention to the Kazakh refugees. However, its approach remained indirect and informal. Florence Percy, the wife of geographic attaché Etzel Percy, unofficially investigated the condition of Kazakh refugees in early November 1951 upon the demand of the Embassy's staff. Percy submitted a brief report to the Embassy at the request of the Tolstoy Foundation in New York.<sup>4</sup> According to this report, she visited the refugee camp in Serai Safa Kadal, where she saw nomadic tents "somewhat like an igloo." Around 60 widows and 40 children "of those who lost their lives in the fight for personal freedom" were "living and sleeping outside on a verandah." There were around a hundred children of school-going age. "Kazakhs seemed hungry for education," Percy says, "not only for their children, but for themselves." She reported the hopes of an elder leader that America would offer not just monetary help, but also support for education.<sup>5</sup>

In her letter to Hall Paxton, who will be mentioned later, Percy pointed out that "the Kazakhs were eminently deserving of any help that we may be able to give them."<sup>6</sup> Her investigation must have prompted the New Delhi Embassy to begin helping the Kazakh refugees.

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<sup>4</sup> Tolstoy Foundation had relieved a small refugee group of the Russian Old Believers who had left Xinjiang in 1947 and reached to Calcutta in 1951 by similar way of Kazakh refugees. Scott Moss, *A History of the Tolstoy Foundation 1939–1989*, [http://www.tolstoyfoundation.org/pdfs/tf\\_history\\_s-moss\\_.pdf](http://www.tolstoyfoundation.org/pdfs/tf_history_s-moss_.pdf), 18–21 (accessed Nov. 12, 2018).

<sup>5</sup> Florence Percy to Paxton, Nov. 18, 1951, National Archives and Record Administration [NARA], College Park, MD, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

*Donald Ebright*

However, the Embassy preferred indirect means of support. In early 1952, a social welfare attaché mentioned the Kazakh refugees to missionary volunteer Donald Ebright, who served as the director of Refugee and Famine Relief for the National Christian Council (NCC) of India (1948–52). The responsibility for relief activities fell on Ebright's shoulders because "this was not a job the American Embassy should undertake."<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps the American Embassy avoided direct aid to Kazakh refugees for reasons that could be asked to Uyghur migrants who had sought asylum in Kashmir prior to Kazakhs since 1950. Their leaders, İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra, met the Ambassador Loy Henderson and expressed their hope for American aid for relief to the refugees and for their organization in February 1950.<sup>8</sup> Though Henderson was personally sympathetic to these refugees, the Embassy feared that certain Indian officials and the public might resent any indirect US relief to Uyghur refugees because India herself had millions of refugees (Washington shared such concern<sup>9</sup>). He reported that the Indian Government feared being accused of harboring the enemies of communist China, and that the government suspected that the Uyghur refugees may be sympathetic to Pakistan because of their shared religion and that some of the refugees may even act as Pakistan's agents.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the Embassy entrusted relief activities for Kazakh refugees to Ebright.

At first, Ebright contacted Dr. Phillip Edmonds, a director of the British Church Missionary Society School in Srinagar, from which most of the top-ranking Kashmir officials had graduated. Then, the Tolstoy Foundation offered substantial funds to support Xinjian Kazakh refugees. In February 1952, Ebright opened a bank

<sup>7</sup> Donald F. Ebright, *Free India: The First Five Years; An Account of the 1947 Riots, Refugees, Relief, and Rehabilitation* (Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1954), 124.

<sup>8</sup> Loy Henderson to Dean Acheson, Feb. 6, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/2-1650. They kept in touch with the American Embassy until Alptekin migrated to Turkey in 1954. In his memoir, Alptekin recalls that the Embassy's staff members told him that America might go to war against Communist China and asked him whether rebels against China in Xinjiang would help in such an event. Ömer Kul, haz., *İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları: Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2007), 2: 15.

<sup>9</sup> Department of State to the Embassy, New Delhi, Mar. 17, 1950, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, no number.

<sup>10</sup> Henderson to Acheson, Apr. 15, 1950, NARA RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/4-1550.

account for the relief fund and immediately sent Edmonds in Srinagar the first check.<sup>11</sup>

The Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, supported the aid to the Kazakh refugees. The Kashmir government housed the refugees in two caravanserais, and Sheikh Abdullah appointed a relief committee. Ebright stated that “it was fortunate” for the smooth operations of the relief activity that Sheikh Abdullah “took a personal interest in the refugees and was a personal friend of Dr. Edmonds.”<sup>12</sup>

While engaging in relief activities such as the supply of food, clothing, and medical care, Ebright also sought land to resettle the Kazakh refugees because they did not want to travel any more. The Sind Valley was suggested, but it was already overpopulated. The Revenue Minister mentioned Uri. Ebright prepared to donate to the refugees sheep that they lost on the trail. Cows were also required, so it was suggested the Mennonites or Brethren to start a “heifer for the Himalayas” or “cows for the Kazakhs” campaign.<sup>13</sup> Ebright left India in 1952, and Donald E. Rugh succeeded his directorship.

### *Donald Rugh and Philip Edmonds*

Although Ebright was not himself accused, some other foreigners in Kashmir were suspected of furthering a political mission in their dealings with the Kazakh refugees. Rajpor, Kaul, and Kumar, Indian leftists, denounced these people, saying “not only do they collect information... but also encourage pro-Pakistani activities and ideas” and “have done indiscriminate propaganda against the dangers of Communism.”<sup>14</sup> In their eyes, missionaries, anthropologists, the United Nations Military Observers Group (UNMOG), and the U.S. Embassy staff members plotted together, and they were closely associated with Kashmir’s Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah. Kazakh refugees were regarded as being involved in this anti-communist, pro-Pakistani, and “independent Kashmir” oriented circle.<sup>15</sup> It should be added that

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<sup>11</sup> Ebright, *Free India*, 124–25.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 132–33.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 133–34.

<sup>14</sup> Ghulam Mohammad Mir Rajpori and Manohar Nath Kaul, *Conspiracy in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Social & Political Study Group, 1954), 27, 30–31.

<sup>15</sup> Accusation towards Kazakh refugees rose up after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, August 1953. Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1976), 272–73.

Sheikh Abdullah was alleged to have accepted “5,000 Kazakh refugees” from Central Asia (obviously exaggerated) while he neglected or did not allow other non-Muslim refugees from Pakistani Punjab and Kashmir.<sup>16</sup>

According to Rajpori and Kaul, Donald Rugh was closely associated with the American Embassy, particularly with the social welfare attaché. It was argued that they had at first decided to settle the Kazakh refugees in Kashmir, but because of the political backgrounds of the refugee leaders, they altered this decision and planned to resettle them in Turkey. USA’s Church World Service liaised with Kashmir and the American Embassy in Turkey. Moreover, Rajpori and Kaul suspected Rugh of some special political “mission” besides the resettlement of Kazakhs.<sup>17</sup>

Phillip Edmonds, the principal of the British missionary school in Srinagar, was the most important personality among missionaries in Kashmir. He had lived in Kashmir for more than six years, and had forged close ties with the American Embassy staff, UNMOG officers, the PM Sheikh Abdullah, and his advisers. In short, he “functioned as the chief link between the Americans and Sheikh Abdullah.”<sup>18</sup> Rajpori and Kaul accused Edmonds of utilizing his position as a missionary and educationalist for varied political purposes, including advocacy for an independent Kashmir or the propagation of a pro-Pakistan orientation to Sheikh Abdullah.<sup>19</sup> According to them, “his [Edmonds’] activities had a much wider range than entailed by his normal functions.”<sup>20</sup> For example, he was condemned for conducting espionage and other subversive UNMOG activities for Pakistan or against India.<sup>21</sup>

In addition, Edmonds engaged in relief fund and cultural activities with Kazakh refugees. He also integrated them into political life. It was suspected that the major part of the relief fund money sent to him from the Tolstoy Foundation via Ebright and Rugh, “has gone to politically undesirable persons.”<sup>22</sup> The following passage in Edmonds’ letter to the *Times* also aroused Kumar’s suspicions about his polit-

<sup>16</sup> Hari Jaisingh, *Kashmir: A Tale of Shame* (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1996), 93–94; Pyarelal Kaul, *Crisis in Kashmir* (Srinagar: Suman Publications, 1991), 67–68; K. N. Pandita, “Demographic Change in Kashmir: The Bitter Truth,” in *Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh: Ringside Views*, ed. Shyam Kaul and Onkar Kachru (New Delhi: Khama Publishers, 1998), 59.

<sup>17</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 27, 30–31.

<sup>18</sup> Vijay Kumar, *Anglo-American Plot against Kashmir* (Bombay: People’s Publishing House, 1954), 202.

<sup>19</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 28–29.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 29–30; Kumar, *Anglo-American*, 202.

<sup>22</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 30.

ical intentions:

a large number of the Kazakhs, ... elected to stay here [Kashmir] largely because they felt they were nearer their homeland and because they believed they would be more likely to play some part in returning when the time come.<sup>23</sup>

It is obvious that America was a hopeful partner for Kazakh refugees in their politicization process. For example, Alibek Hakim told Rugh:

We are sure that the Red tyranny must fall in the fight of all the free nations under the guidance of America upon whom we, the Turkistanis, look, as our sponsor. We are prepared to sacrifice to the last drop of our blood in this struggle. We pray for a better future which will be possible through the democratic countries, especially America.<sup>24</sup>

### *Milton Clark*

While missionaries functioned significantly in settling and politicizing the refugees, American anthropologist Milton J. Clark influenced the manner in which the rest of the world viewed them. Clark was a doctoral student at Harvard University. When he read a news report of Kazakh refugees having appeared in Kashmir in late 1951, he recognized two opportunities and decided to go to Kashmir to visit with them to study them for his dissertation and to hear first hand, the survivors' narratives of the migration.<sup>25</sup>

Soon after arriving in Kashmir in August 1952, Clark developed close relationships with the Kazakh and Uyghur refugees and engaged in anthropological investigation and cultural welfare activities, imparting English lessons to the refugees and their children. However, Rajpuri and Kaul's suspicious eyes also followed Clark's activities. According to their accusations, Clark effected a comprehensive social and political survey with special reference to the frontier areas linking Kashmir with Central Asia and Tibet. He helped Kazakhs form an organization, preparing their statements and documents, and took Kazakh leaders out of town for more confidential discussions. He met Sheikh Abdullah frequently and they discussed Central

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<sup>23</sup> P. A. Edmonds, "Kazakhs on the Move: Building New Life in Kashmir," *The Times*, Apr. 21, 1953.

<sup>24</sup> Ebright, *Free India*, 132.

<sup>25</sup> Clark, "How the Kazakhs": 622.

Asian politics and American foreign policy. In the US, Clark made important political contacts with Republicans in the Far East lobby and maintained contact with the overseas news editor of the *Christian Science Monitor*, who sought information about the situation in Chinese Central Asia.<sup>26</sup> In short, Clark was alleged to disguise his political agency as research. Rajpori and Kaul argued that “he was more suave and subtler than Edmonds, and his techniques of work were more upto date.”<sup>27</sup>

Their claim that Clark took Kazakh refugees to the mountains for filming is plausible.<sup>28</sup> Such an allegation can be supported by Alibek’s son Hasan Oraltay and nephew Şirzat Dođru. According to Oraltay and Dođru, Clark stayed among the Kazakhs to learn their language and customs. He had them set up nomadic tents in Sonamarg, a skirt of the Himalaya Mountains, 80 kilometers north-east of Srinagar. There, Clark encouraged the Kazakhs to wear national clothes, perform a kind of wedding ceremony, practice wrestling, dance, and make *kumis*. Kazakh refugees met his requests for the sake of introducing Turkestan and the Kazakh people.<sup>29</sup> Thus, Clark reproduced national Kazakh life in Kashmir just like in the Altay villages. Of course, this endeavor was not a form of *dilettantism*. Photographs published in *National Geographic* should be considered as a type of “political show” aiming to display freedom seekers who were able to successfully flee communist dominance and to begin rebuilding their lives in the free world. In a way, the photographs were meant to invoke feelings of sympathy for Kazakhs in the magazine’s readers.

In assuming Clark’s political and intelligence tendencies, it is meaningful that İsa Yusuf Alptekin remembered Clark as an agent of the Office of Strategic Services who landed in Kashmir, in Alptekin’s memory, by parachute. During a visit to New York in 1969, Alptekin also recalled that Clark collected information about Chi-

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<sup>26</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 31–32.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 31.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

<sup>29</sup> Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uđrunda*, 272; Şirzat Dođru, *Türkistan’a Dođru: Türkistan, Türkiye, Kazakistan Arasında Anılar, Düşünceler, Bilgi ve Belgeler* (İzmir: Arena Matbaacılık, 2008), 157.

na.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, Clark's name appears again in the late 1950's as the chief of the CIA station in Vientiane.<sup>31</sup>

In any case, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark engaged in relief and social welfare activities for Kazakh refugees in Kashmir in 1952 and 1953. The American ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, expressed his confidence in the ability and integrity of these three individuals in his letter to Alibek. He also suggested that practical measures should be taken in the interests of all concerned through representatives of the Kazakhs and of the Kashmir government and through these three people.<sup>32</sup> In short, Rugh, Edmonds, and Clark functioned as the informal channels of the American Embassy.

### *Adlai Stevenson*

Another obvious political show was effected by Clark and Edmonds when Adlai Stevenson, a presidential candidate of the Democratic Party, visited a Kazakh refugee camp. Stevenson went on a world tour the year following his loss to Eisenhower in the 1952 election. He arrived in Srinagar on May 1, 1953 and met Sheikh Abdullah three times. Rajpori and Kaul insist that Stevenson evinced keen interest in the Kashmir problem, and emphasized direct talks between the Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers while considering the wishes of local inhabitants. Rajpori and Kaul claim that leaning toward Sheikh Abdullah, Stevenson agreed with the independent Kashmir solution.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, Stevenson's visit to the Kazakh refugees may be evaluated as an ex-

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<sup>30</sup> Reha Oğuz Türkkan, "İsa Yusuf Bek Öldü mü? İssız Acun Kaldı mı?," *Doğu Türkistan'ın Sesi*, sy. 47 (1996): 5. Türkkan, a well-known Turkish nationalist who taught at Columbia University at that time, didn't take Alptekin's words seriously at first because he had been familiar with Clark. Immediately, Türkkan called Clark on the telephone, asked him "Let's see now, whose voice is the voice of who will speak now?" Milton Clark quickly guessed Alptekin correctly.

<sup>31</sup> William J. Rust, *Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos, 1954-1961* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 59-60.

<sup>32</sup> Chester Bowles to Alibek, Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, National Academic Library of Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana, Folder 14/14, 28.

<sup>33</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 56-58. However, it would be difficult to take their suspicious eyes at value. During lunch with Stevenson, Sheikh Abdullah expressed he wanted out both India and Pakistan from Kashmir. "He was attacked in India as a Moslem and in Pakistan as a stooge of the Hindus." Moreover, he was also impatient with the UN because its guarantees were worthless without a force. John Bartlow Martin, *Adlai Stevenson and the World: The Life of Adlai E. Stevenson* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1977), 54.





Fig. 1: Stevenson's Visit to Serai Safa Kadal<sup>34</sup>

tension of the US diplomacy on Kashmir and of Sheikh Abdullah's affiliation with America as evidenced by his close association with Edmonds and Clark as mentioned earlier. Stevenson entered into a private discussion with Edmonds and Clark, who took him to a Kazakh refugee camp in Serai Safa Kadal on May 2.<sup>35</sup>

On this visit, Stevenson noted:

Girls in ancient costume sang their folk songs while we sat on rugs surrounded by headman of Tribe. Pure Turks. Speak Turkish. Origin of Turks. [...] Chief made fine speech of appreciate on for my visit; for refuge of Indian govt; for [those]... who died on the way. I responded – U.S. admires a people who value freedom more than life. Applause.<sup>36</sup>

The Associated Press (AP) forwarded Stevenson's description of Kazakh refugees as

<sup>34</sup> "Türkistan'dan Haberler," *Türkistan*, sy. 3-4 (1953), 47.

<sup>35</sup> Rajpori and Kaul, *Conspiracy*, 28, 32, 57.

<sup>36</sup> Martin, *Adlai Stevenson*, 54.

freedom seekers as follows:

The American people deeply appreciate the heroism and courage of the Kazaks in their arduous trek from their homeland across the snow-capped peaks and valleys of the Himalayas to the safety and freedom of Kashmir.

Thus, Stevenson recognized them as people “who love freedom more than the comforts of life” and said that such people deserved “great respect.”<sup>37</sup>

The next day, Kazakh delegates returned Stevenson’s call. “*They had no friends but America,*” Stevenson notes, “Indians didn’t want them; didn’t want to go to Turkey, wanted to go home. Many of their people wanted escape but India wouldn’t let them in.”<sup>38</sup> Though their numbers were very small, Kazakh refugees were no longer insignificant. Although Şirzat Dođru was absent at that point, he told the author of this paper that they wanted to appeal to their existence as anti-communists in Srinagar.<sup>39</sup> It may be asserted that a political show was arranged by Clark and Edmonds provided Kazakh refugees with the favor of a highly important American political figure who confirmed their status as freedom seekers.

### 3. Hall Paxton: Attempt to Include Xinjiang Refugees

#### *“Not Forgetting You,” Uyghur Refugees*

Others outside Kashmir also paid attention to the Kazakh refugees. Jacobs argues that Yolbars Khan in Taipei and Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buđra in Istanbul competed between themselves to attract the Xinjiang refugees to their sides.<sup>40</sup> Apart from this, the refugees in Srinagar also maintained contact with American diplomat John Hall Paxton of Isfahan. In fact, Paxton’s attribution brought the Kazakh refugee problem to Washington’s attention.

Since 1946, Paxton had served as consul to Urumqi, which was called Dihua at that time. He abandoned the consulate in August 1949 as the People’s Liberation Army approached Xinjiang. His party reached New Delhi after detouring the Taklamakan Desert and crossing over the Karakoram Pass.<sup>41</sup> After spending a year in

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<sup>37</sup> *The Boston Globe*, May 3, 1953.

<sup>38</sup> Martin, *Adlai Stevenson*, 54.

<sup>39</sup> Şirzat Dođru, interview by author, Kemalpaşa, Izmir, Aug. 2013.

<sup>40</sup> Justin M. Jacobs, *Xinjiang and the Modern Chinese State* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2016), 207–10. See also Chapter 5 in this book.

<sup>41</sup> Peter Lisagor and Marguerite Higgins, *Overtime in Heaven: Adventures in the Foreign Ser-*

America, Paxton was appointed consul in Isfahan. He corresponded with leading Kazakh refugees such as Delilhan Canaltay, Alibek Hakim, and Hüseyin Teyci between January and April of 1952, two months before his sudden death.<sup>42</sup>

It would be useful at this juncture to focus on the Uyghur refugees who reached Kashmir earlier than the Kazakhs. In brief, the correspondence between Paxton and the Uyghurs paved the way for the relief for Kazakh refugees. For example, Enver Şahkul of the US embassy in Ankara had served in the consulate of Urumqi and had escaped to India as a member of Paxton's party. He was Paxton's informant since December 1949. He forwarded to Paxton, in Washington, and later in Isfahan, the Xinjiang news and the circumstances of the Uyghur refugees in India. These refugees could listen to the short-wave radio messages from Urumqi.<sup>43</sup> Paxton always welcomed Şahkul's reports concerning his "Yurt (homeland)."<sup>44</sup> Thus, Paxton grasped that Alibek and Canaltay were among the 300 Kazakh refugees in Srinagar, that they had applied to Saudi Arabia for settlement but had been turned down, and that they were subsequently asking Turkey for asylum.<sup>45</sup>

Paxton kept in touch with İsa Yusuf Alptekin, and also with the other refugees in Srinagar. Some of them had been students of Paxton's wife Vincoe, who had taught English in Urumqi.<sup>46</sup> They appealed to Paxton in grievous voices. It should be noted at this point that some refugees hoped to receive education, even advanced medical training, in the US for serving their homeland. They had asked Paxton to mediate on their behalf in Washington<sup>47</sup> through their organization, which was called

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*vice* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964), 173–206.

<sup>42</sup> Among these correspondences, Jacobs refers to following themes: a) Being killed of Douglas Mackiernan whom Hüseyin Teyci had treated in Gasköl; b) Delilhan Canaltay's consultation on whether he should accept Kuomintang's invitation to Taiwan; c) \$300 personal check from Paxton for Kazakh refugees, which was divided equally among them. Jacobs, *Xinjiang*, 200–1, 209.

<sup>43</sup> Enver Şahkul to Paxton, Dec. 5, 1949; Jan. 26, 1950; Mar. 13, 1950; Apr. 14, 1950; May 16, 1950; Aug. 5, 1950; Sep. 5, 1950; Nov. 9, 1951; Mar. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 2–4, 7, 9–11, 14–17, 24–25; Şahkul to Bertel E. Kuniholm, Mar. 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 110, 35; Şahkul to Kuniholm, Apr. 9, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 22.

<sup>44</sup> Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 110, 34; Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 114, 20.

<sup>45</sup> Şahkul to Paxton, Nov. 15, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 130, 32.

<sup>46</sup> Murat Alptekin to Paxton, Mar. 30, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6 Folder 115, 39; Lisagor and Higgins, *Overtime*, 185.

<sup>47</sup> Muharrem Kari to Paxton, Jun. 10, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 120, 13; Abdurrauf

the Turkistan Refugee Committee and was located in Serai Safa Kadal.<sup>48</sup> In fact, the committee's president Ubaydullah (spelled as Abaidullah) reported that around 125 refugees led by Hüseyin Teyici and Sultan Şerif arrived in Srinagar and stayed in the same serai, and that more 200 refugees in Ladakh were waiting for their Indian visas and for permission to enter Indian territory.<sup>49</sup>

Along with the other problems of the refugees, İsa Yusuf Alptekin engaged with the issue of education. He asked Paxton to mediate with Washington on their behalf for their youth to study in the US. "The Chinese Government did neither open any educational institutes in our country," he alleged, "and nor allowed our boys and students to proceed to other countries for such purposes." He saw the flight from Xinjiang as "an opportunity for them [Turkestanis youths] to get some education." The loss of this opportunity due to the lack of finances signified "a great injustice with them." In addition, Alptekin cleverly calculated that "America will also be benefitted" if these students were to obtain their education in the US. He attached a list of 11 candidates aged 13 to 25 years.<sup>50</sup>

Paxton, who was "still hoping that something more can be done for our friends" and "working on it several angles,"<sup>51</sup> had devoted himself to engaging with the Americans on this issue. As of May 1951, however, he had found no solution.<sup>52</sup> Dawud Rashid,<sup>53</sup> who had joined Paxton's party to flee Xinjiang and was one of the above mentioned candidate students, fell into great disappointment not having heard from the American government. Ashamed of the parasitic life given to him by Alptekin in Srinagar, Rashid appealed to Paxton to help him obtain some work. "We have many hopes in America," he wrote, "I have many hopes in you and am sure that you would not forget me."<sup>54</sup>

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Kanat to Paxton, Jun. 17, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 126, 5; Ahmed Halimi and Polat Kadiri [Turfani] to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 42; Settar Makbul to Paxton, Jun. 25, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 25.

<sup>48</sup> Halimi and Kadiri to Paxton, Jun. 29, 1950; Jul. 24, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 42-43; Abaidullah [Ubaydullah] to Paxton, Apr. 12, 1951; Apr. 18, 1951; Oct. 8, 1951; Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 48-50, 52-54.

<sup>49</sup> Ubaydullah to Paxton, Oct. 8, 1951.

<sup>50</sup> İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jun. 1, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 11, 13-14.

<sup>51</sup> Paxton to Şahkul, Apr. 3, 1950, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 104, 13.

<sup>52</sup> Paxton to İsa Yusuf Alptekin, May 4, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 111, 1.

<sup>53</sup> Lisagor and Higgins, *Overtime*, 184.

<sup>54</sup> Dawud Rashid [David Rashid Osman] to Paxton, Jan. 30, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 126, 2.

Paxton desired to avoid the refugees feeling disappointment toward America. In his reply, Paxton calmed Dawud's anxiety and wrote that he could not forget Dawud and their escape from Xinjiang, and that he was still pursuing the matter of the scholarship. He hoped to discuss with Alptekin "all possibilities for education in the United States for you and other young people from "Yurt"."<sup>55</sup>

Needless to say, the most obvious sign of "not forgetting you" toward the refugees was donation. Paxton sent the US embassy in New Delhi a check for 300 dollars.<sup>56</sup> Ubaydullah, the president of the Turkistan Refugee Committee, thanked Paxton and the embassy staff member Douglas Forman for their donation of around 1,450 rupees. However, the amount did not matter to him. Instead, "it shows how your goodself still remember us," Ubaydullah referred to Paxton's remembrance, "and it is really a matter of great pleasure for all of us that we have a friend like you and who remembers us in our present hour of plight." According to him, the refugees could also never forget that Paxton had not forgotten them, and that he had extended and increased his help toward them.<sup>57</sup>

The exchanges that Paxton maintained with the Uyghur refugees were prior to and parallel with his correspondence with the Kazakhs. Such communications evidence that Paxton's sympathy and devotion to the Kazakh refugees, expressed in the form of the arrangement of scholarships and donation, was inherited from his feelings for the Uyghurs.

### *Subsequent "Not Forgetting You," Kazakh Refugees*

On the other hand, the correspondence between Paxton and the Kazakh refugees, especially Delillhan Canaltay in Srinagar, began in November 1951.<sup>58</sup> These letters symbolize the politicization of the Kazakh refugees.

In his first letter to Paxton, Canaltay asked him to come to the *serai*, to witness their miserable conditions, and to help him and the Kazakh party. Like the Uy-

<sup>55</sup> Paxton to Rashid, Feb. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 35.

<sup>56</sup> Clare H. Timberlake to Paxton, Apr. 5, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 11.

<sup>57</sup> Ubaydullah to Paxton, Apr. 18, 1951; Apr. 29, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 49–50.

<sup>58</sup> Kazakh leaders such as Alibek Hakim and Hüseyin Teyci, who stayed in the Gasköl region, dispatched letters to Alptekin and Buğra in spring of 1951. Alptekin and Buğra started acting for the Kazakhs after they received those letters. They requested Ambassador Henderson and the Indian government to approach the Tibetan government. After Kazakh refugees fled to the Indian border of Ladakh, Buğra attempted to obtain permissions for them to enter India (Alptekin had gone to Saudi Arabia). Kul, *Esir Doğru*, 2: 20–29, 44–45, 53–54.

ghur refugees mentioned above, Canaltay's message must have appealed to Paxton for mercy: "Whenever I remember your companionship of Uramchi [sic] I burst into tears."<sup>59</sup>

Receiving the letter finally on January 2, 1952, Paxton was "deeply moved." He marveled at Canaltay's perseverance and was delighted to hear from him. Excusing himself for not visiting Srinagar for the time being, Paxton tactfully showed his affection for the Kazakhs as follows: "our continuing interest in the refugees from "yurt" which we have come to consider our own second country" and "never forgetting your loyal friendship to our country and both of us." Paxton encouraged Canaltay not to abandon hope because he had sought aids by all means.<sup>60</sup>

Canaltay asked again Paxton to help Kazakh refugees and to explain their miserable conditions to his American friends for aid. "I too was a chairman of a kingdom [sic]," he claimed as he recounted his misery, "but at present I am a friendless of [sic] helpless refugee." According to him, all the Kazakh refugees in Srinagar and in Ladakh lacked money and friends.<sup>61</sup>

Paxton immediately sent the refugees a \$300 check, the same amount he had sent the Uyghurs, and each Kazakh leader including Ubaydullah wrote him a thank-you letter.<sup>62</sup> On the very same day that he wrote his letter of thanks to Paxton, however, Canaltay wrote another personal missive which may be considered negotiation for his personal profit. Canaltay described his misery, "a head worker of a Nation and a man equal to aking [sic]" fell into "a position not more than a begger [sic]." He requested Paxton to send him some money separately. Further, he expressed his wish to go back to his motherland and asked for Paxton's opinion and help in this regard also.<sup>63</sup>

When it appeared that Paxton did not agree with Canaltay's proposed return to Xinjiang ("it would seem to imply cooperation with the very people who

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<sup>59</sup> Dalile Khan Haji [Delilhan Canaltay] to Paxton, Nov. 27, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 118, 27.

<sup>60</sup> Paxton to Canaltay, Jan. 3, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 17.

<sup>61</sup> Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 18, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 53.

<sup>62</sup> Husayin Tayji [Hüseyin Teyci] to Paxton, Jan. 23, 1952, in *Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 1945-1955* ([Wilmington, DE]: Scholarly Resources, [1989]), microfilm, 18: 589; Ubaydullah to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 133, 54; Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1958 in *Records* 18: 587.

<sup>63</sup> Canaltay to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1952, in *Records* 18: 588.

drove you out”),<sup>64</sup> Canaltay apparently changed his mind and expressed the desire to go to the US. He asked Paxton to write to high ranking officers and to send him the requisite expenses, passports, and visas for his family, at least for a future visit. As Jacobs refers, Canaltay asked for Paxton’s opinion about whether or not he should accept Kuomintang’s invitation to go to Taiwan. Moreover, according to Canaltay’s letter, Donald Rugh visited the refugee camp on 27 February, gave out clothes and grains, and told the people about a relief plan to distribute sheep, cows, and cultivation tools in June. Canaltay appreciated Paxton because “It is only you who always informed and impressed your American friend to help us.”<sup>65</sup>

In his last reply to Canaltay, Paxton suggested that he communicate with the Embassy in New Delhi about a visit to Taipei. In response to Canaltay’s wish to visit the US, Paxton merely replied that all he could do was pass on the request to the American authorities. Instead, Paxton proposed a scholarship to study in America as he had arranged for the Uyghur refugees.<sup>66</sup> However much Paxton showed his sympathies toward Canaltay and the other Kazakh refugees, he could not make rash promises in response to Canaltay’s requests. In fact, Washington did not allow it. In the confidential letters to Ambassador Henderson, Burton Berry, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Near East Affairs, the Department of State expressed its reluctance to accept refugees from Chinese Turkestan to the US. Upon the expiration of the Displaced Persons Act on December 31, 1951, there was “no special legislative authority to deal with the problem of refugees.” Berry referred to the fact that a similar legislation might be enacted during that year, “but with [presidential and congress] elections coming up,” he added, “not much hope can be held out.” In addition, the Chinese immigration quota, under which Turkestani refugees might qualify, was greatly oversubscribed.<sup>67</sup> In short, Washington reviewed the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees within the legislative frame. In short, Washington reviewed the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees within the legislative frame.

Arranging scholarships for the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees was one of the few options Paxton could find. In fact, such a scholarship plan was later discussed between Alibek Hakim and the American Embassy in New Delhi. According to the

<sup>64</sup> Paxton to Canaltay, Feb. 11, 1952, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 113, 31.

<sup>65</sup> Canaltay to Paxton, Feb. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 596–97.

<sup>66</sup> Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 579.

<sup>67</sup> Burton Y. Berry to Henderson, Feb. 1, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

Ambassador, Chester Bowles, who succeeded Henderson, Alibek had proposed that four Kazakh students should be allowed to study in the US in addition to the four Uyghur candidates who had already been selected. Bowles replied that these Uyghurs had been offered funds by private American citizens after careful consideration, and that arranging similar scholarships for four Kazakhs would cause considerable difficulties. However, he also suggested the possibility that funds could be obtained for courses higher than preliminary study if there were some applicants who were “considered to have adequate educational background and command of English to enable them to benefit by education in the United States.”<sup>68</sup>

According to William Anderson, a staff member of the Office of Chinese Affairs (CA), Department of State, who wrote some confidential memoranda in this regard, the CA took the responsibility for the case of one Uyghur student and it was agreed “in recent conversations with S/P [Policy Planning Staff] and CIA” that the CA would mediate with Georgetown University and the US embassy in New Delhi. It is worth noting that Anderson believed that the details of the financial sponsorship program would not be communicated to the embassy, and that the CA assumed that in this process a channel for helping or utilizing selected persons from Central Asia may be developed through the Committee for Free Asia, which founded the Radio Free Asia in 1951.<sup>69</sup> Along with the Uyghur students, the CA also continued to function “as the primary action office in developing plans for assisting or utilizing selected Kazakhs of Sinkiang origin” with the consent of the functionaries of the Office of South Asian Affairs.<sup>70</sup>

### *Investment on Refugees*

Although Alibek appeared to have failed to confirm scholarships for the Kazakh youth, it is very meaningful that “assisting” some Kazakh refugees was the reverse side of “utilizing” them. From the beginning, Paxton clearly stated his motivations for helping the refugees in several of his communications. In his letter to Canalatay, Paxton explained the reason for offering American aid as follows: “it chiefly due to your freedom-loving standards having evoked much American interest and the

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<sup>68</sup> Bowles to Alibek. Nov. 20, 1952, Hasan Oraltay Private Archive, Folder 14/14, 28.

<sup>69</sup> William O. Anderson, memorandum, Aug. 25, 1952, “Memorandum for File,” in *Records* 27: 270; Anderson to Alfred L. Jenkins, memorandum, Jan. 7, 1953, “Aid for Sinkiang Refugees,” in *Records* 31: 1113.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*



activity of the Embassy in New Delhi in presenting your case.”<sup>71</sup> However, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that such humanitarian concerns and impressions, though they themselves could not be denied, also served to disguise America’s pursuing of its own interests.

In January 1952, Ambassador Henderson in Teheran forwarded to the above mentioned Berry a copy of Paxton’s letter addressed to him. In this missive, Paxton emphasized that the importance of “the smallest gesture of aid” to the Uyghur refugees in Kashmir would bring a disproportionate credit to the US. In other words, a tiny “investment” on these refugees would result in high returns, viz. American credit and Russian discredit throughout Muslim Central Asia. In fact, as of March 1950 according to Paxton, the Political Planning Staff had planned to resettle Uyghur refugees in the US and Paxton would be assigned to assist Alptekin who would arrive by airplane first. Though this plan fell through, Paxton still continued to consider this case seriously, saying “their problems deserve more sympathetic consideration than they have yet been given.” In short, “these people should not be forgotten.” That was why Paxton had been interested in helping the Uyghur refugees and had appealed to Henderson although this issue was far removed from their contemporary missions.<sup>72</sup>

Similarly, in February 1952 Paxton told Garret Soulen, the consul in Calcutta, the reason why he aided refugee groups who fled from communists. Paxton believed that Americans should respond to the refugees’ adherence to the ideals of liberty:

I feel that people, who have demonstrated so conclusively their adherence to the ideals of liberty that we Americans also hold dear, have already established a claim (though they do not make it themselves) to our moral support, at least.

Subsequently he disclosed his true political aim:

Also I feel that some day we might find it advantageous to have, where they will be available to help us, several of these people who have faced the difficulties of the terrain and are familiar with the customs and dialects of the area.<sup>73</sup>

In short, Paxton acknowledged the strategic and intelligence value of the

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<sup>71</sup> Paxton to Canaltay, Mar. 29, 1952, in *Records* 18: 579.

<sup>72</sup> For full text, see Appendix 1.

<sup>73</sup> Paxton to Garret H. Soulen, Feb. 9, 1952, in *Records* 27: 278.

refugees from Xinjiang along with—or “rather than”—the moral value of helping freedom seekers. Without any doubt, such worth was also applicable to the Kazakh refugees.

In the end, Paxton’s appeals were accepted by high officials in Washington several months after his death in June 1952. The success of this endeavor should be attributed mostly to Henderson, who agreed with Paxton and who reminded Berry of these refugees although, since he was no longer in India, “this problem is not mine.” In his letter, Henderson described the point in symbolically:

The problem of course is in part humanitarian. On the other hand, I am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the funds and time which we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the United States.<sup>74</sup>

#### **4. The Escapee Program: Overt Humanitarian Aid for Covert Aims**

##### *Escapee Program and “Phase B”*

With regard to the reception of Uyghur and Kazakh refugees and their resettlement in Turkey within the quota of the 1,850 “Settled Immigrants (İskânlı Göçmen in Turkish)” realized in 1952 through the efforts of İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra, Alptekin indicated the significant preconditions of which the Turkish Government informed them. Immigrants must arrive on the Turkish border on their own expenses and the Turkish government would never sponsor their travel costs.<sup>75</sup> Turkey opened its doors to the so-called “same origins,” but how did the Xinjiang refugees manage to raise such costs? Almost all of them were living in abject poverty in Srinagar and had asked Paxton for help. Asked this question, Kazakh refugees generally answer, both in published and oral form, that the National Council of Churches (Edmonds and Rugh) and the Red Crescent assisted their transfer from Srinagar to Bombay.<sup>76</sup> Such a response is not wrong. In reality, these organizations conducted the transfer of the refugees, however, one-sided it was. To answer who really paid their costs and how, researchers must turn to Washington’s arguments in this regard.

The State Department recognized the potential import of the Kazakh refu-

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<sup>74</sup> Henderson to Berry, Jan. 8, 1952, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

<sup>75</sup> Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 85, 88, 90, 94.

<sup>76</sup> For example, Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda*, 273–75; Doğru, interview by author.

gees and incorporated them into the Escapee Program. The United States Escapee Program (EP or USEP in short) was created by the Department of State in December 1951 and was approved by President Truman in March 1952. This program aided those who fled communist oppression from behind the Iron Curtain.<sup>77</sup> EP was a comprehensive relief program that supplied food, provisions, household goods, medical care, and vocational education. It also secured immigration to the third country for refugees or helped migrants with the interrogation and screening procedures and the process of local integration. The EP only operated small staff units in Western Germany, Austria, Italy, Trieste, Greece, and Turkey to supervise all its projects, which were mainly managed through contracts with interested voluntary agencies. It was reported that as of March 1961, the EP had resettled 143,544 people in third countries and that it had integrated 34,544 people in their first asylum countries since its launch. The assistance offered by this agency aimed to “rebuild hope among refugees,” showing them that they were not forgotten by the free world.<sup>78</sup>

At the same time, however, the EP also purposed to shake Moscow, appealing to the “captive populations behind the Iron Curtain” that America and the free world were “still mindful of their tragic lot and have not forsaken them”<sup>79</sup> and encouraging further defections from them. It was a kind of “zero-sum game whereby America’s gains represented the Kremlin’s direct losses.”<sup>80</sup> According to Susan Carruthers, who analyzed the concept of “escapee” and its liminality, the term could be defined as: someone who defected the Eastern bloc including the Soviet Union and its orbiting nations except East Germany, Yugoslavia, and communist China due to

<sup>77</sup> EP was mainly based on the Section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which authorized expenditure “not to exceed \$100,000,000 of such appropriation for any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, or the Communist dominated or Communist occupied areas of Germany and Austria, and any other countries absorbed by the Soviet Union either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes.” *Mutual Security Act of 1951*, Public Law 165, 82nd Cong., 1st sess. (Oct. 10, 1951).

<sup>78</sup> Edward W. Lawrence, “The Escapee Program,” *Information Bulletin: Monthly Magazine of the Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany*, March 1953: 6–8; Roger W. Jones, “Department Supports Continuation of Refugee and Migration Programs,” *Department of State Bulletin* 45, no. 1157 (1961): 383–84; George L. Warren, “The Escapee Program,” *Journal of International Affairs* 7, no. 1 (1953): 84–85.

<sup>79</sup> Jones, “Department Supports”: 385.

<sup>80</sup> Susan L. Carruthers, “Between Camps: Eastern Bloc “Escapees” and Cold War Borderlands,” *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (2005): 918.




Fig 2: EP's flowchart<sup>81</sup>

political oppression from / disaffection with the communist regime; an escapee was neither an economic immigrant nor an opportunistic non-anticommunist; therefore, escapees had their own dramatic narratives of crossing borders from the East bloc to the West, which could be utilized for propaganda proclaiming the latter's superiority;<sup>82</sup> escapees were contemporarily accommodated in European camps. In fact, life in the camps was quite wretched and the transfers took a long enough time so that escapees were disappointed<sup>83</sup> waiting to be resettled in the West or in other countries of the "free world" to rebuild their hope.<sup>84</sup> The EP targeted those who were worthy of being an intelligence source and could help in the psychological warfare of the early cold war period, disguising its real interest with its "investment in humanity."<sup>85</sup> Here, it should be marked that not all kinds of people who left the East

<sup>81</sup> Foreign Operations Administration, *Escape to Freedom* [Washington DC: Foreign Operations Administration, 1954].

<sup>82</sup> Warren, "The Escapee Program": 83; Carruthers, "Between Camps": 930-32.

<sup>83</sup> Carruthers, "Between Camps": 930-32.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*: 934.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*: 917, 923.

bloc, such as the refugees, displaced persons, economic immigrants, or ordinary military deserters could enjoy the status of “escapee.” The nomenclature was selective, anomalous, and applied to those who were disaffected with the East bloc and deserving of American interest.<sup>86</sup>

Prior to the EP, Truman’s Psychological Strategy Board designed “The Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees,” code-named “Engross,” in December 1951. According to this scheme, the ostensible means for escapees such as employment, resettlement and care were named “Phase A,” which crystalized as the EP within four months. “Phase B,” on the other hand, was targeted at enticing more defectors/escapees and at better utilizing them in covert operations against the Soviet bloc. Such usage included their incorporation into the US military services and into other agencies such as the Voice of America and the CIA.<sup>87</sup> According to the Operation Coordinating Board’s report on the EP in February 1954, the Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, and the United States Information Agency viewed the EP’s specific benefits as providing:

1. Propaganda material based upon FOA [Foreign Operations Administration]/USEP activities and as provided by individual escapees.
2. Intelligence value information.
3. Candidates for operational programs, both overt and covert.
4. Special service support such as assistance in developing a co-operative attitude in escapees during debriefing and through special handling of disposal cases referred by the operating programs insofar as feasible by an overt apparatus.<sup>88</sup>

EP’s hidden goals such as the above have been partially disclosed in recent years. According to the AP’s investigation conducted in 2007, the American authorities instituted the International Tracing Service, whose task was to go through Nazi documents and to use them to reunite families dispersed during WWII, and to screen

<sup>86</sup> Scott Lucas, *Freedom’s War: The American Crusade against the Soviet Union* (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 140; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 918–19, 922–23.

<sup>87</sup> For the Operation Engross, see Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin: America’s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 78–80; Lucas, *Freedom’s War*, 140–41; Carruthers, “Between Camps”: 920.

<sup>88</sup> Operations Coordinating Board, *Report on the Examination of the Effectiveness of the Escapee Program in Meeting Objectives under NSC 86/1*, Feb. 2, 1954, NARA, RG 59, Box 38, Entry A1 1586C, NND 959007, no number.

EP files on the backgrounds of the escapees for the purpose of recruiting covert US spies.<sup>89</sup>

The EP clearly articulated its political reasons for supporting refugees from communist countries. A memorandum entitled “Escapee Program Submission FY 1954” and revised on October 17, 1952 stated the history of refugee relief in the following manner:

The United States Government has traditionally taken a keen interest in the problems of refugees and escapees, because of the humanitarian considerations involved, as well as the political, economic and psychological significance of these groups.<sup>90</sup>

It is noteworthy that the EP emphasized “political, psychological warfare, and intelligence interests” beyond humanitarianism.<sup>91</sup> Such an emphasis coincides with Paxton’s covert intentions with regard to the Uyghur and Kazakh refugees.

The EP identified the importance of refugees in terms such as a) the cooperation of individual refugees and “usefulness of the group as sources of intelligence or as participants in U.S. psychological warfare”; b) the neglect of escapees or their lack of hope would damage the US’s psychological warfare efforts against the USSR and its satellite countries; c) the reception, care, and resettlement of the refugees would provide a firm factual basis for the US’s psychological programs.<sup>92</sup> The EP targeted select groups and applied a relatively small amount of money for relief. The application of the EP in these areas would be “directed primarily toward assisting U.S. political, psychological warfare and intelligence programs.”<sup>93</sup>

### *EP’s Application to Kazakh Refugees*

Kazakh refugees matched such US interests very well. Memoranda written by two men, both named Edwin Martin, describe the reasoning behind the expansion of the EP to include Kazakh refugees. As previously mentioned, the EP did not in-

<sup>89</sup> However, it failed to reach outstanding results. Arthur Max and Randy Herschaft, “Archive Catalogs Use of Cold War Refugees: ‘Escapee Program’ Covert Side Was Recruiting Spies,” *SFGate*, Jan. 4, 2009, <https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Archive-catalogs-use-of-Cold-War-refugees-3255775.php> (accessed Nov. 13, 2018); DW Staff, “US Cold War Resettlement Program Used for Propaganda, Spying,” *DW*, Dec. 29, 2008, <http://p.dw.com/p/GOKK> (accessed Nov. 13, 2018).

<sup>90</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program Submission FY 1954,” in *Records* 27: 225.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*: 227.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*: 228–29.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*: 230.

clude refugees from communist China at its inception. The first Martin, Edwin W. Martin of CA, wrote his colleague on October 27, 1952. Martin learned that the Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs (UNA/R), had approached CA to extend the EP which had been limited to Europe and to refugees in Hong Kong, South Asia, and the Near East. CA had also previously recommended such an expansion. According to Martin, CA felt that to continue the EP agenda in Europe while “neglecting Asia would be an untenable proposition,” and that there was an “important political and psychological advantages to be gained” in adopting the EP’s program in Asian areas. Further, the UNA/R was attempting to get approval from the Director of Mutual Security (DMS) for an immediate assistance project for around 300 Xinjiang refugees in Kashmir, namely the Kazakhs.<sup>94</sup>

On the same day that the first Martin wrote his memorandum, the second Martin, Edwin M. Martin, Special Assistant for Mutual Security Affairs, wrote to John Ohly in DMS. This message represented the views of the Department of State with regard to a proposal to assist Kazakh refugees. At first, Martin indicated that “It is anticipated that this project [EP] will serve to advance United States national psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives.” He continued, “it is believed that assistance to this group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the United States and, apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial political effects.”

Paxton’s devotion to arousing the interest of high officials in the Kazakh refugees can be seen in Edwin’s quotation from Loy Henderson, which has already been quoted above: “we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the U.S.” In short, Paxton’s efforts finally reached one of the highest officials in the Department of State. These phrases also remind us of Paxton’s intention as expressed in his letter to Soulen as previously mentioned.

What do “invest” and “return” mean here? Edwin M. Martin distinguished the Kazakhs from refugees in Europe, whom the EP should resettle in some third country due to over-population and local unemployment in Europe. On the contrary, Martin considered it possible to push for the local (in Kashmir) resettlement or integration of refugees “who prefer to remain close to their homeland.” Local resettlement could be relatively low cost. He estimated that 147 refugees could be settled in

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<sup>94</sup> Edwin W. Martin to Walter P. McConaughy, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, “Developments in Escapee Program,” in *Records* 27: 223.

Departure in	Eminent immigrant	Immigrants to Turkey	Total	Remainders in Kashmir
Aug. 1952	Hüseyin Teyci	102	102	230
Nov. 1952	Ömer Çobanoğlu (Alibek's group)	78	180	152
Jan. 1953	Enver Koçyiğit (son of Sultan Şerif)	20 families	-	-
Oct. 1953	-	-	253	97
till Nov. 1953	?	18	271	70
till Mar. 1954	Sultan Şerif	32	303	65
Jun. 1954	Alibek Hakim	59	362	6 (the Canalays)

**Table 1:** Process of Kazakh refugees' resettlement from Kashmir to Turkey<sup>95</sup>

Kashmir for \$11,000 USD while \$9,000 would be needed to establish the 153 refugees who had transited to Turkey, i.e., Hüseyin Teyci and the group that left Srinagar in October 1952. For this group, in fact, the above mentioned memorandum "Escapee Program Submission FY 1954" mentioned covering the deficit in their transportation cost.<sup>96</sup> Per capita, the cost of the former option would be \$75, and the latter would require \$59. Martin concluded that "In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasible and inexpensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group." With respect to the urban resettlement of 68 Uyghurs (Turki), he entrusted a voluntary agency for small loans for business, trading and crafting, the refund of which "would be applied to further work among Central Asian refugees."<sup>97</sup>

Such different aid resolutions depending on the group are mentioned in the above mentioned EP memorandum. This note recommended a combined migration: a local resettlement project for Xinjiang refugees as an "illustrative project for the Es-

<sup>95</sup> Jacques Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1953), 744; House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Mutual Security Act of 1954: Hearings on H.R. 1449*, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, 914, 925; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 83rd Cong., 2d sess., 1954, S. Rep. 1979 reprinted in *United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, 83rd Congress, Second Session* (St. Paul, MN: West, 1954), 2: 3232; Erkin Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan Hicretimizin 40. Yılı* (Kayseri: Erciyas Dergisi Doğu Türkistan Yayınları, 1990), 20, 30–36.

<sup>96</sup> U.S. Department of State, "Escapee Program," in *Records* 27: 253.

<sup>97</sup> For full text, see Appendix 2.



capee Program for the Near East and South Asia, subject to continuing study and development, and to prior determination that such projects will provide maximum support for political, psychological and intelligence activities in Central Asia, both overt and covert.”<sup>98</sup>

Martin’s resettlement plans were not realized. According to several data sources including the hearings before the committee of the House of Representatives and report of the Senate committee, the group that was expected to settle in rural Kashmir also gradually migrated to Turkey. As previously mentioned, the National Council of Churches was charged with transferring the Kazakh refugees from Srinagar to Bombay, and its headquarters at the World Council of Churches was also contracted with the EP.<sup>99</sup> Finally, in June 1954, Alibek and the last group of Kazakh refugees departed, and only Canaltay’s family remained in Kashmir.

### *Wedge into Soviet Russia*

Nevertheless, Edwin M. Martin’s aim of utilizing the Kazakh refugees as “political, psychological and intelligence” agents can be noted in the memories of Mansur Teyci, Hüseyin’s son. He recalled his childhood in Kashmir as follows:

One day, my father, Alibek, Canaltay, and Sultan Şerif were invited to the house of a person connected to Indian intelligent service. My father took me there. I remember well there was a bicycle which I had never seen in Eastern Turkestan. After years I learned that they offered to supply efficient foods, clothes, house etc. if Kazakhs present them their youths. Indians intended to send these Kazakhs back to China wearing nomad clothes and to engage them in intelligence activity. This was an attractive offer. But my father refused perhaps for his naive character and I was sole son of him. The others showed interest, but due to my father’s refuse, this offer did not realize.

Later Canaltay served in Indian intelligence service.<sup>100</sup>

The exact reason why Kazakh refugees who had desired to remain in Kash-

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<sup>98</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Escapee Program,” in *Records* 27: 253–54.

<sup>99</sup> U.S. Foreign Operations Administration, *Escape*, 21. Besides the World Council of Churches, the Tolstoy Foundation and Church World Service also attended to the EP.

<sup>100</sup> Mansur Teyci, interview by author, Istanbul, Sep. 2013.

mir, like Alibek's group, decided to migrate Turkey is still unclear.<sup>101</sup> Of course, Turkish citizenship must have been attractive to them, but this reason is still insufficient in explaining why the refugees surrendered their hopes of remaining in Kashmir, which was close to their homeland, and which matched the second Edwin Martin's expectations.

Because of this move, Washington could not accomplish the EP's hidden aim, or initiate "Phase B" of utilizing Kazakh refugees for "political, psychological and intelligence" purposes in Kashmir as divulged by Mansur's statement. However, it was very possible that some other refugees who had left Xinjiang in 1934 and had remained in Pakistan were recruited by the CIA for covert operations in Xinjiang. In his memoir, the former Chief Justice of Azad Kashmir High Court, Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, recorded the entrance of the Kazakh refugees into Kashmir. Years later, they dispersed through the northern parts of British India and in 1950–51, there existed a large number of Kazakh refugees in Jhelum, a city of Pakistani Punjab.<sup>102</sup> After Pakistan entered the Baghdad Pact in 1955, these refugees disappeared and Saraf describes their news in the following manner:

after we had entered into the American-sponsored Military alliances, they [Kazakh refugees in Jhelum] suddenly disappeared from the town and rumours have been current persistently that they were picked up by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States, smuggled out of Pakistan and after training, at least some of them were smuggled into the Soviet Union for spying. In December, 1973, this writer [Saraf] met two Kazak shop-keepers in Mecca who had been among these refugees. They confirmed that some had "gone" back to Soviet Russia.<sup>103</sup>

Of course, this report was merely based on hearsay and the refugees in Jhelum may have emigrated to Turkey or may have returned to Xinjiang of their own free will. The same applies to escapees in Western camps, who were disillusioned with the West and "found the "free world" less than hospitable" and who re-

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<sup>101</sup> Doğru told the author just Turkish Government suddenly gave them visas. Doğru, interview by author.

<sup>102</sup> Muhammad Yusuf Saraf, *Kashmiris Fight-for Freedom* (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1977), 1: 572–73.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*: 572.

defected to the East in the mid-1950's.<sup>104</sup> 221 of the 798 Uyghurs who fled Xinjiang with Alptekin and who reached Ladakh returned to Xinjiang because of lack of finances and other reasons. Subsequently, 45 refugees returned to Xinjiang from Srinagar. More than 100 refugees also returned to Xinjiang from a pilgrimage to Mecca because of financial reasons and because of the false rumor of improved conditions in their homeland.<sup>105</sup>

Thus, it was quite natural that refugees returned to Xinjiang because of the difficulties and disillusionments they encountered in their first asylum country. The more refugees re-defected, the better suited they were for covert operations. The dissatisfaction of the re-defectors with the "free world" could have been also exploited to mask their intelligence and psychological warfare roles for "Phase B."

It may be pertinent at this juncture to recall the instance of Soviet counter-intelligence against the Turkestan National Union, the outstanding anti-Soviet organization of Western Turkestan émigrés in Western Europe and Middle East. In 1931, an exile from Tashkent named Bahrom Ibrohimov wrote Mufti Sadriddin Xon, the representative of the Union's Mashhad branch. He claimed to be a writer who was in a relationship with a secret organization, and who had escaped from Turkestan fearing arrest. Sadriddin Xon verified Ibrohimov's statement as accurate and forwarded it to the Union's headquarters. Thus, Ibrohimov penetrated the Union and subsequently adopted the new name Mahmud Oyqorli. He worked as Sadriddin Xon's secretary in Afghanistan. However, Oyqorli, whose real identity was GPU agent, took over the Union's Kabul branch and eliminated his boss Sadriddin Xon in 1935. He managed the Union's operations encompassing Iran, Afghanistan, North India, and Xinjiang under the supervision of Soviet spy networks for 24 years. Some of the former anti-Bolshevik guerrillas fell to Oyqorli's death traps. It was only after 1954 when Oyqorli returned to the Soviet Union that his identity was fully exposed.<sup>106</sup> Why then, would Washington not conceive of sending Xinjiang refugees back home to infiltrate their native country under the guise of being disillusioned with Pakistan/India or the "free world" as re-defectors? Why would the US, at the very least, not assist these refugees and keep them close to the Sino-Indian borderland in the name of local integration?

<sup>104</sup> Carruthers, "Between Camps": 934-35.

<sup>105</sup> İsa Yusuf Alptekin to Paxton, Jan. 28, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 115, 19-20.

<sup>106</sup> A. Ahat Andican, *Turkestan Struggle Abroad: from Jadidism to Independence* (Haarlem: SO-TA, 2007), 361-62, 364, 370-80, 445, 545-48, 601-5.

Returning to Saraf's testimony, it is noteworthy that the Kazakh shopkeepers affirmed that some refugees had returned to Soviet Russia, not to China's Xinjiang. Similarly, Donald Ebright of the NCC of India also observed Russia's advance into Xinjiang, writing that "Russia needs Central Asia's resources for her global conquest!"<sup>107</sup> It may hence be said that Kazakh refugees tended to be regarded as fleeing from Soviet Russia.<sup>108</sup>

A travel journal written by American naturalist and explorer John Stanwell-Fletcher provides interesting narrative of Kazakh refugees in this context. While traveling through Kashmir, John heard by chance of the refugees led by "Hassantaj" and Sultan Şerif in Kargil before they entered in Srinagar. "Hassantaj" willingly accepted John's offer of an interview. According to "Hassantaj," he had originally lived in eastern Kazakhstan and had been a leader of the first 25 Kazakh men, women, and children who had openly resisted communist policies. They were forced to flee to Urumqi, and were soon driven out from that location by the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR) security troops to Barköl. There, they were joined by another Kazakh group led by Sultan Şerif and months later they began to flee toward the Taklamakan Deserts, the Tibet mountains, and finally reached India. "All of the first twenty-five," "Hassantaj" said smiling briefly, "who had fled with me from Kazakhstan were with me still."<sup>109</sup>

In fact, there was no Hasan Teyci among prominent refugee leaders. This term must be a misspelling of the name Hüseyin Teyci (Qüsayin Täyzhı), whose background was wholly different from the above narrative. Hüseyin was born in Saertuohai (Sartohay), Qinggil, in north Xinjiang in 1900 and left Barköl in 1938 as a result of Sheng Shicai's purge. The Kazakhs led by Hüseyin settled in the mountains in southern Suzhou. As a result of armed clashes with Ma Bufang's army in 1940, however, they wandered to southeast Xinjiang (Ruoqiang) and west Qinghai (Wutumeiren). After 1943, Hüseyin Teyci's group moved to Gasköl in northwest Qinghai close to Xinjiang. After this transition, Hüseyin worked to increase his livestock, and sheltered other defectors from Xinjiang such as Alibek Hakim, Yolbars Khan, and Douglas Mackiernan.<sup>110</sup> When Osman Batur was defeated and the Peo-

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<sup>107</sup> Ebright, *Free India*, 135–36.

<sup>108</sup> As to the Soviet factor on Kazakh migration, see Chapter 3 in this book.

<sup>109</sup> Stanwell-Fletcher, *Pattern*, 127–35.

<sup>110</sup> For Mackiernan and his follower Frank Bessac's stay in Timurlik of the Gasköl region, see Godfrey Lias, *Kazak Exodus* (London: Evans Brothers, 1956), 170–72; Thomas Laird, *Into*

ple's Liberation Army advanced to Huahaizi in March 1951, Hüseyin Teyci, Delilhan Canlatan, and Sultan Şerif's groups decided to flee to India via Tibet.<sup>111</sup>

In short, it is difficult to regard Hüseyin Teyci as resistant to Soviet policies. Hence, his narrative was just a means of arousing John's pity.<sup>112</sup> Hüseyin Teyci knew very well how to frame people who fled Xinjiang, not from Soviet Kazakhstan as "freedom seekers" who would be ideal for America's "zero-sum game" to display its superiority against the Soviet Union. The adoption of Kazakh refugees to the expanded EP was not a passing whim for Washington. Assisting them was expected to drive a wedge not only into communist China, but also into the Soviet Union's eastern front while the original EP targeted the escapees from the Iron Curtain. As Paxton wrote to Henderson, they were eligible for "investment."

## 5. Conclusion

This paper focused on the various forms of American aid extended to the Kazakh refugees in Kashmir from the local agencies to the highest political echelons of Washington. In the early stages of this support, missionary organizations and an anthropologist politicized the Kazakh refugees parallel to the humanitarian assistance. Apart from their humanitarian motives, the Americans also found a way to fit the refugees into their strategy against the communists. Such approaches were made under the disguise of relief. In particular, the role played by Hall Paxton was crucial from the viewpoint of encompassing them within the "not forgetting you" affect. He struggled to maintain the refugees favorable attitude toward America and in doing so (donation, arrangement of scholarship, etc.), he sublimated the poor Kazakh refu-

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*Tibet: The CIA's First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa* (New York: Grove Press, 2002), 127, 146–53; Frank Bagnall Bessac, Susanne Leppmann Bessac and Joan Orielle Bessac Steelquist, *Death on the Chang Tang: Tibet 1950; The Education of an Anthropologist* (Missoula, MT: University of Montana Printing & Graphic Services, 2006), 71–82; Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda*, 216–18. Before his departure, Mackiernan tore a five-dollar bill into two pieces and placed his and Alibek's thumbprints on each portion. Mackiernan gave one to Alibek and told him to show it to a certain American official in Delhi. However, Mansur Teyci questioned this famous episode and alleged that Alibek tore the bill after arriving in Kashmir. Teyci, interview by author.

<sup>111</sup> Ömer Kul ve Emin Kırkıl, "Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri Liderlerinden Bir Portre: Hüseyin Teyci Alkenbayoğlu (1900–20 Eylül 1963)," *Trakya Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 1, sy. 2 (2011): 107–11, 113, 122; Haruhira Abe, "Rurō kazafu kaimetsu no kiroku," *Chūgoku kenkyū geppō* 56, no. 1 (2002): 23–24, 29–32.

<sup>112</sup> Mansur Teyci also laughed off his father's narrative. Teyci, interview by author.

gees into recipients of America's "investment" or to the position of hopeful candidates of the US's covert "Phase B" operations. Kazakh refugees also repeatedly expressed their ties with Paxton and America. From Washington's perspective, it was difficult to accept these refugees into America. Here the EP emerged to fulfill not only overt aid to them in humanitarian concern, but also covert aims to utilize them for America's own strategic interest. Though the EP offered two options for refugees, migration to a third country or local integration, the latter was apparently more desirable for the Kazakh refugees for the sake of American interests.

If only the results are considered, the Americans could not sufficiently utilize the Kazakh refugees within the EP framework. Almost all of the Kazakh refugees left Kashmir, so the EP merely ended up covering their migration expenses and failed to retain them in Kashmir as hopeful candidates for "Phase B." Further, soon after they settled in Turkey, conflicts emerged between some Kazakh migrants and the Uyghur refugees headed by Alptekin, and even between groups of Kazakhs. In December 1955, CA pointed out that "Turkey has already had some difficulty owing to factionalism within the groups settled in Turkey."<sup>113</sup>

Nevertheless, American involvement in the Kazakh refugee problem, and with political refugees from Central Eurasia in general, would take a new, more statistical shape in the form of Radio Liberty in Munich. Previous studies on this anti-communist broadcasting service have not paid requisite attention to its recruiting of young refugees or the children of other Turkic-origin diasporas such as Hasan Oral-tay or Ali Akış who were active in the Idil-Ural Movement of Volga Tatars, and Settar Makbul Çoban, whom Alptekin listed as a candidate to study in America and who did so.<sup>114</sup> Some employees of Turkic origin were transferred to academic careers in the post-Soviet years and are still engaged. This overlap between the extension of "Phase B" and the national struggles of Turkic émigrés and refugees overseas needs more cautious investigation.

Today, the core generation that experienced the Kazakh "exodus" has almost passed away and the second generation born in Turkey is also aging. The fact that Kazakh refugees in Kashmir had attracted the attention and aid of missionaries, anthropologist, diplomats, high-level politicians, and overt—but well calculated—

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<sup>113</sup> Douglas Forman to Kendrick, memorandum, Dec. 9, 1955, "Proposed Trip by Representative of Yolbars Khan to Visit Sinkiang Refugees in Various Foreign Countries," in *Records* 19: 67.

<sup>114</sup> Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 16.

kindness has already fallen into oblivion. It is almost forgotten that this small, marginalized group of people had been deemed to be vested with a peculiarity that was worth receiving the EP investment for “psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives,” namely “Phase B.” In this sense, the migration of the Kazakh refugees to Turkey was accomplished as the very product of the early cold war period.

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## Appendix

### 1. *J. Hall Paxton's Letter to Loy Henderson*<sup>115</sup>

American Consulate  
Isfahan, Iran  
November 14, 1951

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you perhaps already know, I have been much interested in helping the group of Turkis who fled from Sinkiang with Mohammed Emin Bugra and Isa Yusuf Aliptekin [sic] and are now dragging out a poor existence in Srinagar.

I have been told that, as soon as their case was presented to you in New Delhi, you called to the Department's attention the importance of not permitting the opportunity to slip for our Government to show an interest in them. Their case is simply this: they are bitterly anti-Communist and have endured tremendous hardships and suffered heavy losses, in both wealth and lives, in their escape over the Karakorum Route from Sinkiang to Ladakh and are now friendless in a strange land.

While it is clear that they do not have the slightest claim on the United States, still it is natural that, in view of the aid given by our country to others who have opposed Soviet Imperialism, they should turn first to us for succor and might hope to receive somewhat more consideration both as a group and as individuals than has yet been shown them by the American Government.

In addition to deserving, at least, moral support from us, I feel it to our national interest to win the disproportionate propaganda credit that would accrue from the smallest gesture of aid to them. This group now seems deserted tiny financial investment (a few thousand dollars in an outright gift to alleviate their misery until something more permanent can be worked out for them, in the way of their resettlement in the New World), this news would reverberate far and wide throughout Muslim Central Asia to our credit and the Russian discredit.

In March 1950, when I was leaving Washington on another assignment, I was told by a member of the Policy Planning Staff that: it had been decided to bring

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<sup>115</sup> Paxton to Henderson, Nov. 14, 1951, NARA, RG 59, Box 5645, NND 822910, 893.411/1-852.

the entire party to the United States for permanent residence; funds had been allocated; their place of settlement in America determined; visa requirements arranged for and they all should be arriving by ship at New York within less than four months; Isa Yusuf Aliptekin would be flying in first and, on his arrival, I should be notified and assigned to assist him in planning for the reception of the group. However, since that time, not a word further from my friend in P. – not even an acknowledgement to my letters enquiring about his undertaking.

I have continued to hear from Isa every few months and others of the group from time to time, and there appears to be nothing known to them in prospect, either proximate or long term, for their relief.

Naturally I do not wish to prejudge what should be done for these refugees, but their case has not yet been heard and, in view of the possible wide repercussions that might result from even limited action on our part, it surely deserves a hearing. I have not yet tried to organize the pertinent facts – perhaps it could not be done adequately without a visit to the group now in Kashmir, which seems unlikely for me at present – but I think you will agree that their problems deserve more sympathetic consideration than they have yet been given.

I should appreciate your advice as to the best means of having this matter weighted in executive councils where the problems of these displaced people and our national interest in giving them some aid could really be considered. When we are handing out millions of dollars for, sometimes, weaker causes and so large a portion of our aid to Asia is earmarked for China it seems that these people should not be forgotten.

While Government action is being delayed I would like to explore other resources that might be available for these unfortunates, rejected by both the slave world and the free. I feel confident that some of them would make as good sheepherders as the Basques, whom I hear are being specially imported to fill vacancies in that industry in Wyoming, Montana and Idaho. Might not the Senators from these states and possibly also from Utah, Nevada, Arizona, or New Mexico be interested Turki oasis-farmers who have had experience in growing crops with little irrigation facilities? What are the channels through which these needs for immigrants can be ascertained?

Another possible source of assistance is suggested in the clipping I enclose

from a recent radio bulletin. Would an appeal to philanthropic groups such as these be advisable?

In the meantime I wish to make another personal contribution and should appreciate your assistance in transmitting it to New Delhi. I am enclosing a personal check made out in your name. I am doing this because a check payable to the "American Embassy, New Delhi" was returned, last year, for substitution of the name of an officer there, as it was inconvenient to take it through the official accounts.<sup>116</sup> Would you be so kind as to endorse and mail it to the appropriate person in India for transmission to the "Turkestan Refugee Committee, Srinagar, Kashmir" under whatever safeguards may be appropriate to ensure that it does all the good possible at the best rate of exchange?

Forgive my bothering you with this problem, so remote from our present concerns, but I feel it to be of considerable importance. In view of the reports which have reached me of your personal interest in the plight of these unfortunates, I am encouraged to hope that you may assist me in finding some available way to help these good friends.

Sincerely yours,

J. Hall Paxton

*2. Memorandum on EP's Adaption to Kazakh Refugees*<sup>117</sup>

MEMORANDUM FOR: John H. Ohly

Office of Director for Mutual Security

SUBJECT: Resettlement of Sinkiang Refugees now in Kashmir

I would like to explain further the views of the Department of State concerning certain aspects of the recent proposal to assist to Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir.

It is anticipated that this project will serve to advance United States national psychological warfare, political and intelligence objectives. With respect to the Government of India and local authorities in Kashmir, it is believed that assistance to this group of Sinkiang refugees in Kashmir is in the interests of the United States and,

<sup>116</sup> Forman to Paxton, May 21, 1951, Paxton Papers, Box 6, Folder 119, 21.

<sup>117</sup> Edwin M. Martin to John H. Ohly, memorandum, Oct. 27, 1952, "Settlement of Sinkiang Refugees now in Kashmir," in *Records* 27: 216-18.

apart from purely humanitarian reasons, will have beneficial political effects. The government of India is already heavily burdened with the problem of resettlement of the millions of refugees from Pakistan, and will welcome United States assistance in caring for the needs of this small additional group. This action on the part of the United States will provide concrete demonstration, in a part of India where the Point 4 Program is not operative, of the continuing humane concern of this country for the plight of the oppressed peoples around the world. Ambassador Loy Henderson has recently written the Department from Tehran concerning this group: "... I am convinced that there is a strong possibility that the funds and the time which we might be able to invest in assisting these refugees might yield a rich return to the U.S."

With respect to the areas from which these people have fled, it is important to note that, pursuant to present National Security Council policy, it is in the United States interest to encourage and exploit areas of potential friction between the USSR and Communist China. Sinkiang Province, which has long been a source of contention between Russia and China, is a notable example of such areas of political friction. In addition to its strategic location, Sinkiang has had a long history of resistance to both Chinese and Russian encroachment. The racial minority groups living there are among the most intensely nationalistic of Central Asia. Various ethnic groups in Sinkiang have made repeated appeals to United States officials, notably the late J. Hall Paxton, for United States moral, economic and political support. Considering the little help extended by the United States to these people, it is fortunate and, indeed, surprising that an opportunity still remains for cultivating their friendship and political assistance at relatively little cost. Intelligent assistance is not only desirable but, in the light of United States policy objectives, is imperative if the latent potential is to be utilized. In this connection, particular attention should be invited to the usefulness to the United States of a program providing assistance for settlement of anti-Communist escapees reasonably near the area from which they fled.

It should be emphasized, with reference to the questions which have been raised concerning the local resettlement aspects of the project, that the primary objective of the Escapee Program is to re-establish the individual escapees on a self-sufficient basis, so that he may regain his dignity and self-respect, and will no longer require relief assistance. In Europe, the countries of first asylum happen also to

be, with one or two possible exceptions, areas of surplus population. The means, therefore, for assisting the escapee must in general be onward migration to areas of expanding employment opportunity, such as Canada, Australia or Latin America. The Escapee Program has not, in consequence, engaged to any great degree in projects to resettle escapees locally in their European countries of refuge. Resettlement in Europe, however, has been recognized from the outset of the program as a possible alternative under certain circumstances. President Truman, in his message to the Congress of March 24, said: "Supplemental care and overseas migration do not, however, constitute all that should be done for those who escape Eastern Europe. A substantial number of them want to stay in Europe and should have the chance to do so. They should be welcomed in Europe and given the opportunity to make their individual contributions to the free world."

In Kashmir, no similar unemployment exists among the local population to make the onward movement of refugees mandatory. This presents the definite alternative of local resettlement or integration for those refugees who prefer to remain close to their homeland. In this instance, the local settlement can be accomplished by homestanding in rural Kashmir, and establishment in small business in Srinagar, at a per capita cost roughly equal to that of movement to Turkey. In my letter of September 15, 1952 to Mr. Harriman concerning this matter, it was pointed out that 153 refugees can be moved to Turkey for \$9,000, or approximately \$59 per capita, and 147 would be resettled locally per \$11,000, or approximately \$75 per capita. With reference to the method of administering the urban resettlement project for 68 Turks, it is anticipated that small land or partnership arrangements would be worked out in individual cases by the administering voluntary agency. Where practicable, funds would be recovered from the local resettlers, and would be applied to further work among Central Asian refugees under provision of the contract between the United States Government and the administering voluntary agency.

In both the European program and the Kashmir project the objective is that of permanent establishment of the refugee under conditions favorable to self-dependence. In Europe, local conditions of unemployment among the indigenous populations recommend onward movement. In Kashmir, local resettlement is a feasible and inexpensive alternative, consistent with the wishes of many of the group. The proposal represents a practical solution, in light of prevailing local conditions, to this problem of selecting the means best calculated to serve the objective of the program.

With reference to the question of recurrent requests of this nature, I would call your attention to the fact that a small program for the Near East, South Asia and the Far East is included in the FY 1954 Escapee Program submission. Illustrative programs have been developed to specify the type of projects contemplated for these areas, and in the Near East local resettlement is clearly one of the means to be considered. It is assumed, therefore, that this matter will shortly be placed directly before the Congress for approval on a continuing basis. In the interim, I would again recommend your approval of this urgent project as being wholly consistent with the objectives of the Escapee Program as defined in basic Psychological Strategy Board documents and administered under section 101(a)(1) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended, and within the intent of legislative authority already available under section 303(a) of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended.

Edwin M. Martin  
Special Assistant to the Secretary  
for the Mutual Security Affairs

CLEARANCES:

SOA<sup>118</sup>:FDCollins

CA:EWMartin

CA:WOAnderson

UNA<sup>119</sup>:

UNA:UNA/R<sup>120</sup>:RMCashin:mit

10/27/52

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<sup>118</sup> Office of South Asian Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>119</sup> Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State.

<sup>120</sup> Refugees and Displaced Persons Staff, Bureau of United Nations Affairs, Department of State.





## Chapter 5

# An Examination of the Fate of Xinjiang Refugees during the Cold War

**Justin M. Jacobs**  
American University

### Abstract

This paper analyzes the office of the Nationalist Chinese “chairman” (*zhuxi*) of Xinjiang Province from Taiwan during the Cold War. This so-called government “in exile,” under the initiative of Yolbars Khan, undertook significant efforts to maintain contact with, and offer financial support to, Uyghur and Kazakh refugees in South Asia and the Middle East. A history of the relations between Yolbars Khan and the Xinjiang refugee community during the Cold War will help to explain why the political activism of prominent Xinjiang refugees such as Mohammed Emin Buğra and İsa Yusuf Alptekin failed to reach the same level of international recognition as the Dalai Lama was able to achieve for the plight of Tibet.

### 1. Fleeing Xinjiang

In September 1949, a steady exodus of Nationalist officials and soldiers, along with more than ten thousand anxious Kazakh nomads and various other Communist irreconcilables, streamed south from Xinjiang toward the Himalayan passes, eager to exit the province before the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army. Those fortunate enough to flee on wheels were sped recklessly through local oases, plowing through donkeys and other livestock, whose intestines came to decorate the vehicles in macabre fashion. As they neared Tibet, motorized transport was abandoned and everyone either struck out on foot or took mount, scaling snowy slopes in sub-zero temperatures. Pack animals slipped on a daily basis and fell to their demise, their splattered innards and mangled limbs traumatizing those who dared to look down. The ele-

ments were just as brutal, with lips and facial extremities peeling beyond all recognition. Numerous children froze to death, debilitating injuries were common, and few escaped chronic sickness. Some two to three months later, however, the survivors found themselves in Gilgit or Kalimpong, from whence they proceeded to Srinagar or New Delhi, many panhandling to make ends meet.<sup>1</sup> By 1952, some 2,300 Kazakhs, 1,300 Uyghurs, and several hundred Chinese refugees had managed to survive the flight into South Asia from Xinjiang.

As British and American diplomats in New Delhi and Isfahan were soon to learn, many of them carried fond memories of Douglas Mackiernan. Long an enigma, he is now tacitly acknowledged as the name behind the first star on the Memorial Wall at CIA headquarters, having been shot and dismembered by Tibetan border guards in April 1950. "I knew Mackiernan very well, from the time he was in charge of a small detachment of army meteorologists," recalled an assistant to J.C. Hutchison, the British Charge d'Affaires in Beijing, in 1950, "and always wondered why a man with his exceptional qualities stayed on in Urumchi after the end of the war."<sup>2</sup> We now know why: from 1945 until his death five years later, Mackiernan seems to have cultivated extensive ties with potential anti-Communist guerrilla warriors, the most famous of which was Kazakh chieftain Osman Batur, executed in 1951. The Chinese Communists were convinced Mackiernan had spent his time dangling the prospect of significant American aid to disaffected nomads come World War III, and said as much in reams of post-1949 propaganda.<sup>3</sup>

With the benefit of archival hindsight, such charges are beginning to appear less and less outlandish. Upon their arrival in Srinagar or New Delhi, prominent Uyghur and Kazakh refugees invariably asked American and British visitors the same two questions. What had happened to their good friend Douglas Mackiernan? And when was World War III due to break out? Yolbars Khan, the one-time *ordabegi* (major-domo) of the Hami khanate who had once parlayed his resistance toward warlord Sheng Shicai into an advisory post in the Nationalist government in Chongqing, was canvassed soon after his arrival at the British embassy in New Delhi. He

<sup>1</sup> Zhang Dajun, *Hengdu Kunlun san wan li* (Xianggang: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954), 44-45, 74-76, 86-87, 124.

<sup>2</sup> "A Report on Conditions in Sinkiang Prepared by Mr. O. C. Ellis," November 15, 1950, British National Archives, Far Eastern Department, FO 171/92207, Enclosure 2, 2.

<sup>3</sup> Justin M. Jacobs, "The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 5 (2010): 1291-1314.

“has reconciled himself to awaiting hopeful developments, among which he seems (like so many other refugees) to include the possibility of a Third world war.”<sup>4</sup> Hüseyin Teyci, one of the heads of some three hundred Kazakh refugees in Srinagar, revealed extensive prior contact with Mackiernan, as well as considerable apprehension over whether or not he could still leverage the latter’s investment in him. “I am very much eager to hear any news about Mr. Meckarneen who is, however, expected to have been settled down in the free world,” he wrote to John Hall Paxton, the former U.S. consul in Urumchi, now posted to Isfahan. “I did my best to welcome and precede him at Gas-kul, my dwelling place, where I got the chance to treat and entertain him for five months as my only guest I have ever had. I am still carrying his notes and an introduction as souvenir he had written for me. I would be thankful to you if you be kind enough to get me hear of him as soon as possible.”<sup>5</sup>

Just as the tragic fate of one past suitor came to light, however, another suitor quickly stepped in to fill his shoes. This was the Nationalist government in Taipei, which soon issued numerous invitations for Kazakh and Uyghur refugee leaders to relocate to Taiwan. Delilhan Haji, the son of former Xinjiang Minister of Finance Janimhan (Canumhan), a Kazakh chieftain executed by the Communists in 1951, relayed his invitation to sympathetic American diplomats. Speaking in “a cultured and well-modulated voice” to those who visited his camp in Srinagar, Delilhan also sought advice from John Hall Paxton in Isfahan. “I received a letter from Formosa in which I have been invited to come to Formosa,” he informed Paxton in admirable English, adding that the Nationalists had already agreed to send him funds and a passport for the journey. “But I afraid if I will go to Formosa, the Communists may reach there. Therefore I require your consultation weather I will go to Formosa or not.”<sup>6</sup> Delilhan ultimately decided to remain in Srinigar, where he kept an open and sympathetic line of communication with Taipei. For Yolbars, however, who was then sixty-three years old and thus Delilhan’s senior by some four decades, the prospect of a comfortable sinecure on Taiwan was most appealing. During an interview with

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<sup>4</sup> “Record of Interviews with General Yolbas Beg, former Governor of Hami in Sinkiang, at New Delhi,” April 3, 1951, British National Archives, Far Eastern Department, FO 171/92207.

<sup>5</sup> “Letter from Hüseyin Teyci to Mr. J. Hall Paxton,” January 23, 1952, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, 350.4.

<sup>6</sup> “Notes on the Kazak refugees in Kashmir” and “Letter from General Delilhan Haji to J. Hall Paxton, February 29, 1952,” National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, 350.4.

British diplomats in New Delhi, Yolbars “stated his intention of going first to Kashmir to see the Sinkiang refugees there and then of continuing to Formosa where he was proposing to tell Chiang-kai-Shek of his mistake in giving arms to the Commander-in-Chief of Singkiang ... who surrendered to the Communists, when he might have given them to Yolbas who fought the Communists.”<sup>7</sup>

Also frequent participants in such meetings were İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mohammed Emin Buğra, both of whom ranked extremely high on the list of Xinjiang personages desired by the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Neither man expressed any interest in relocating to Taipei, however, and instead appear to have spent the majority of their time lobbying the Indian and Turkish governments to look after the welfare of the refugees in Kashmir. The most influential factor driving the various postures of İsa, Emin, and Yolbars toward Nationalist Taiwan appears to be found in their assessment of prospects for Xinjiang’s geopolitical future. “We understand,” wrote F. E. Cumming-Bruce, a British diplomat in the New Delhi embassy, “that whereas [İsa Yusuf] Aliptakin holds that an independent Turkestan is possible, Yolbas sees that such a state would be unable to withstand Soviet determination and that the only hope for Turkestan is to seek the protection of China, while endeavouring to secure the maximum degree of autonomy.”<sup>8</sup> As a result, the Nationalists were only able to recruit one of their four coveted personages to Taiwan (though Delilhan, from his base in Srinagar, later proved willing to make official appearances at the occasional political conference in Taipei).

The failure to convince either İsa or Emin to take up residence in Taiwan did not sit well with many of the Nationalist faithful in Taipei, some of whom were not enamored of the increasingly geriatric Yolbars. İsa and Emin were learned, cosmopolitan Uyghurs, flush in the prime of their careers, respected throughout the Muslim world, and thoroughly versed in the power of propaganda. By contrast, Yolbars was a product of the battlefield, and a parochial one at that. Up until now, he had never set a single foot outside of China. Furthermore, his well-known loyalty to the Nationalist government made his recruitment to Taiwan something less than a public relations coup. Of course someone like him would work for the Nationalists. In the mid-1940s, when the Nationalists finally succeeded in appointing their own governor to Xinjiang, Yolbars leveraged his well-known loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek into the

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<sup>7</sup> “Record of Interviews with General Yolbas Beg,” FO 171/92207.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

reclamation of his former authority in Hami. Ever since his return, wrote one admiring Nationalist official at the time, Yolbars “has extolled the virtue of the central government to various leaders and ... strenuously refuted the absurd proposals for independence and high-level autonomy.”<sup>9</sup> By contrast, luring İsa or Emin—both vocal critics of the Chinese government during the 1940s—to Taiwan would have allowed the Nationalists to parlay their recruitment into a substantial amount of political capital among Xinjiang refugees abroad.

That some top Nationalist officials in Taiwan were determined to pursue an alternative to Yolbars is clear well into the 1950s, many years after he first set foot upon the island. In November 1953, K. L. Rankin, the American ambassador in Taipei, solicited the views of Foreign Minister George Yeh regarding future Nationalist policy toward the non-Han borderlands, should the government one day succeed in retaking the mainland. Yeh took the occasion to excoriate Yolbars, calling him “ridiculous,” “illiterate,” and a “drag on the situation.” Most importantly, Yeh charged, “he is quite unacceptable to Mehmet Emin BUGRA and İsa Yusuf ALPTEKIN, whom Dr. Yeh regards as among the real leaders of the Sinkiang people -- despite their unfriendly attitude towards the Chinese Government. Dr. Yeh wished that these two men would come to Taipei but declared that, owing to Yalpus Khan’s being here (and to other reasons), they would not come here.”<sup>10</sup> Yeh’s allegations—several of which were questionable—nonetheless reflected the views of an influential faction within the Nationalist Party. The very next year, Chu Chia-hua, president of the prestigious Academia Sinica, published a series of letters he exchanged with Mohammed Emin Buğra, in which he continued to implore his “misinformed” Uyghur friend to take up residence on Taiwan, all the while somehow managing to avoid even a single reference to Yolbars, who by then had already been “chairman” of the province for three years.<sup>11</sup>

The reason Xinjiang exile politics were so contentious was because there were so few men with the necessary credentials to serve as a convincing representative for the province. Of the five former governors of Xinjiang who were still alive in 1950,

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<sup>9</sup> Zhongguo di er lishi dang’an guan, ed., *Zhonghua minguo shi dang’an ziliao huibian—di wu ji, di san bian: zhengzhi (wu)* (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1999), 466.

<sup>10</sup> K. L. Rankin to Walter P. McConaughy, November 5, 1953, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, 350.4.

<sup>11</sup> Chu Chia-hua, *Taiwan and Sinkiang (Formosa and Chinese Turkistan)* (Taipei: Chinese Association for the United Nations, 1954).

two (Zhang Zhizhong and Burhan Shahidi) had defected to the Communists, one (Masud Sabri) was waiting to die in a Communist jail cell, and two (Wu Zhongxin and Sheng Shicai) had fled to Taiwan. Unfortunately for the Nationalists, the two ex-governors who had chosen to seek refuge in Taiwan were both ethnic Han. Quite apart from the obligation, ubiquitous in the age of decolonization, to elevate “indigenous” politicians to positions of conspicuous authority, both Wu and Sheng were effectively barred from participation in Xinjiang refugee politics for reasons entirely unrelated to their ethnicity. Wu Zhongxin, governor for two years dating from late 1944, was an implacable foe of both İsa and Emin, having long viewed them as “ambitious careerists” who had shrewdly played the race card to advance a separatist platform from within the Party. As a result, if the goal was to lure İsa and Emin to Taiwan, Wu would be useless.

That left Sheng Shicai. The obligations of national determination notwithstanding, there is no reason an “enlightened” Han official could not play some substantive role on behalf of Chinese claims on Xinjiang, as former governor Zhang Zhizhong continued to do for the Communists after 1949. And Sheng, for his part, had once been considered among the most “enlightened” of any Han official who had ever set foot in Xinjiang, having developed and sponsored numerous institutions of Soviet affirmative action during his eleven-year tenure as *duban*. That, of course, was all before 1937, the year when Sheng began to purge nearly everyone he had briefly enfranchised. Yolbars, in particular, dated his first period of exile from Xinjiang to Sheng’s attempts to kill him in the mid-1930s, and the two men must have taken strict pains to avoid one other at Party gatherings in Taipei. Former American consul John Paxton, during a visit to Hami in 1948, noted how Yolbars “continued throughout to extol the Chinese Government of the province since the overthrow of Sheng, for whom, alone of Chinese, Yolbars had no good word.”<sup>12</sup>

Even for those more concerned about placating Emin and İsa rather than Yolbars, still General Sheng was anathema. In the chaos of 1949, when eleven members of Sheng’s extended family were brutally murdered as part of a revenge plot, İsa made a special trip to Lanzhou to console the perpetrators—recast in his account as “heroes”—and lobbied for their clemency in the courts.<sup>13</sup> Throughout his remaining

<sup>12</sup> “Travels in Southern and Eastern Sinkiang,” September 20, 1948, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, Sinkiang file 893.00.

<sup>13</sup> Ma Zhiyong, “Xinjiang junfa Sheng Shicai yuefu yijia bei sha zhi mi,” *Wenshi tiandi* 9 (2008).

years on the mainland and well into the 1950s on Taiwan, Sheng grew accustomed to calls for justice whenever and wherever he attended a Party conference. By the late 1950s, the uproar over Sheng's lack of accountability reached a peak, and some people suggested that he should "commit suicide in order to appease Heaven."<sup>14</sup> It was only the personal intervention of the Generalissimo himself that insulated Sheng from his detractors. Following his collaboration with Allen S. Whiting in 1958, with whom Sheng co-authored *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*,<sup>15</sup> Sheng promptly dropped out of public life, changed his name, and began to carry a revolver everywhere he went, supporting himself on the 50,000 taels of gold he had siphoned off from Xinjiang's coffers two decades prior. For such a man, there was no public or private role possible within the Xinjiang exile community. Instead, Sheng appears to have limited himself to accepting the occasional consultant gig for those in government or media who were looking for historical context to Soviet designs on Xinjiang.<sup>16</sup>

All of the above did not constitute an auspicious beginning for the borderland posture of the new regime on Taiwan. In the final analysis, the Nationalists had only managed to procure one aging Uyghur dignitary, whose degree of literacy was dubious and whose loyalty had never been in question. Optimists within the Party might also point to the tacit support of a young Kazakh general in Srinagar, Delilhan Haji, who looked upon a veteran man-of-arms like Yolbars with reverence. Pessimists, however, could have noted Īsa and Emin's considerable head start in the cultivation of refugee loyalties in Kashmir, as well as their extensive prior contacts throughout the Muslim world. How were Yolbars and Delilhan going to compete against Īsa and Emin, who had mastered the art of Nationalist discourse but were no longer constrained by Party discipline?

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<sup>14</sup> Zhang Murong, "Li jiang hou de 'Xinjiang wang' Sheng Shicai," *Wenshi chunqiu* 11 (2003).

<sup>15</sup> Sheng's contribution was limited to a self-exculpatory account of his time as *duban* of Xinjiang, translated into English as the second half of the book. It follows the lengthy historical analysis authored by Whiting. See Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1958).

<sup>16</sup> For a complete account of the afterlife of Sheng Shicai, see Justin M. Jacobs, "Empire Besieged: The Preservation of Chinese Rule in Xinjiang, 1884–1971" (doctoral dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2011), 380–84.



## 2. Recruiting Kazakhs

Once settled in Taiwan, Yolbars received for his daily paperwork a Nationalist government seal demonstrably out of place in tropical Taiwan: Office for the Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government (*Xinjiang sheng zhengfu zhuxi bangongchu*). This was a special office reserved specifically for the chairman (governor) of Xinjiang alone, bereft of any claim to actual territorial administration. Three other provincial administrations operated by the Nationalists after 1949—those of Taiwan, Fujian, and, briefly, Yunnan—all retained a living tax base and tangible clumps of land to look after.<sup>17</sup> Not so in the case of Xinjiang. The *raison d'être* for this office derived entirely from its symbolic power. By 1951, the dramatic plight of Uyghur and Kazakh refugees had caught the attention of Western media, culminating first in a lengthy *National Geographic Magazine* spread, then in a popular *Reader's Digest* account, and later in a highly embellished novelistic treatment, *Kazak Exodus*.<sup>18</sup> “The world is looking at developments in Xinjiang very closely,” a planning committee on Taiwan observed. It was Yolbars’ job to ensure that whenever the global spotlight shined on Xinjiang, the Nationalists came out the better for it.

He began by sizing up his competition. The archival record in Taiwan opens in 1952, with letters to and from İsa and Emin, who by this point had left South Asia and relocated to Turkey. The extant missives, written in Uyghur and translated into Chinese by Yolbars or his secretary, strain to maintain a façade of civility. “I served in the central government for thirteen years,” İsa wrote to Yolbars in December. “Thinking back on it now, I accomplished absolutely nothing. It was all a waste of time. In the formulation of policy, the government never once consulted us, and it never adopted a single piece of our advice.” Embittered by the glass ceiling experienced by non-Han figures such as himself within the Nationalist government, İsa used his correspondence with Yolbars as an opportunity to vent his feelings of dissatisfaction at Han rule in Xinjiang. “If I go to Taiwan, won’t it be just like before? It is enough that you are there. Until I finish my work abroad, and until the central gov-

<sup>17</sup> In the case of Fujian, this meant only a handful of offshore islands, while in the case of Yunnan, this was limited to jurisdiction claimed by defeated Nationalist general Li Mi in Burma.

<sup>18</sup> Milton J. Clark, “How the Kazakhs Fled to Freedom,” *National Geographic Magazine* 106, no. 5 (1954): 621–44; George Kent, “The Kazakhs’ Fabulous Flight to Freedom,” *Reader's Digest* 396 (1955): 111–17; Godfrey Lias, “Kazakh Nomads’ Struggle against Communists,” *The Times* (London), February 17–18, 1955; and Godfrey Lias, *Kazak Exodus* (London: Evans Bros, 1956).

ernment recognizes our achievements, then there is nothing for me to do in Taiwan. It is better for me to stay here.”<sup>19</sup>

“Here” was Istanbul. As it turned out, in the three years since 1949, İsa and Emin had been quite the industrious exiles. When they were not shuttling between New Delhi and Kashmir, they were crisscrossing the Middle East on fundraising tours among Xinjiang refugee communities from an earlier era, when Sheng Shicai had taken aim at his province’s Kazakhs. One goldmine was Saudi Arabia, where some eight thousand refugees had long since integrated into local society and were eager to donate to İsa and Emin’s cause. In 1951 alone, Yolbars learned, Emin had collected six thousand U.S. dollars in Saudi Arabia and an additional two thousand in Egypt, where the local press referred to him as the former “Governor of Turkestan.”<sup>20</sup> The funds were intended to help relocate several thousand Kazakh refugees in Kashmir to Turkey as well as publish anti-Communist propaganda from their new offices in Istanbul.<sup>21</sup> In order to speak for Xinjiang in the non-Communist world, İsa and Emin needed a Xinjiang constituency that would lend legitimacy to their words. Turkey, now the only Turkic-speaking nation not under Communist rule, fit the bill. Working tirelessly with representatives from multiple governments and charity organizations, İsa and Emin ultimately succeeded in securing asylum in Turkey for 1,734 Kazakhs, along with several hundred Uyghurs. The former settled in rural Anatolia, the latter in Istanbul.<sup>22</sup>

By the time Yolbars got his office in Taiwan up and running, İsa and Emin’s resettlement plans for Turkey were nearly complete. Nevertheless, Yolbars still sent out feelers to the refugees, ensuring that some funds from the Association for Mainland Refugee Assistance were redirected to Kashmir. He also dangled the prospect of resettlement in Taiwan. Upon learning of the proposal to send Kazakh nomads to a tropical island, a British clerk in India recorded a caustic observation: “The idea of sending Kazakhs to Formosa seems fantastic.” Nevertheless, Yolbars was determined to make up for lost time, and in three years from 1951 to 1953, he managed to direct

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<sup>19</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 109/0005, “Xinjiang nanmin yiju Tu-er-qi,” 108.

<sup>20</sup> “Governor of Turkestan Has Escaped from Russia and arrived in Cairo,” November 4, 1953, British National Archives, Far Eastern Department, FO 371/106523.

<sup>21</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 109/0005, 113–18, 239–42.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, 227–35.

US\$16,000 to the refugees in Kashmir.<sup>23</sup> Two of them, Kali Beg and Hamza, duly began to parrot the rhetoric of the Nationalist government. Noting that 176 Kazakhs and 13 Uyghurs had already left for Turkey, Kali Beg announced that the remainder of his band, some 180 Kazakhs, “swore an oath to remain behind in Kashmir and await orders to invade Xinjiang and eliminate the Communist bandits. We are loyal to Party and state, and will follow the blue sky and white sun flag as we march forward.”<sup>24</sup> Unbeknownst to Yolbars, however, these two Kazakh chieftains had also been in touch with American and British authorities, and seemed to be soliciting anyone with deep pockets.<sup>25</sup> In early 1952, Consul Paxton, from his office in Isfahan, was moved to send a personal check for almost three hundred dollars to the same Kali Beg and Hamza. “We have the pleasure to inform you that this amount was equally distributed by us amongst ourselves,” Kali Beg wrote back in March. “So please accept our heartfelt thanks for this aid especially from the refugees of Kazakhs 340 in number.”<sup>26</sup>

At the same time that Yolbars and Kali Beg were exchanging letters, representatives from the Communist government on the mainland approached a large group of Kazakh refugees in Pakistan. After a month of free banquets and regular allowances paid out in Russian rubles, a deep split emerged. Some of the refugees returned to the mainland by sea, while others were persuaded to recross the Himalayas on their own initiative. İsa, alarmed by the sudden overtures from Beijing and Taipei, attempted to reel Kali Beg back in. “The Turkish government has recently sent representatives to agitate among us, and they are inviting us to go to Turkey,” Kali Beg informed Yolbars, referring to İsa and Emin’s outfit in Istanbul. “But I was resolute, and told them that my government is the Nationalist government, and that I will always be a citizen of the Republic of China.” By late 1953, however, the allure of the resettlement deal in Turkey, brokered almost entirely by İsa and Emin, proved too much for the destitute refugees to turn down. Only Kali Beg and a hundred of his followers remained behind, in a final bid for Nationalist largesse. “People from Xinjiang

<sup>23</sup> “Kazakh Refugees,” October 12, 1951, British National Archives, Far Eastern Department, FO 371/92897; and Letter from Orville L. Bennett to Dr. George A. Fitch,” March 24, 1955, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office for Refugees, Migration, and Voluntary Assistance.

<sup>24</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 109/0005, 129–30.

<sup>25</sup> Godfrey Lias conveyed their overtures to Winston Churchill in *Kazak Exodus*, 229.

<sup>26</sup> Letter from Kali Beg and Hamza to J. Hall Paxton, March 13, 1952, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, #6p Sinkiang.

are scattered throughout many Muslim countries now," Kali Beg wrote. "If the central government ignores us, then it will have a negative impact on foreign relations with the Muslim nations of the Middle East, and they will begin to suspect that the government looks down on the weak peoples of the world."<sup>27</sup>

Yet news of the resettlement of 1,734 refugees to Turkey had severely undermined Kali Beg's declarations of loyalty to the Nationalist government in Taiwan. This in turn undermined Yolbars' ability to lobby on their behalf. "In light of current financial difficulties," the Executive Yuan in Taiwan announced soon after hearing of the resettlement in Anatolia, "it will no longer be possible to provide relief funds to Xinjiang refugees in India and Pakistan. At this time of hardship, we hope our compatriots will be able to cultivate a spirit of 'overcoming all hardship' and look after their own provisions." Though Yolbars scrambled to come up with a formal blueprint to bring Kali Beg and his hundred followers to Taiwan, the anticipated price tag (US \$30,000) for their relocation was seen as too high to justify the benefits that their publicity might facilitate. Instead, the Nationalist government decided—quite optimistically—that it could try to work through İsa and Emin, and attempt to foster symbolic declarations of loyalty from among the resettled refugees.<sup>28</sup> Unwilling to admit that İsa and Emin had "won" the opening round of Xinjiang refugee politics, certain voices within the Nationalist Party, such as Foreign Minister Yeh, instead took to blaming Yolbars for the exodus of nearly two thousand Kazakhs—former citizens of the Republic of China—to Turkey.

### 3. The Rift between Taiwan and Turkey

The idea that the Nationalist government could simply work through İsa and Emin was based upon a faulty assumption; namely, that the interest was mutual. Once the refugees were settled in Turkey and the prospect of additional aid from Taiwan diminished, however, serious doubts began to surface. "Of course we are extremely excited about news of an impending counterattack on the mainland," Emin wrote to Yolbars in February 1953. "But never once did we receive a clear indication of what the government's position will be regarding Xinjiang." In order to facilitate preparations for the retaking of the mainland, Emin demanded that Taipei issue a

<sup>27</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang'an guan, 109/0005, 175–80, 171, 110.

<sup>28</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang'an guan, 152.11/0048, "Xinjiang sheng zhengfu ji Zhongguo huijiao xiehui zhi guomin waijiao huodong," 30; and 109/0005, 216–19, 229, 246–47, 256.

clear statement regarding its “attitude” toward Xinjiang. “If the government insists on being as stubborn as before and continues to view Xinjiang as an inseparable province of China,” he added, “then I assure you that the disputes and disagreements will never end.” Yolbars countered with vague assurances. “As far as I know, the government plans to respect the opinions of local figures and implement regional autonomy,” he replied. He then cautioned Emin not to let his political ambitions cloud his judgment. “You are an old veteran cadre of the Party,” he wrote, “and you have served the central government for a long time now. You have studied the dictates of our late Premier [Sun Yat-sen] and know what the fundamental policies of the Party are. Surely you do not harbor any misconceptions on that front.” Instead, Yolbars tried to focus all attention on the Communist threat to their homeland. “Mutual suspicions and individual pursuits will only serve to divide our strength.”<sup>29</sup>

But the rift was clear, and Yolbars was quick to remind his detractors of Emin’s continued “intransigence.” Just three months after this exchange, Yolbars submitted a comprehensive plan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to raise the Nationalists’ profile in the Middle East. He now blamed the “conspiracy of Emin” for the way in which “two thousand of our Kazakh compatriots were seduced into adopting Turkish citizenship,” and elsewhere referred to “selfish and scheming individuals like Emin and İsa.” To make matters worse, the Communist government in Beijing had also begun to send formal Muslim diplomatic delegations to the Middle East, an initiative that dovetailed with its interest in those refugees still living in Pakistan. In response, Yolbars proposed a detailed list of countermeasures. He suggested bringing some of the refugees from Turkey to study in schools on Taiwan, staffing Nationalist embassies abroad with Muslim personnel, sending an annual delegation to the World Muslim Council, and participating in the *hajj* to Mecca. This last proposal met with enthusiasm, and plans got underway to organize a pilgrimage to Mecca the following year. Yolbars himself would headline the delegation. In the meantime, in January 1954, Emin paid a visit to the Nationalist embassy in Ankara with his wife, not realizing that Yolbars had been forwarding his letters up the Nationalist chain of command. Much to Emin’s surprise, the ambassador lashed out at him for “advocating Xinjiang independence and separation from the Republic of China.” In no uncertain terms, Emin was told that “the central government will never grant you independence,” and that “bad things” would happen to him if he persisted

<sup>29</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 109/0005, 109, 120–121.

in “pursuing such proposals abroad.” Though the ambassador still forwarded Emin’s request for \$400 to Taipei, it was now clear that any further largesse would come with tight strings attached.<sup>30</sup>

On July 17, 1954, with tensions running high, Yolbars, his son, and three other prominent Hui officials boarded a plane for Egypt. Though the Nationalist press touted this *hajj* delegation as an opportunity to win over Middle Eastern leaders, the real goal was to bring İsa and Emin to heel. Chiang Kai-shek approved additional relief funds for distribution among Xinjiang refugees, and Yolbars vowed to convince İsa and Emin to relocate to Taiwan.<sup>31</sup> On July 26, the long awaited reunion took place in Cairo. Yolbars handed İsa a goodwill gift of \$2,000 and asked him to come to Taiwan. According to Yolbars, İsa countered with a request for another \$10,000 as a Nationalist show of faith in his cause. Yolbars must have demurred, because suddenly the gloves came off. “The government has never trusted me,” İsa said, “instead giving power to Zhang Zhizhong, Masud, and finally Burhan [i.e., the last three governors of Xinjiang]. Though I once received the post of secretary, still the government did not trust me.” Five years later, İsa was still smarting from an incident with Nationalist border guards in 1949, who had apparently detained and roughed him up as he tried to flee the province. He now realized that his service for the Nationalists in Xinjiang a decade prior had all been a charade, and that Chiang Kai-shek had simply used him as a rhetorical counterweight to the Soviet puppet government in Ili. “The government fanned my hatred for communism and the Soviet Union, but then let Xinjiang fall into their very hands. As a result, untold numbers of anti-Communist youth were slaughtered and thousands of refugees fled abroad. The government cannot shirk responsibility for this tragedy.”<sup>32</sup>

Yolbars appears to have been taken aback by İsa’s tirade, for his account contains no indication of a rebuttal. Not so two weeks later, when they met again in Mina, a town just outside of Mecca. This time İsa showed up with a host of refugees in tow. They immediately put Yolbars on the defensive. “We hear that you are destitute in

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<sup>30</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 152.11/0048, 21–22; 109/0005, 226, 239–42; and Letter from Yolbars Khan to Mr. George Fitch, Far East Director of the Committee to Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals, July 1955, National Archives of the United States, Department of State, Office of Chinese Affairs, #6p Sinkiang.

<sup>31</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 105.22/0005, “Juyu feibang chaosheng tuanti qianzheng; zhu Sha dashiguan zhoubao,” 89–90, 95–96, 110, 119.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 157–58.

Taiwan and have had to borrow money to make ends meet," Yolbars later recounted them as saying. "If you like, you can remain here with us and we will make sure that all of your living expenses are met. Rest assured that we have the means to take care of you." In addition, they blamed the loss of Xinjiang on the Nationalist failure to grant high-level autonomy to the province. This time, however, Yolbars came prepared with a rebuttal. "It is inappropriate to raise words of accusation at this time and place," the minutes record him as saying. "Unless we succeed in our goal of re-taking the mainland, all talk of other matters is nothing more than hot air." If they wanted high-level autonomy in Xinjiang, Yolbars suggested, then they would have to earn it by deeds, not words. "I obtained my current titles as Governor and Commander of Xinjiang Pacification neither before the loss of Xinjiang nor after arriving in Taiwan," he explained. "They were bestowed on me while I was in the mountains waging war on the Communists." If İsa wanted an official statement on high-level autonomy or independence for Xinjiang, Yolbars suggested, then he and the refugees would first have to unite with the Nationalist government on Taiwan and work together for the liberation of the mainland.<sup>33</sup>

In the evening İsa returned for a third meeting. Yolbars did not even bother to record a detailed set of minutes for the occasion, noting merely that he "again complained about the government's lack of trust in him and revisited his abuse at the hands of the border patrol officer" in 1949. When Yolbars again visited İsa at his lodgings the next day, he found sixty refugees waiting for him. They must have had some choice words, for Yolbars immediately launched into a spirited defense of his past. "When Sheng Shicai leaned toward the Soviets and united with the Comintern," Yolbars said, "I fled to the central government and met high-ranking officials on İsa's introduction. The details of my service in the central government are well known to İsa and he can vouch for me. I have never been bought off by the Han and I am certainly not their running dog. İsa is in attendance here today. Go ahead and ask him whether or not this is true." One month later, upon his return to Taiwan, Yolbars hurried to debrief the Generalissimo. His conclusion was decidedly pessimistic. The goal of "preventing İsa and Emin from being used by others" would prove "very difficult to meet," he wrote. Over the course of four heated meetings in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two things had become clear. First, İsa and Emin's "true colors" had emerged: they were now hostile to Han rule in general, be it in Nationalist or Com-

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., 158–59.

munist guise. And second, Xinjiang refugees throughout the Middle East were fast falling under their wing, imbibing a narrative of ethnic conflict that elided the many contributions İsa and Emin themselves had once made on behalf of Chinese rule in Xinjiang.<sup>34</sup>

Faced with a propaganda war on two fronts, Yolbars quickly got to work. He renewed his correspondence with Kali Beg in Turkey, and through him learned of other former nomads in rural Anatolia who were either unhappy with the life of a farmer, annoyed at İsa and Emin, or both. Working through the Nationalist embassy in Ankara, Yolbars extended an offer of free university education for any disaffected refugees, permitted they were willing to study in Taiwan. Among the hundred or so volunteers was Kali Beg's own son. At the same time, Yolbars petitioned George Yeh, the Nationalist Minister of Foreign Affairs, to build a new mosque in Taipei, in hopes of making a positive impression on visiting Muslim dignitaries. The *hajj* trips to Mecca became a near annual occurrence, though poor health and advanced age precluded Yolbars' inclusion. As for the rift with İsa and Emin, Nationalist authorities simply acted as though nothing had happened, continuing to claim both men as allies in the press. They combined their public silence on the "East Turkestan" issue with a slew of new propaganda from Yolbars' office, including *Frontier Culture* (*bianjiang wenhua*), a monthly pictorial highlighting Uyghur, Kazakh, Tibetan, and Mongol loyalty to the Republic of China.<sup>35</sup>

The publication of *Frontier Culture* in October 1955 coincided with the designation by Beijing of Xinjiang province as the "Uighur Autonomous Region." If Yolbars understood the modified Soviet calculus of the Chinese Communists on this front, his pronouncements in the press gave no indication of it. He went on public record denouncing the move as a "stepping stone" to formal annexation of Xinjiang by the Soviet Union, and claimed that Moscow had succeeded in "swallowing up" China's northwestern province. Aware only of Beijing's discourse but lacking eyes on the ground, Yolbars may actually have believed that Beijing "had to satisfy its master in the Kremlin." The Nationalist Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, was less quick to jump to such conclusions. After a thorough examination of an atlas recently pub-

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 159–60.

<sup>35</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang'an guan, 109/005, 246–47, 251–53; 112.22/0003, "Tu-er-qi jizhe fang Tai; lü Tu-er-qi huaqiao fang Tai; lü Ba-ji-si-tan huaqiao Sha-bu-lei; Ai-sha zhangzi Mu-la-de fang Hua; Zhong Tu youhao xiehui," 28–31; and 152.11/0048, 111–14.



lished on the mainland, one official observed that “Yining, Tacheng, and Altay are all still present on the bandits’ map.” This official, thinking that perhaps Yolbars had based his comments on dubious intelligence gleaned from refugees, concluded that the comments in the press by Yolbars and other Nationalist officials were mere hyperbole, and that Xinjiang had not literally been “swallowed up” by Moscow. “Though Soviet ambitions in northern Xinjiang are well known,” he wrote, “even the Communist bandits would not lightly give away a chunk of our national territory.”<sup>36</sup>

It was this uncompromising aspiration for political and national sovereignty, a goal shared by both Chinese Communists and Nationalists alike, that ultimately determined the fate of Chinese border politics during the Cold War. Simply put, neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Zedong would willingly countenance the separatist activities of non-Han actors, be they in Turkey or Tibet. During the 1959 Tibetan uprising against the Communist government, the Generalissimo, while eager to exploit the revolt for his own aims, was unable to bring himself to support the goals of the rebels.<sup>37</sup> To do so would be to betray the ideal of national unity. It was the same with Xinjiang. In July 1956, when Yolbars issued a comprehensive report on the activities of İsa, Emin, and the Chinese Communists among Middle Eastern countries, he made a telling assessment. “Taking advantage of their physical proximity,” he wrote, İsa and Emin “frequently lure [the refugees] with promises of gain, threatening and cajoling them with considerable skill. From their bases of operation in Istanbul and Cairo, they publish journals and magazines, thereby swaying hearts and minds and influencing international opinion.” The implications for Nationalist policies on Xinjiang were clear and surprising. “We should worry more about these activities than those of the Communist bandits.”<sup>38</sup>

In other words, the threat of non-Han separatism was deemed of greater concern than that of a Communist regime committed to the protection of China’s national sovereignty. To be sure, Yolbars kept meticulous tabs on the many cultural and religious delegations sent by the mainland to various Middle Eastern countries, and he often noted the participation of “the traitor Burhan.” But these reports quickly became routine. Far more worrisome were indications that Xinjiang refugees in Turkey

<sup>36</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 152.11/0048, 186–93; and 119.5/0001, 228.

<sup>37</sup> Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 505–6.

<sup>38</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 152.11/0048, 124.

were lending a willing ear to the increasingly hostile ethnopopulist platform of İsa and Emin, who now ran the East Turkestan Refugee Association in Istanbul. These shifting dynamics were apparent in a letter sent to Yolbars in 1958 by a Uyghur man who identified himself in Chinese as “Wahede” (likely “Wahid” or “Ahad” in Uyghur).<sup>39</sup> Once a lieutenant-colonel in the Nationalist army in Xinjiang during the 1940s, Wahede fled to Istanbul in 1949 and there came in touch with İsa and Emin’s refugee community. In 1957, he wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek requesting a military pension. His plea apparently fell on deaf ears, for the following year he wrote a letter to Yolbars filled with violent imagery. “It is very difficult to get one’s debts back from the Han,” he wrote. “Unless you slit their throats you can’t get anything.” Referring to the Chinese staff at the Nationalist embassy at Ankara as “authoritarian Han,” he lambasted the “many excuses they have for why they cannot help a Uyghur compatriot.” But the Han themselves, he continued, “have tons of money, travel to all the gorgeous places in the world, and live in beautiful Western houses.” In order to enforce his claim for a military pension, Wahede stated his intention to murder an embassy employee. “Maybe if I do this, I can knock some sense into the Han.” He signed off with a declaration that “it will be my glory to dispatch of such an enemy.”<sup>40</sup>

It seems safe to say that Wahede’s letter did not elicit much sympathy in Taiwan. Yet it must have been unsettling to see a former lieutenant-colonel in the Nationalist army transformed into a hate-spouting proponent of ethnic violence. This was a loyal Uyghur who had once risked his life for the Nationalist cause. Once he arrived in Istanbul, however, where the close-knit Uyghur community numbered in the hundreds, it would have been difficult to remain aloof from İsa and Emin’s orbit, if for no other reason than the indispensability of their services in navigating the Turkish immigration bureaucracy. The lesson for Yolbars and the Nationalist government on Taiwan was clear: without vigorous countermeasures in relief funds, educa-

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<sup>39</sup> If “Wahid,” then it seems probable that this man was Imin Wahidi or one of his relatives. Imin Wahidi had been involved in nationalist initiatives in the 1930s and worked under Mahmud Muhiti. He also left a memoir, which has been analyzed by Ondřej Klimeš. See Klimeš, *Struggle by the Pen: The Uyghur Discourse of Nation and National Interest, c. 1900–1949* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2015), 127–28.

<sup>40</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 107/0001, “Tu-er-qi renwu zhi; Xinjiang ji Wa-he-de shenqing zhengjian; Xinjiang ji Su-dan shenqing zhengjian; Xinjiang ji Pa-la-ti xueli shenqing zhengjian,” 61, 107–9.

tion, and propaganda, Xinjiang refugees throughout the Middle East would eventually begin to parrot the anti-Han discourse of İsa and Emin.

#### 4. Taiwan Gains the Upper Hand

Despite the insinuations of İsa's refugees in Mecca, Yolbars appeared to be doing quite well for himself on Taiwan. In 1966, the *United Daily News* (*Lianhe bao*) reported on a thief who had broken into his home and stolen NT\$200,000 worth of jewelry and other valuables, suggesting a life of considerable wealth and privilege.<sup>41</sup> Yet Yolbars, now entering his seventh decade, felt the wear of his age more than ever, and was often confined to his desk. This, however, did not prevent him from continuing to attend official government functions, host the occasional delegation from Muslim countries, and continue to arrange for more exchange students from Turkey. In 1960, one such student, Chengis Yarbağ, asked for more money to fund his studies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed Yolbars that expenses for these refugee students were becoming "excessive." Still, the cost was worth it. "Since it is our nation's policy to take care of our border peoples, and seeing as İsa and Emin continue to raise the flag of independence at this time," the same memo observed, "we too will actively continue to cultivate the loyalty of our expatriate sons overseas for our own ends."<sup>42</sup>

Things changed again in the mid-1960s, when new developments began to alter the refugee landscape. First, in 1965, Emin died in Istanbul, aged sixty-four. İsa, who would live another three decades, now moved to exert even greater control over the exile community in Turkey. He immediately took the East Turkestan movement to a new level. In April 1965, he traveled to Mecca to make a presentation at the eleventh session of the World Muslim Congress. He asked the delegates assembled there to pass a resolution encouraging the Nationalist government on Taiwan to declare "East Turkestan" independent of China and to abolish the "colonial name" of Xinjiang. In addition, member nations were asked to commit to providing both tangible and moral support for Xinjiang refugees throughout the Middle East. When a representative from Syria seconded the motion, Nationalist spokesman Sun Shengwu immediately lodged a note of protest, invoking Congress prohibitions against involvement in politics. The next day the representative from Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of

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<sup>41</sup> *Lianhe bao*, March 9, 1962; January 30, 1963; June 25, 1963; and February 25, 1966.

<sup>42</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang'an guan, 112.22/0003, 34-35.

the Nationalist government, rallied to Sun's defense, declaring that Muslims everywhere must adapt to the conditions of the country in which they live. In his notes, Sun recorded his satisfaction in seeing İsa pack up his briefcase to leave, only to be dissuaded by the Congress host.<sup>43</sup>

After the initial blindsides, Sun Shengwu regained his composure. Several days later, he issued a rebuttal. "Mr. İsa was appointed by our very own government as secretary-general of the Xinjiang Provincial Government," Sun read. "Once the Communist Party began to occupy the mainland and Xinjiang, all the provincial leaders fled abroad. Except for a small number of ambitious careerists like İsa, the majority of them have continued to embrace the legal government of the Republic of China." It was here that the recruitment of Yolbars and two decades of funding for the activities of his office paid huge rhetorical dividends. "In Taiwan we have set up an Office for the Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government, and it is chaired by Yolbars Khan, a Uyghur Muslim. This office provides relief aid and succor for dispersed refugees, and draws up plans for the recovery of lost territory." The biggest blow to İsa's narrative of legitimacy, however, came when Sun divulged his extensive history of cooperation with the Nationalist government, a rhetorical strategy deployed to great effect by Yolbars during his spirited debate with İsa at Mina. "The political status of China's Muslims are not below that of any other Muslim nation," he concluded. "Indeed, Mr. İsa himself has now been nurtured and mentored by our government for more than three decades." In his report, Sun again recorded with relish the sight of İsa "folding up his briefcase and preparing to depart." In front of the assembly, however, Sun attempted to retain the moral high ground. He made a grand show of extending an invitation to İsa to come to Taiwan and "participate in the sacred task of resisting communism and recovering the mainland," and promised to submit his grievances to the Nationalist government for "consideration."<sup>44</sup>

Back in Taiwan, Yolbars was getting help from unexpected quarters. The disastrous famines of the Great Leap Forward (1958–61) and persecution campaigns on the mainland had resulted in a renewed crop of 701 refugees from Xinjiang. (In an unrelated incident in 1962, tens of thousands of Uyghurs and Kazakhs fled to the Soviet Union, where neither Beijing nor Taipei could attempt to win their loyalties). These new refugees ended up in Pakistan and Afghanistan, neither of whose govern-

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 152.11/0045, "Huijiao renshi Sun Shengwu yu Xiao Yongtai," 40–43, 46–48.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., 152.11/0045, 61–66.

ments recognized Taipei. One refugee in particular stood out from the pack, a man by the name of Sabik. In December 1963, two years after his escape from Xinjiang, he wrote a letter to the Nationalist ambassador in Ankara, who duly forwarded it onward to Yolbars. Sabik related the following story. A native of Yarkand in southern Xinjiang, he was once a member of several Nationalist Party organizations, including the local branch of the Uyghur Association for Ethnocultural Advancement, a vestige of the Sheng era. Formerly a well-to-do man, he described repeated imprisonments after 1949, including the confiscation of US\$60,000 in assets. During the famines of the Great Leap Forward, he claimed—most unlikely—that starving Han had resorted to eating Uyghur babies.<sup>45</sup> In 1961, following his wife’s remarriage to another man, he contacted relatives in Afghanistan and managed to flee as part of a trade caravan. Once in Kabul, the Afghan government pressured the refugees either to return to Xinjiang or resettle in another country. After turning to the Americans for help, he was encouraged to get in touch with both İsa in Istanbul and the Nationalist embassy in Ankara.<sup>46</sup>

Yolbars sensed a golden opportunity. Sabik’s background was not unlike that of Wahede, the one-time loyal Nationalist lieutenant-colonel turned violent anti-Han racist. Furthermore, because Sabik was from Yarkand, where İsa once maintained an influential base of operations, Yolbars worried that the two men would quickly form a bond. When, for reasons that are unclear, İsa proved slow to respond, Yolbars sprung into action. “In this hour of need, when life and death hang in the balance,” he wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “İsa and Emin have abandoned these refugees. The political significance of a rescue effort undertaken by our government at

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<sup>45</sup> Though it is now clear that cannibalism was a common strategy of survival in many regions of China during the Great Leap Forward, there are several reasons why this claim is suspect with regard to Xinjiang. First, Xinjiang suffered perhaps the least of any region in China during the Great Leap Forward, to the point where it soon became a net exporter of grain to other regions in China. On this point, see Li Danhui, “Dui 1962 nian Xinjiang Yi-Ta shijian qiyan de lishi kaocha: laizi Zhongguo Xinjiang de dang’an cailiao,” in *Zhanhou Zhong Su guanxi ruogan wenti yanjiu: laizi Zhong E shuangfang de dang’an wenxian*, ed. Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006), 486–514. Second, in those rural areas where starvation might possibly have occurred in Xinjiang, the state maintained a strict policy of segregation between Uyghur and Han communities, the latter tightly insulated within military colonies.

<sup>46</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 119.5/0001, “Zhiliu A-fu-han Xinjiang nanmin,” 11–12.

this time would be considerable.” Though Yolbars wanted to bring them to Taiwan, the Ministry urged them to relocate to Turkey, which was now offering to pay for their relocation expenses. Events soon conspired to undermine this arrangement. First, İsa finally wrote back to Sabik, “scolding me for exchanging letters with Governor Yolbars.” Suddenly aware of the deep schism that ran throughout the Xinjiang refugee community, Sabik informed Yolbars that he “no longer wanted to go to Turkey, since it will be hard to get along with my compatriots there if İsa is acting like this.” Instead, Sabik asked Yolbars if he could help them travel to Saudi Arabia, where the Xinjiang exile community was more prosperous. But even that would prove difficult now. Alerted to Turkey’s offer of resettlement, Beijing began to put pressure on Kabul to reverse its stance and let the refugees remain in Afghanistan. At least in this case, it seems, the Communists were more determined than the Nationalists to keep potential recruits out of İsa’s reach.<sup>47</sup>

For his part, Yolbars, informed that his own government was unwilling to assume the burden of mass resettlement in Taiwan, saw little reason to help them relocate to Saudi Arabia, where the existing refugee community maintained extensive contacts with İsa. In Afghanistan, however, Sabik could continue to work on behalf of the Nationalist government as a covert agent among the steady stream of refugees who continued to file out of Xinjiang. With relocation efforts stalled, Kabul fast became the next battleground for İsa and Yolbars. According to Sabik, İsa sent his men to Afghanistan to spread rumors about the negative effects a Nationalist passport would bring to its owner, and further promised to sponsor free annual *hajj* trips to anyone who relocated to Turkey. They apparently also brought letters from refugees in Istanbul attesting to the luxurious life they were living under İsa’s patronage. Yolbars countered by lodging urgent requests with his own government for relief funds to be distributed among Sabik’s followers. It is not clear how much, if any, money was actually dispensed at this time, but something in Yolbars’ overtures must have been sufficient to give many of the refugees pause. For, by 1967, when İsa finally succeeded in leveraging UN support for their resettlement in Turkey, only 235 of Sabik’s 701 followers took up the offer. The remainder—how many in each case is not clear—either moved on to the Soviet Union, relocated to Taiwan, or simply remained in Kabul, where Sabik continued to speak on their behalf in his correspond-

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 14–20, 51–53, 96–100.

ence with Yolbars. In his own documents, Yolbars began to refer to Sabik as “my secret agent and contact man in Afghanistan.”<sup>48</sup>

For the next four years, Sabik was exactly that. The complex wheelings and dealings of the Xinjiang exile community need not detain us here, but suffice it to note that during these years Sabik seems to have served as a highly effective counterweight to Īsa among the Middle Eastern exile community. Shuttling back and forth among Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and Taiwan, he was entrusted with ever greater sums of money, numbers that peaked in 1969 with the deposit of US\$25,000 in an Iranian bank account. Such large sums of money inevitably opened Sabik up to accusations of graft, and—if the counter-accusations can be trusted—Īsa’s men never missed an opportunity to fan the rumor mill in Kabul. An investigation by Yolbars’ son purported to clear Sabik of any wrongdoing, and merely advised him to obtain a signed receipt whenever money changed hands. In 1969, the Xinjiang refugee population in Afghanistan having suddenly swelled to 12,000, largely as a result of renewed chaos during the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Yolbars gave Sabik his biggest task yet, flying him out to Taiwan to draw up comprehensive blueprints that would provide this exile community with the necessary start-up capital to maintain a livelihood in Afghanistan. The archives for this time period are filled with requests for relief funds from newly arrived refugees. More often than not their wishes were granted, with gifts ranging anywhere from one to six hundred U.S. dollars apiece. With confidence running high, Yolbars, cognizant of his impending mortality, even offered his governorship to Īsa, provided he assumed it on Taiwan.<sup>49</sup>

During the late 1960s, the momentum continued to shift in Yolbars’ favor. By 1969, the son of former Xinjiang governor Masud Sabri (1947–48), once a devout follower of Īsa, had broken off contact with his former mentor and informed Yolbars that he would like to visit Taiwan. With his coterie of covert agents across the Middle East growing fast, Yolbars decided that the time was ripe to spur his greatest ally into action. This was General Delilhan Haji, the one-time Kazakh guerrilla warri-

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 101–7, 150–53, 220, 225, 242–50. See also “Information: Refugees: From East Turkestan,” November 17, 1967 to October 17, 1968, British National Archives, Far Eastern Department, FO 95/15.

<sup>49</sup> Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 119.5/0001, “Jiuji Xinjiang nanbao” and “Zhiliu A-fu-han Xinjiang nanmin,” 47–48; and 119.5/0002, “Jiuji Xinjiang nanbao.”

or and son of the former Minister of Finance in Nationalist Xinjiang. Delilhan, who had remained in Srinigar but kept up a voluminous correspondence with Yolbars, declined numerous offers of relocation to either Turkey or Taiwan. He did, however, deign to fly out to Taipei on several separate occasions in the 1950s and 60s to participate in Nationalist Party congresses as a formal “representative” from Xinjiang. In possession of an Indian passport, Delilhan seems to have served as an intelligence agent for both the Indian and Taiwanese governments. Delilhan also made several trips to Afghanistan to liaison with Sabik, and even took over the latter’s responsibilities for a time when accusations of graft temporarily sidelined Yolbars’ “secret agent.”<sup>50</sup> That same year, however, Delilhan made his biggest move yet: he and his brother decided to abandon their home of nineteen years in Srinigar and spend their twilight years in Istanbul, İsa’s home turf.

Neither Delilhan nor his brother, cut from the same ideological cloth as Yolbars, liked what they saw. The second generation of Kazakh youth had been almost entirely assimilated into Turkish culture, and Uyghur exiles in Istanbul enjoyed far better living conditions than their Kazakh counterparts, confined as they were to the impoverished Anatolian countryside. Delilhan immediately blamed İsa, whom he accused of siphoning off UN aid money for his own personal use, all the while inflating his and Emin’s own role in resisting the Chinese Communists in 1949. He reminded everyone of how İsa and Emin had fled Xinjiang long before the arrival of Communist troops, and how he, his father, Yolbars, and Osman Batur had waged a bloody struggle long after their departure. Fluent in Kazakh, Turkish, Chinese, Urdu, and English, Delilhan wasted no time in contacting Turkish authorities and lobbying for better living conditions for the Kazakh community.<sup>51</sup>

Delilhan was a cosmopolitan, experienced politician, with an established reputation among Kazakh youth. They had grown up hearing tall tales about the brave

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<sup>50</sup> For those activities Delilhan carried out on behalf of Yolbars, including correspondence between the two men, see Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang’an guan, 119.5/0002, 13–15, 156–59; 119.5/0001, “Zhiliu A-fu-han Xinjiang nanmin,” 249; 119.5/0001, “Jiuji Xinjiang nanmin,” 104, 163–65; 112.22/0003, 40–41, 96–99; 109/0005, 137–39; and *Lianhe bao*, May 26, 1960. On Delilhan’s work as an intelligence agent for the Indian government, see Ryosuke Ono, “American Aids for Xinjiang Kazakh Refugees in Kashmir: Missionaries, Anthropologist, and the Escapee Program,” paper presented at the “Emigrants/Muhacir from Central Asia to Middle East: Xinjiang Case during 1940-50s” conference, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, March 3, 2018, 15.

<sup>51</sup> Ingvar Svanberg, *Kazakh Refugees in Turkey: A Study of Cultural Persistence and Social Change* (Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell International), 172–74.



struggles of men like Delilhan, Osman, and Yolbars Khan. İsa, a complete stranger to the battlefield, had no rhetorical antidote to such a man. After Delilhan's arrival in Istanbul, a new rift emerged within the exile community in Turkey. Delilhan published editorials in the Turkish press attacking İsa and his supposedly partial treatment of the Uyghur communities in Turkey, at the expense of the Kazakh community. This rift was made possible in no small part due to Yolbars' efforts from Taiwan. Delilhan described Yolbars and the Nationalist government in Taiwan in glowing terms, and continued to sponsor student exchanges into the 1980s. One beneficiary of this exchange, Mustafa Ozturk, studied the Chinese martial arts in Taiwan and later became a taekwando specialist. When this author met Delilhan in Istanbul in 2008, he was eighty-seven years old and basking in the reverent respect of the younger Kazakh generations. (He has since passed away). It was their parents who had moved from rural Anatolia to urban Istanbul under his auspices, eventually striking it rich via the manufacture of thermoplastic polymers. Now grossly outnumbering the Uyghur expatriate community in Istanbul and infinitely wealthier, these third-generation Kazakhs have elevated Delilhan and the long-departed Osman Batur into a new pantheon of Xinjiang historical icons. They have also gutted the East Turkestan Refugee Association of almost any association with its founder, who passed away in 1995. By and large, this third generation of Kazakh youth did not seem to be aware of the considerable diplomatic legwork bequeathed their new patriarch by Yolbars Khan on his island of exile.<sup>52</sup>

## 5. One China, Indivisible

On the morning of July 27, 1971, at Taipei's Veterans General Hospital, Yolbars Khan passed away in his sleep. He was eighty-three years old. Chiang Kai-shek wrote an inscription for his tomb lauding his many decades of loyalty and service to the central government. Yet it was his services after the fall of the mainland that were probably of greater import to the Chinese state than anything he did before 1949. By the time of his death, the frustration of İsa's political ambitions was well advanced, and the East Turkestan Refugee Association could not claim anything close to a political monopoly over Xinjiang expatriate communities outside the Communist bloc. By maintaining a vigorous base of operations on Taiwan, Yolbars emitted a via-

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<sup>52</sup> Svanberg, *Kazak Refugees in Turkey*; Jacobs, "The Many Deaths of a Kazak Unaligned:" 1304–12; and author interviews, Istanbul, May and April 2008.

ble gravitational pull for anyone willing to pay lip service to the Nationalist ethnic platform. That declarations of loyalty among the refugees were likely motivated more by poverty than ideology is beside the point. Though İsa enjoyed a considerable head start in the cultivation of refugee loyalties and funded his activities with money from the United Nations, he proved unable to insulate his constituency from the overtures of two powerful and influential Chinese metropolises. In the end, Yolbars effectively denied a steady stream of impressionable migrants to Turkey, retained crucial loyalties in Afghanistan and Kashmir, and, when the time was ripe, even infiltrated İsa's own de facto jurisdiction via proxy assault (Delilhan). Indeed, just two months before his death, the fruits of Yolbars' final labors were put on full display in the Nationalist press: Pakistan refugee Seyit Abdullah and his family of eight arrived in Taiwan to take up permanent residence on the island. Their portraits were splashed about in the newspapers.<sup>53</sup>

Not all of the Xinjiang refugees responded favorably to Yolbars' overtures from Taiwan, however. In 1968, for instance, Yolbars sent his eldest son Yaqub to Turkey to meet with refugees in Istanbul. Upon his arrival, a group of Kazakh youths issued a statement against Yaqub, who, they lamented, had "changed his Turkish name (Yakup) into Chinese and made [others] call him Yo Dao Hung [Yao Daohong]." At the heart of the matter was a nearly twenty-year-old allegation that Yolbars and his son had killed three Kazakhs who had fled with them from Xinjiang through Tibet in February 1950. "If Yolbars Khan the betrayer, who lives in Formosa as the Governor-General of Eastern Turkestan," they wrote, "sends his son, the murderer, to visit us before the blood in his hand has dried, we see it as our duty to wake you up."<sup>54</sup>

After the death of Yolbars, the Office for the Chairman of the Xinjiang Provincial Government quickly withered away. Under Yao Daohong (Yaqub), the office signed off on a letter to U.S. President Jimmy Carter in 1977 urging him not to normalize relations with the mainland government. Other than that, however, the archival record runs dry, and rumor has it that the bulk of the files were burned to avoid investigations of financial malfeasance. Then, in 1988, Yao submitted a routine

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<sup>53</sup> *Lianhe bao*, July 28, 1971; and Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo dang'an guan, 162.5/0001, 154–55.

<sup>54</sup> Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1976), 229–31. The original statement is held in the private archives of Hasan Oraltay in the National Academic Library of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

application for a new government car, as permitted once every ten years. The proposed price tag of ¥600,000 attracted ministerial attention, and it was decided to shut down the office within a year. By this time the Xinjiang office was little more than a quaint curiosity of the Cold War, and several articles appeared in the newly democratic press poking fun at its past activities.<sup>55</sup> But it had been no laughing matter for the Generalissimo. During the twenty-two years that the Nationalist government on Taiwan had held the “China seat” in the United Nations, its “governor” of Xinjiang had played a crucial role in upholding Chiang’s “one China” policy. Just as the Generalissimo’s continued survival on Taiwan guaranteed that the island would not fall victim to Washington’s preferred “two Chinas” policy, so too did the Xinjiang government-in-exile help secure Chinese sovereignty—both Nationalist and Communist—over a historically non-Han, weakly integrated region.

In the form of İsa and Emin, the Nationalist Party encountered a credible threat to its narrative of Chinese political legitimacy in Xinjiang. It was all the more credible owing to the fact that İsa and Emin had originally developed their political platform within the umbrella of the Nationalist government itself. No longer inhibited by the lack of promotional opportunities once encountered in the Chinese administration in Xinjiang, İsa and Emin lacked only an ethnic constituency in whose name they could speak. This they found in the first few years after the Communist takeover, shepherding some two thousand Uyghurs and Kazakhs to Turkey and establishing organizational linkages among the many more thousands of Xinjiang refugees scattered throughout the Middle East. Before long, the Nationalist government in Taiwan deemed İsa and Emin’s political outfits in Istanbul to be of greater threat to China’s territorial integrity than the Chinese Communists themselves, a judgment they also levied on Xinjiang expatriates in receipt of Soviet support in Tashkent.

Once it became apparent that İsa and Emin would never relocate to Taiwan, the Xinjiang government in exile set out to sabotage their alternative narratives of political legitimacy. The consequences of İsa and Emin’s inability to withstand the relentless assault levied against them from Taiwan and its ideological proxies in South Asia stands in sharp contrast to the fate of ethnic politics in Tibet. After the Tibetan uprising against Communist rule in 1959, approximately 80,000 Tibetans fled with the Dalai Lama to India, where they set up a Government of Tibet in Exile. Less well known than the uprising itself is that the Nationalist administration on Taiwan, act-

<sup>55</sup> *Lianhe bao*, May 20, 1988; May 31, 1991; and December 28, 1991.

ing through its Committee for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs in Taipei, also made overtures to the Tibetan leadership and offered assistance to the refugee community in Dharamsala. By and large, their overtures were rebuffed, and it was not until the late 1960s that any Tibetan political figures or students traveled to Taiwan to meet with Nationalist representatives. Offers of financial assistance, the construction of refugee schools in India, and invitations to travel to Taiwan were all declined. The Dalai Lama's personal fortune, estimated at nearly four million U.S. dollars, proved more than enough to sustain the Tibetan exile community on its own.<sup>56</sup>

The only other person even remotely qualified to challenge the Dalai Lama's claim as spokesman for Tibet, the Panchen Lama, made the fateful decision to remain in China after 1959, where he publicly supported the Communist government. His subsequent persecution during the Cultural Revolution, combined with the failure of the Nationalists to recruit their own Tibetan eminence to Taiwan, meant that the Dalai Lama never had to endure a credible challenge to his leadership such as that experienced by İsa and Emin. Though the international reputation of prominent Xinjiang expatriates cannot be compared to someone of the Dalai Lama's stature, and the Islamic faith has never captured the sympathy of the Western world in the manner of an ostensibly "pacifist" Buddhism, still the comparison is illuminating. With regard to Tibet, the international community recognizes one very powerful, sympathetic, and credible expatriate spokesman. He stands in opposition to two Chinese metropolises, neither of which can claim much pride in its historical handling of the Tibet issue.

Regarding Xinjiang, however, neither the East Turkestan Refugee Association in Istanbul nor the legacy of the Xinjiang government in exile in Taiwan is widely known, if at all. And that is exactly how Chinese officials in Beijing and Taipei prefer to keep it. As political scientist David Bachman notes, there exists today "no unified opposition and no widely agreed upon leader who is seen internationally (and even in China) as speaking for Uygurs or Xinjiang in the way that the Dalai Lama speaks for Tibet."<sup>57</sup> Why did İsa and Emin prove unable to capitalize upon similar missteps

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<sup>56</sup> Chen Ming-hsiang, "Zangbao zai Tai shenghuo zhuangkuang diaocha ji fudao cuoshi zhi yanjiu," paper commissioned by the Committee for Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs and Tamkang University, 2002.

<sup>57</sup> David Bachman, "Making Xinjiang Safe for the Han? Contradictions and Ironies of Chinese Governance in China's Northwest," in *Governing China's Multiethnic Frontiers*, ed. Morris Rossabi (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2004), 182.

by Beijing in Xinjiang as the Dalai Lama had been able to do for the situation in Tibet? As this paper has shown, the answer lies not in Xinjiang or mainland China. Instead, we must look to Yolbars Khan and the Xinjiang government in exile in Taiwan to understand just how much opposition İsa and Emin faced in their efforts to propagate a new political vision for the Turkic peoples of Xinjiang.

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## Chapter 6

# Immigration from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey in 1961

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### **Abstract**

With the invasion of Eastern Turkestan by the People's Liberation Army, persecution and torture began. Due to financial hardship and indifference of the international public, many Eastern Turkestan Muslim-Turks were forced to leave their homeland to seek independence and attract the world's attention to the situation in Eastern Turkestan. These Eastern Turkestanis, who left Eastern Turkestan in 1961 and initially settled in Afghanistan, struggled to survive for months in the region. Mehmet Kasım Cantürk and İsa Yusuf Alptekin in Turkey helped some Eastern Turkestan families emigrate to Turkey and settle in Kayseri. This study describes the struggle of Mehmet Kasım Cantürk and the Eastern Turkestanis who migrated.

### **1. Life of Eastern Turkestanis under Communist Chinese Rule**

When Eastern Turkestan was occupied by Communist China, the Chinese government pursued a policy based on oppression and violence in the region. Under these pressures, the people of Eastern Turkestan appealed to world public opinion by organizing protests to obtain their freedom. However, they did not achieve independence. For this reason, many Eastern Turkestan Muslims decided to leave their homeland and migrate elsewhere.

In this paper, we focus on the migration of Eastern Turkestan people who were forced to leave Eastern Turkestan due to the events that took place in 1961 and who subsequently migrated from Afghanistan to Turkey, settling in Kayseri. The difficulties in Eastern Turkestan were caused by the civil war in China that began in



1925. After World War II, the Communist Chinese won the war between the Nationalist Chinese government and the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The People's Republic of China was established in 1949.<sup>1</sup> The leader of the new administration was Mao Zedong, a communist and chauvinist Chinese nationalist. Mao's greatest dream was to reach the borders of the ancient Chinese Empire in Turkestan. The first thing he did to realize this dream was deployment of infantry units under the command of Wang Zhen to the Gansu on October 12, 1949.<sup>2</sup> The main aim of sending the troops was to break the national sentiments in the region and break the Soviet Russian influence trying to dominate the region.<sup>3</sup> As Chinese forces advanced to the region, Nationalist Chinese soldiers either fled to Taiwan or chose to surrender.<sup>4</sup> The indigenous people wanted to fight, but their efforts were not successful. On October 20, 1949, the Communist Chinese army invaded Urumçi and took over Eastern Turkestan.<sup>5</sup>

In Communist China's occupation of Eastern Turkestan, some leaders such as İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra chose to leave the country,<sup>6</sup> while other leaders such as Canımhan Hacı and Osman Batur chose the path of resistance and lost their lives.<sup>7</sup>

In the country, pro-Soviet statesmen, considering cooperation with Communist China, decided to go to Beijing to participate in the "China People's Politics

<sup>1</sup> Han Suyin, *Sabah Tufanı 1: Mao Zedung ve Çin Devrimi 1893-1954*, çev., Coşkun Irmak (İstanbul: Berfin Yayıncılık, 1997), 533.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew D. W. Forbes, *Doğu Türkistan'daki Harp Beyleri: Doğu Türkistan'ın 1911-1949 Arası Siyasi Tarihi*, çev., Enver Can (Münih: Doğu Türkistan Vakfı Yayınları, 1990), 407.

<sup>3</sup> Ebubekir Türksoy, "Hicreti Hazırlayan Sebepler," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 1 (1994): 14.

<sup>4</sup> Allen S. Whiting, "Soviet Strategy in Sinkiang 1933-49," in *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot*, ed. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), 117-18; Donald Hugh McMillen, *Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949-1977* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 24; Li Sheng, *Çin'in Xinjiang Bölgesi: Geçmişi ve Şimdiki Durumu*, çev., Xu Xinyue (Urumçi: Xinjiang Halk Yayınevi, 2006), 117 vd.; Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan Devletlerinin Millî Mücadeleleri Tarihi*, 2. bs. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2004), 330; Forbes, *Doğu Türkistan'daki*, 406.

<sup>5</sup> McMillen, *Chinese Communist*, 24; June Teufel Dreyer, "The Kazakhs in China," in *Ethnic Conflict in International Relations*, ed. Astri Suhrke and Lela Garner Noble (New York: Praeger, 1977), 155; *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, s.v. "Burhan," New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

<sup>6</sup> Mehmet Emin Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan: Tarihi, Coğrafi ve Şimdiki Durumu* (İstanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1952), 68; Ömer Kul, haz., *Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin: İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2010), 1: 558; Erkin Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan Hicretimizin 40. Yılı* (Kayseri: Erciyes Dergisi Doğu Türkistan Yayınları, 1992), 6.

<sup>7</sup> Gülçin Çandaroğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu: Nurgocay Baturun Anılarıyla Osman Batur* (İstanbul: Doğu Kütüphanesi, 2006), 204; Hızır Bek Gayretullah, *Altaylarda Kanlı Günler* (İstanbul:

Consultative Conference." However, on August 27, 1949, they died in a plane crash in near Lake Baikal.<sup>8</sup>

The Communist Chinese administration, which was trying to dominate Eastern Turkestan, tried to remove the leaders that could create problems. Then the Chinese government implemented a policy of Chinese immigrant placement on Turkestan lands.<sup>9</sup> After Chinese immigrants settled in Eastern Turkestan, the indigenous people faced economic trouble. This development was followed by land reforms in 1952 to 1953. In the direction of land reform, the efficient parts of the land were given to the Chinese immigrants and the inefficient lands were given to the local people. This made the indigenous people even poorer, and under the tax burden the public became more oppressed. In 1955, it was decided to consolidate the cooperatives under the name Kaperansiya (Eastern Turkestan dialect form of the Russian word *Kooperatsiya*) in order to obtain better yields from the land that had been distributed. In 1958, the "Commune (Great Leap Forward)" movement was initiated. On communes, the villagers were forced to work for 18 hours a day in unhealthy conditions. They were deprived of social and legal rights. Living on the communes was extremely difficult. For example, family life was ignored and there were no health facilities. In short, a silent genocide took place on the communes, supposedly for the sake of the people.<sup>10</sup>

When the Chinese occupation began, restrictions on travel within the coun-

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Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1977), 101, 152–53, 157, 160; Hızırбек Gayretullah, "Osman Batur ve Millî Mücadelesi," *Altay Kartalı Osman Batur*, haz., Hızırбек Gayretullah, Ahmet Türköz ve M. Ali Engin (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği Yayını, 2003), 16–17, 19, 32–33, 37; İklil Kurban, *Şarki Türkistan Cumhuriyeti: 1944–1949* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), 82; Mustafa Başaran, "Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Kahramanı Osman Batur İslamoğlu (1899–1951)" (bitirme tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1972), 24.

<sup>8</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 14; Whiting, "Soviet Strategy," 143; Dreyer, "The Kazakhs in China," 155; Baymirza Hayit, *Türkistan: Rusya İle Çin Arasında* (İstanbul: Otağ Yayınları, 1975), 322; Basil Davidson, *Turkestan Alive: New Travels in Chinese Central Asia* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1957), 132–33; McMillen, *Chinese Communist*, 24; O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The "Great Game"* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 371; Jack Chen, *The Sinkiang Story* (New York: Macmillan, 1977), 275; Kurban, *Şarki Türkistan*, 87; Abdullah Bakır, *Doğu Türkistan İstiklâl Hareketi ve Mehmet Emin Buğra* (İstanbul: Özrenk Matbaası, 2005), 90; Amaç Karahoca, *Doğu Türkistan Çin Müstemlekesi* (İstanbul: Fakülte Matbaası, 1960), 25.

<sup>9</sup> Fook-lam Gilbert Chan, "The Road to Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai's Early Years in Sinkiang (1930–34)," *Journal of Oriental Studies* 7 (1969): 234; Owen Lattimore, *Pivot of Asia: Xinjiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1950), 68; Aitchen K. Wu, *Turkistan Tumult* (London: Methuen, 1940), 63.

<sup>10</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 15.

try were introduced. Basic food items were provided by means of ration books. Communication facilities were also restricted to prevent people from organizing. There was even a ban on two people greeting each other on the street. In addition, the use of Turkish and Eastern Turkestan words was prohibited.<sup>11</sup> In 1955, the People's Republic of China wholly bound Eastern Turkestan to itself as the Uyghur Autonomous Region.<sup>12</sup> China treated Eastern Turkestanis as minorities in their homeland to assimilate the Muslim-Turkish people. To this end, a campaign was carried out to disseminate the message that the Turkish people were actually Chinese. The name Eastern Turkestan was changed to Xinjiang (new soil).<sup>13</sup> Particularly, an attempt was made to place Chinese words in public, including as place names.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 15–16. For the policies Communist China pursued after the invasion of Eastern Turkestan, see Hacı Yakup Anat, *Hayatım ve Mücadelem*, haz., Soner Yalçın (Ankara: Özkan Matbaacılık, 2003), 172–73.

<sup>12</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 16; Ahmet Kemal İlkul, *Çin-Türkistan Hâtıraları: Şanghai Hâtıraları*, haz., Yusuf Gedikli (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyatı, 1997), 42; David Bonavia, "Axe Falls on a Survivalist," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 99, no. 6 (1978): 24; Li, *Çin'in Xinjiang Bölgesi*, 6; Erkin Alptekin, "Eastern Turkestan: An Overview," *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 6, no. 1 (1985): 129; Ahmet Taşağul, "Esaretteki Son Türk Yurdu," *Tarih ve Medeniyet*, sy. 37 (1997): 24; İsmail Cengiz, *1982 Çin Anayasası'na Göre Doğu Türkistan'ın Hukukî Durumu* (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Dayanışma Derneği Yayınları, 1998), 1: 3 dip. 19; Duygu Gözlek, "Asya'nın Kalbi Doğu Türkistan-1," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 71 (2006): 21. Cengiz, *1982 Çin Anayasası'na*, 1: 13.

<sup>13</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 16; Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan*, 27; Michael Dillon, *Doğu Türkistan: Çin Orta Asya'sında Etnik Ayrımcılık ve Kontrol*, çev., Hayati Aktaş (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Platformu Yayınları, 2001), 4; Morris Rossabi, *Encyclopedia of Asian History*, s.v. "Xinjiang," New York: C. Scribner; London: C. Macmillan, 1988; Alptekin, *Doğu Türkistan'dan*, 5; Erkin Alptekin, "Doğu Türkistan'a Şingcang İsmi Verilişinin 95. Yıldönümü," *Bayrak*, 14 Kasım 1979; Li, *Çin'in Xinjiang Bölgesi*, 117; Melike Ülker ve Nazmiye Yüce, "Doğu Türkistan'ın Sessiz Çığılığı," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 77 (2007), 21; İsmail Cengiz, *Sürgündeki Doğu Türkistan Hükümeti* (İstanbul: Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Derneği, 2005), 12; Taşağul, "Esaretteki," 24; Cengiz, *1982 Çin Anayasası'na*, 12; İdil Nilay Demir, "Xin-jiang'da Çin Politikası" (lisans tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sinoloji Anabilim Dalı, 1988), 1. Oraltay considers it was 1768 when Eastern Turkestan was named "Xinjiang." Hasan Oraltay, *Hürriyet Uğrunda Doğu Türkistan Kazak Türkleri*, 2. bs. (İstanbul: Türk Kültür Yayını, 1975), 22. Çandarlıoğlu shows that the name "Xinjiang (Hsinchiang)," which means "New Territory," was given to Eastern Turkestan by the subordinates of Sheng Shicai, who was of Chinese origin and studied in Japan, and that a new regime was established through an agreement with Russia. Çandarlıoğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu*, 15. Arpacık mentions "Xin-jiang, which means the new territory forcibly seized" after the occupation of 1878, without revealing the source. Yusuf Ziya Arpacık, *Osman Batur ve Asrın İbretlik Olaylar* (İstanbul: İleriş Yayınları, 2008), 106. Anat lists 1887 as the year that Eastern Turkestan was changed to Xinjiang. Hacı Yakup Anat, "Safsatalara Cevap," *Doğu Türkistan*, sy. 183–84 (1999): 21 Dip. 1. Tanrıdağlı states Xinjiang means "New Frontier." Erkal Tanrıdağlı, "Çin Komünist Partisi'nce Yazdırılıp, Neşrettirilen "Uygurların

Many uprisings broke out in Eastern Turkestan, but China suppressed them and did not allow the establishment of an independent Eastern Turkestan. For instance, in 1956 and 1958, a movement of the rebel Eastern Turkestanis was violently suppressed.<sup>15</sup> For Eastern Turkestanis looking for a way out, the only solution was to leave their homeland.

## 2. Preparations for Migration after the Agreement between China and Afghanistan

When Eastern Turkestan was occupied by Communist China, the Chinese government pursued a policy based on oppression and violence in this region. According to an agreement signed in 1959, people living in Eastern Turkestan who were of Afghan origin could emigrate to Afghanistan.<sup>16</sup> This agreement marked the starting point of the movement that would result in migration to Turkey in 1964. Until now, there have been no academic resources published on this migration. For this reason, Mehmet Cantürk, who helped initiate the beginning of the migration, and Hamit Göktürk and Mahmut Rahmanoğlu, who participated in the migration, tried to describe how the migration was realized.<sup>17</sup>

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Kısaca Tarihi"nin Hiçbir İlmî Kıymeti Yoktur," *Doğu Türkistan'ın Sesi*, sy. 38 (1993): 8. Sadri argues that the name Eastern Turkestan was changed to Xinjiang in 1882. Roostam Sadri, "The Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkestan: A Commemorative Review," *Journal Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs* 5, no. 2 (1984): 295.

<sup>14</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 16; Buğra, *Doğu Türkistan*, 27; Taşağıl, "Esaretteki," 24; Çandaroğlu, *Özgürlük Yolu*, 15; Ömer Kul, "Osman Batur ve Doğu Türkistan Millî Mücadelesi (1911–1955)" (doktora tezi, İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2009), 27.

<sup>15</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 16; Anat, *Hayatım ve Mücadelem*, 176.

<sup>16</sup> Türksoy, "Hicreti": 16; İbrahim Yarkın, "Doğu Türkistan Göçmenleri İle İlgili Bazı Bilgiler," *Türk Kültürü*, sy. 38 (1965): 64; Mine Akman, "Uyghur Immigrants in Turkey: A Home Away from Home" (yüksek lisans tezi, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 2010), 52; Remzi Ataman, "Türkiye'de Yaşayan Doğu Türkistan Kökenli Uyghur Türklerinin Sosyo-Kültürel Kimlikleri -Kayseri Örneği-" (yüksek lisans tezi, Gazi Üniversitesi, 2006), 67. The text of the agreement was not found despite our investigations. Mehmet Cantürk stated that he learned about the existence of the agreement through the official newspaper of China.

<sup>17</sup> Hereafter, the story of the migration led by Cantürk is based on following literatures. Ebubekir Türksoy, "Hazırlık," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 2 (1994): 19–21; "Hicret'e Hazırlık," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 3 (1994): 19–20; "Hicret [4]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 4 (1994): 18–19; Mehmet Cantürk, "Hicret [5]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 5 (1994): 18–19; "Hicret [6]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 6 (1994): 16; "Hicret [7]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 7 (1995): 18–19; "Hicret [8]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 8 (1994): 18–19; "Hicret [9]," *Gökbayrak*, sy. 9 (1995): 18–19.

The agreement signed with Afghanistan arose in an interesting way. An old classmate approached Mehmet Cantürk, the leader of emigration, gave him a newspaper, and left without any explanation. The newspaper was the official gazette of the Communist Chinese Government and was only given to Chinese senior officials. When Cantürk read the newspaper, he saw that a comprehensive agreement had been signed in August 1959 between the Chinese dictator Mao and Afghanistan's Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud Khan.<sup>18</sup> The two countries were intent on establishing close relations with each other in economic, commercial, cultural, and political areas. The newspaper also stated that people of Afghan origin living in Eastern Turkestan could come to Afghanistan. After reading about the agreement, Cantürk decided to leave for Afghanistan to describe the pressures experienced by Eastern Turkestan people to the free world. However, the real problem was that very few people living in Eastern Turkestan were of Afghan origin. For this reason, some people thought about using friendships and kinships that had been established through trade with Afghanistan over the course of years. These people gave references to their relatives living in Afghanistan. Some people bribed Chinese officers and managed to use the agreement in accordance with their own interests.<sup>19</sup>

Cantürk first consulted with a friend who had information about the road. At the same time, he wrote a letter to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Beijing. The answer to the letter arrived a month later. The Afghan ambassador confirmed the agreement and said that anyone who wanted to emigrate to Afghanistan should apply to the embassy.<sup>20</sup> After that, he secretly forwarded relevant information to his immediate surroundings. After a while, the secret information became known and there was no longer a need to work in secret. The work accelerated, and preparations for migration began.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> We could not meet Mehmet Cantürk because of his health problems, and he passed away on February 1, 2015. However, his son Ahmet Cantürk said he could not remember where his father put the newspaper.

<sup>19</sup> We interviewed Hamit Göktürk and Mahmut Rahmanoğlu (Istanbul, February 15, 2014) and asked them how they benefited from this agreement despite their being of Uyghur origin. Many families said they went to Afghanistan because of trade and their families were related to Afghans through marriage. They indicated that they benefited in this way. They also said many people bribed Chinese officers and acted as if they had relatives in Afghanistan.

<sup>20</sup> Türksoy, "Hazırlık": 21.

<sup>21</sup> In an interview, Mahmut Rahmanoğlu said, "Thanks to trade, some Afghanistans had settled in Eastern Turkestan. The agreement between China and Afghanistan gave Afghans

### 3. Coming to the Sino-Afghan Border under Chinese Supervision

After 20 months of work, petition forms were sent out by the Afghan Embassy. Approximately one month after the forms were filled out, notices were sent to the petitioners by the neighborhood outposts. According to the notices, persons participating in the migration would be divided into three groups and the first group would gather in Yarkand Toluk Secondary School within 15 days. On May 17, 1961, the first gathering was held in the courtyard of Toluk Middle School, surrounded by high walls. The Chinese confiscated the immigrants' precious goods, such as gold and silver. Those who had money were told to deposit it to the bank. They could receive their money back in Afghanistan. The immigrants had nothing besides a pillow, duvet, and a few goods.<sup>22</sup> They also had dried bread that they shared for the migration. On that day, although they had gathered to immigrate, they were kept waiting in the school for various reasons. In the meantime, they were forbidden from contacting outsiders. They were under constant police surveillance. An inspector called "Kalta Xitay (short Chinese)" by Eastern Turkestan was sent from Beijing for this journey. The people who were kept waiting for days in the schoolyard were fed only turnip and dry bread, which they boiled in water. In addition, during the week they spent in the school garden, communist propaganda was distributed to them. Yet rather than live under oppression, the people chose to leave their homeland, families, and friends. In addition, the names of their relatives who were staying in Eastern Turkestan were taken. This created anxiety within the group. Some gave up relocating because of fear that the Chinese government would harm their relatives.

In the 1961 migration, about 118 families moved from Eastern Turkestan to Afghanistan.<sup>23</sup> This migration, however, differed from the previous migrations in that it was made with official permission. Not all of the families migrated at once; instead, they came in groups. The first group was put on trucks to be taken to the Afghanistan border on May 24, 1961. The group, going through Manas, Hutubi, Urumqi, Aksu, Kucha, Yengisar, and Kashgar, crossed the boundary and came to the Pamir

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who settled in Eastern Turkestan an opportunity to return. Citizens of Afghanistan in Eastern Turkestan were applying to the government authorities to go back. Family elders who heard of this course applied to be able to go to Afghanistan from Eastern Turkestan. In June 1961, some Uyghur Turks also decided to go to Afghanistan under the leadership of Mehmet Cantürk to escape from Chinese oppression, taking advantage of the situation."

<sup>22</sup> According to Hamit Göktürk, though many migrants were very poor, some families engaged in trade. There were many valuable goods and gold.

<sup>23</sup> "Doğru Türkistan'dan Kanlı Göçler," *Türk Dünyası*, sy. 7 (1967): 11.

Mountains region from the Tashkurgan region. The first group, which consisted of 34 families and 128 people, was packed into four trucks along with their belongings under the leadership of Mehmet Cantürk. They were prepared to go out with a police inspector Kalta Xitay from Beijing and 10 policemen.<sup>24</sup>

The day the trucks delivered people from Yarkand to Kashgar, the population at the first head was about 135–140 people. They were placed in the former British Embassy in Chini Bagh and waited for a week.<sup>25</sup> Then, they were put in trucks again. The group traveled to Tashkurgan city and came Tash Malik in the vicinity of Upal<sup>26</sup> that night. The next day, they reached mountainous and hilly areas. After passing by the edge of Tashkurgan city, the group got off the trucks. The trucks went back, and the immigrants spent the night there.

In the morning, people who were indigenous to the region and lived in the mountains were brought to guide them. Based on the groups' size and number of children, the guides advised that everyone should buy a donkey.<sup>27</sup> However, due to insufficient finances, the families could only afford a few donkeys. After staying there for three days, they went to Pamir Mountains and then to the Sino-Afghan border. After passing through places named Subashi and Chechektu, they reached the top, called Tikili. Officers pointed downward from the top and told the migrants that Afghanistan was there. They said to travel in that direction.<sup>28</sup>

#### 4. From Afghanistan to Pamir

The emigrant group moved toward the direction they had been shown as Afghanistan. They traveled between the Himalaya Mountains and a rocky hill. Chinese officers and police behind them watched the group from the hill. As the group

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<sup>24</sup> Hamit Göktürk explained that neighbors and relatives saw them off in tears, even though the Chinese government does not allow it and that they cried in these embracings not to forget each other.

<sup>25</sup> It is highly possible that the Chinese Gazette given to Mehmet Cantürk was taken in Kashgar.

<sup>26</sup> The place Mahmud Kashgari is buried.

<sup>27</sup> Mahmut Rahmanoğlu explained that the refugees had to sell their clothes and even their gold teeth and shirt buttons due to material shortages.

<sup>28</sup> According to Hamit Göktürk, the Chinese officers showed them forward with their own hands as if they were saying, "Go, let us get rid of you" at the border and watched the migrant group go from the hilltop after saying Afghanistan was there.

climbed, it started to snow even though it was June.<sup>29</sup> People tried to protect themselves from the cold by putting clothes on their hands. After walking up the hill for about a kilometer, they saw structures that looked like houses. These buildings were not houses, but domes.<sup>30</sup> It turned out there was nobody there. All together, they looked for a solution. One of them said that he knew the place because he had come to the plateau with his father when he was young. Four or five members of the group went in search of people who might live nearby.

They walked 4–5 km on difficult roads and saw smoke rising from a place. When they went there, they saw 7–8 tents. As they approached the tents, one of them was stopped by an elder and two youths who were. They were Kyrgyz. “Who are you?” a man said, “I will fire if you approach.” The migrants responded that they had come from Kashgar, that they were not alone, that 130 people were staying in the place where the domes were, and that their lives were in danger. When the Kyrgyz people asked, “Are you Muslims?” they replied yes. The Kyrgyzs then asked them to read various Qur’anic sura to test whether they were Muslims.

The Kyrgyzs invited them into their tents and offered them milk, dried curd, cream, and milk tea.<sup>31</sup> The emigrants asked for help. Kyrgyz shepherds told the wife of the *aga* about the situation. Then, 12 Tibetan oxen, 10 horses, a pair of mullets, two pairs of overalls, cream, milk, and dried curd, were given to the emigrants. These materials were from the *aga*’s wife. The guests were taken to the Kyrgyz tents. The guests were served meat, cream and milk as an evening meal and spent the night in the tents.

In the morning, officials came from the Afghanistan Population Division. Mehmet Cantürk, who understood the seriousness of the officials, showed them the letter from the Embassy of Afghanistan. The officials read the letter and spoke about

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<sup>29</sup> Hamit Göktürk, who told an interesting story about the snowfall, narrated that he felt warm when he slept although the weather was cold when he reached the bottom of the felt in the evening because it had snowed a snap-depth on the felt and this snow acted as a quilt.

<sup>30</sup> Mahmut Rahmanoğlu stated that they encountered many such *kümbets* (domes) along the road, that it caught his attention that the distance from one *kümbet* to another was a day-long interval on foot, and that many people still had to sleep outside since they did not fit into the *kümbets* encountered along the road due to the group’s large size.

<sup>31</sup> Mahmut Rahmanoğlu and Hamit Göktürk stated that Kyrgyz leader Rahmankul Khan helped arriving families in the point of fodder. Göktürk stated that they gave Kyrgyzs goods such as cloth for the horses taken from the Kyrgyzs.



it in Persian. Cantürk, the only person who knew Persian among them, gave the officials necessary information. The officials' attitudes changed after the answers they received.

Afghan officials told the Kyrgyzs to help them in every way and to send them to the official government authorities. Rahmankul Khan,<sup>32</sup> the leader of the Kyrgyz Turks there, brought the emigrants up to Shighnan. He then handed them over to the commander of the border guard in Shighnan.<sup>33</sup>

## 5. Difficulties in Afghanistan and Attempts to Emigrate to Turkey as Settled Immigrants

The group that stayed in Shighnan for one week moved from there to Badakhshan. The emigrants were provided with a variety of food along the way by locals.<sup>34</sup> Emigrants who reached Badakhshan in the middle of August were placed in a large yard. There, the government authorities took records of who they were. At the beginning of September 1961, it was reported that a group of 20 families and their leader Abdülveli Efendigil were moving toward Afghanistan. Many houses were rented with the support of traders who formerly knew the emigrants, and the first group was placed in these houses. The second group that came later was placed in the yard. Mehmet Cantürk played an active role in the investigation of emigration affairs and the second group of emigrants. Meanwhile, the third group of about 20 families, led by Mir Ahmet Batur, was reported to have crossed the border. The third group consisted mainly of children and elderly people. After great troubles, the third

<sup>32</sup> Rahmankul Khan led the Kyrgyz people living in Ulupamir village of Erciş District of Van until 1990. Hadji Rahmankul Khan's 77-year-old miserable life filled with immigration, deportation, and conflicts ended in the Erzurum State Hospital on August 6, 1990. Rahmankul Khan, who had nine sons and one daughter, greatly affected the Pamir Kyrgyzs. İsmail Cengiz, "Rahmankul Han Ata'nın Öyküsü," İyigünler.net, 27 Kasım 2014 <http://www.iyigunler.net/rahmankul-han-atanin-oykusu-makale,1815.html> (accessed: November 23, 2018)

<sup>33</sup> Hamit Göktürk tells that Rahmankul Khan felt very angry because one of the Kyrgyz people who were assigned to take them did not want to give them their horses, and that he ordered this fellowman to carry the immigrants' belongings on his back. While Göktürk praised Khan's leadership and authority, he was also rather worried about this fellowman.

<sup>34</sup> According to Mahmut Rahmanoğlu, when they came to the Ishkashim district of Fayzabad by the way of Badakhshan, they tried to obtain food by begging on the way due to hunger, and as they continued they ate edible grasses.

group reached the Ishkashim District of Afghanistan. With the help of the governor, they were brought to Badakhshan.

In addition, it was learned that the fourth group of about 24 families had come in under the leadership of Yusuf Batuhan. The fourth group entered Afghanistan through the Pamir Plateau in the end of September 1961. When the group reached Badakhshan, they were placed in places where Cantürk and his followers had been set previously. The people who settled in Afghanistan gradually began to deal with problems of subsistence, but this time the Afghanistan government started to feel political pressures coming from China. In September 1962, the Afghan police took 24 families, who settled in Ghazni, Kandahar, and Khan Abad cities, to Badakhshan and settled them in the garden of pilgrimage place named "Hirka-i-Sharif," where they were cordoned off by soldiers. It was learned that these Eastern Turkestanis would be returned to China on September 20, 1962.<sup>35</sup> Then, the other Eastern Turkestan people made a great effort to solve this problem by meeting with politicians, and they managed to stop the decision.

Mehmet Cantürk and his followers became worried after this event. Following consultations, they decided to settle in Kabul because there were consulates of many countries there. If they encountered a negative situation, they could take shelter in the consulates. The move of these families to Kabul continued until the middle of 1963. Only 10–12 families remained in Badakhshan after these movements.

Meanwhile, everyone was concerned about livelihood. While some people were working in jobs related to their profession, those who were unemployed started to work in various factories.<sup>36</sup> When Cantürk, who had served as an imam in Eastern Turkestan, came to Afghanistan, he learned watchmaking and later opened a shop.

Cantürk wanted to do something for Eastern Turkestan. He went to the UNESCO library of the United Nations in Kabul and started to research Arabic and Persian works. He wrote an article about the reasons for their migration from Eastern

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<sup>35</sup> Hamit Göktürk told us that Afghans were prejudiced against them because they came from a communist country, but they gave some aid. According to Göktürk, the Afghan Government wanted to send his own family back to Eastern Turkestan. However, when those were against being sent back cried, the commander of the border felt sorry for them and swore he would not send them.

<sup>36</sup> According to Göktürk, although the Afghan Government did not give them citizenship and it was forbidden, the government tolerated their activities and the people of Afghanistan helped them. However, the government did not help to feed them at all because Afghanistan was a poor state.

Turkestan in the newspaper *Enes*, published in Kabul.<sup>37</sup> He decided to describe the Chinese persecution in Eastern Turkestan to the media in Kabul and to draw international attention to the issue. For this, he wrote Persian articles in the newspaper *Enes* in the capital city Kabul and sought an opportunity to speak on Radio Kabul. Both organizations said he needed permission from the Ministry of Transport and Press. Thus, Mehmet Cantürk was sent to the Ministry of Interior Affairs. The Minister of the Interior invited Cantürk to his office. "Afghanistan is a small state," the Minister said, "we cannot deal with Russia and China. You can carry out these issues, however, in Turkey." Meanwhile, the Chinese Embassy officially requested the return of refugees from the Afghan government.

One day, Cantürk's parents told him that a police officer had come from the Kabul police headquarters to see him during his absence. He went to the Kabul police and did not open his shop the next day. In the section of foreigner affairs, Cantürk interviewed an inspector named Bekir who had left him a message. Inspector Bekir invited Cantürk to his room and extended a letter to him. Cantürk read it two or three times. The inspector turned to Cantürk and said, "Did you understand? That's all from me. You're on your own!" He then took back the paper. The paper said that all the Eastern Turkestani people who had come to Afghanistan from the Pamir Mountains in 1961 would be officially handed over to the Chinese border guard on September 22, 1964. This letter, which was the decision of the Afghan Parliament, held the official seal and signature of the Prime Minister of the Interior and Foreign Ministers. Cantürk immediately went to the house of Habibullah Adam, a Pakistani professor, after saying goodbye to Inspector Bekir. Habibullah Adam prepared an English petition and gave it to Cantürk. He advised him to take the petition to the UNESCO branch in Kabul and give it to the president if possible. Cantürk went to the place where he waited for hours to be able to submit the petition to the president. Finally, he succeeded in giving it to the president. The president of UNESCO said something to the interpreter after taking the petition. The interpreter told Cantürk and his followers, "We are a small institution, and this is an internal issue of Afghanistan. We cannot intervene in the internal affairs of the state." He returned the petition to them. When Cantürk and his followers left the UNESCO building, they saw a signboard that said "Turkish Embassy" on opposite side. Soon they

<sup>37</sup> We could not confirm this newspaper Cantürk mentioned. It was a local publication, and there were no numbers.

crossed to the opposite sidewalk and read again and again the signboard that said "Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Kabul" in Turkish. They entered and met a guard and an Afghan police officer at the gate of the embassy. The guard blocked Cantürk and his followers, shouting "Get back! What do you want?" Cantürk explained that they were Uyghur Turks from Eastern Turkestan. Guard said to Cantürk, "Wait in the garden." The guard came back and said that the general secretary of the embassy was waiting for them. Upon hearing this, Cantürk and his followers walked toward the detached building. General Secretary of the Embassy of the Kabul, Kaya Toperi, welcomed them.

Kaya Toperi asked what they wanted. In reply, Mehmet Cantürk explained that all migrants passing through the borders of Afghanistan from June to the end of September 1961 were in danger of being sent back to China. "We have been aware of you since the day and hour you came to Afghanistan," Toperi said, "We are well aware of what happened to you in Badakhshan. We are also aware of how many families and populations are in Kabul and other provinces and accidents. Nobody has ever come to tell us about it. We, as the embassy, went to the tents in Qataghan, Aybak, Mazar-i-Sharif, and the Turks in the vicinity of Ghazni and the plains. We have been their guests for days. You have just come here." The Secretary General went to inform the embassy. After 15–20 minutes, he returned to the room and took Cantürk and his followers to the ambassador. When they entered the ambassador's office, they met with the Ambassador of Kabul, Talat Benler, who was tall, weak, and around 60 years old. Cantürk told the ambassador of their request to go to Turkey since they were faced with the danger of forced repatriation to China. The ambassador asked if everyone who migrated had the same opinion. Cantürk replied yes. The ambassador proposed that Cantürk and his followers should rest in the garden. He himself would go to the Afghan authorities for negotiation.

Mehmet Cantürk and his followers waited in the garden. Approximately an hour and a half later, the ambassador arrived. The ambassador exited his vehicle and told Cantürk and his followers, "Now there is no danger of extradition. The Afghan government will give you citizenship, with which you can live where you want. I have just met the Prime Minister, the Interior and Foreign Ministers." The Afghan ministers said that the decision to extradite was the decision of the Afghan Parliament, the only thing that they had to obey. They then promised that this decision would be discussed again in the parliament. The ambassador laughed happily, say-

ing, "They promised me that you will be able to live as an Afghan citizen wherever you want." Cantürk said, "They may have given this promise to you today. They can return us in pieces later. Please help us so that we can go to Turkey!" The ambassador replied "I cannot say anything about that. But why not?" He invited Cantürk and his followers to his office. The Ambassador of Kabul received detailed information from them about the locations of people from Eastern Turkestan in Afghanistan. He was asked again whether everyone agreed about going to Turkey. Cantürk and his followers repeated that everyone agreed. Then the ambassador called the first secretary to send a telegram. The latter said they would receive an answer within 15 days. Cantürk and his followers left the embassy building after the telegram was written. When they left, Kaya Toperi told them that they could come to the embassy for any trouble.

Mehmet Cantürk and his followers went back and told the situation to all their fellow countrymen. He said they would receive a reply from Ankara after 15 days. All the emigrants were waiting for what would come. After 15 days, Cantürk met with General Secretary Kaya Toperi and the first secretary Hayati and learned that the answer had not come yet from Ankara. Cantürk went to the embassy building three or four times a week to learn the answer to the telegram. Each time they went to the embassy, they were asked whether they had any trouble. This took about a year. One day, when Cantürk closed his workplace and returned home, he learned that he had been called by the consulate. When Cantürk went to the consulate the next day, Kaya Toperi was at the door. "170 families were accepted," he said. In the consulate, the places where these 170 families resided were identified and their addresses were defined. The responsibility to inform his fellow countrymen outside Kabul was entrusted to Cantürk. The embassy officials also said they would help him with financial issues. Upon this, Cantürk started to work immediately to inform his fellow countrymen living elsewhere, the families who wanted to migrate, came to Kabul and settled there. Cantürk immediately sent the lists of the families who came to Kabul to the embassy authorities.

Meanwhile, the Chinese, Russian, and American embassies in Kabul tried to incite people against Turkey. They said, "There is no religion in Turkey, no prayer. Twenty people die in the hospitals every day. Their cause of death is malnutrition. Women walk naked. Old people cannot walk around with beards and turban." The American embassy said that they would bring 35 people to Canada every year. The

Russians, meanwhile, expressed that they could take three or four families to Russia. The Chinese attempted material, moral, and political repression as possible to prevent the Eastern Turkestanis from going to the free world. As a result of these campaigns, divisions among the Eastern Turkestanis in Afghanistan arose. Most of them wanted to go to sacred lands like Mecca and Medina, and this view gained weight over time. Cantürk told this development to Habibullah Adam, who was helping the group and working to solve their problems in Kabul. Habibullah Adam said that it was a very good idea and that he himself could also go to the Saudi Arabian Consulate in the event. Later, Cantürk and Habibullah Adam went to the Saudi Arabian Consulate and told the authorities their troubles. The authorities said that they could receive four families each year during the pilgrimage season. After leaving the consulate, they had a consultation meeting, and as a result, Cantürk and his followers decided to go to Turkey.

Meanwhile, application forms for Taiwan passports were sent to 170 families from the Taiwan Embassy in Jeddah. In addition, a letter was sent to them saying that they could live in Saudi Arabia. With Habibullah's advice, they wrote Mehmet Emin Buğra and İsa Yusuf Alptekin in Istanbul about to ask the matter. Within 15 days, they received replies. Cantürk told Habibullah about the contents of the letters. "Would you like to live in Saudi Arabia and say, 'I'm Chinese with a Chinese passport?'" the replies said, "or would you prefer to live in Turkey and say, 'I am a Muslim Turk?' We leave this choice to you entirely. The decision is yours." After listening, Mr. Habibullah recommended, "Here, leaders and those with leadership qualities, go to Turkey and never part from their ways." On the same day, emigrants from Eastern Turkestan came together and consulted among themselves. After this consultation, they all decided to go to Turkey.<sup>38</sup> Six families who had wanted to stay in Afghanistan also agreed to go to Turkey following interviews.

Two days later, General Secretary Kaya Toperi told Mehmet Cantürk that some of them were withdrawing from the list Cantürk gave him, that they were deleting their names, and that Cantürk was mocking him. Upon hearing this, Cantürk explained to Toperi that the consulates of other countries had carried out propagan-

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<sup>38</sup> Although the decision to go to Turkey was made by consensus in a consultation meeting, Hamit Göktürk pointed out that a great majority of families declined to go because they were attracted to Chinese propaganda on the subject, that these people became miserable later, that they applied in 1967 to come to Turkey, and that some parts of families came to Turkey this way.

da campaigns. Toperi became angry, saying, "Why did not you tell us about these things? Why did not you inform us?" He continued, "We can even delay your departure to Turkey. Try to send all of the 170 families as possible." About five months later, 71 families had decided to go to Turkey as a result of contacts and talks Cantürk had made.

## **6. Settlement of Eastern Turkestani People Who Came to Turkey from Afghanistan**

Mehmet Cantürk and his followers worked for months. However, only 71 families decided to come to Turkey. The others made it clear that they would not come. Cantürk and his followers later informed the Consulate about the final decision of the 71 families. A group from Kabul Embassy and Eastern Turkestanis went to the UNESCO branch of Kabul to request that the International Committee of the Red Cross supply aircraft from Kabul to Ankara. Organization officials promised to help. Secretary General Kaya Toperi told the Eastern Turkestanis to prepare for the journey to Turkey, and they began their preparations. The Embassy of the Republic of Turkey in Kabul announced the dates of when the refugees would go to Ankara: October 8, 10, and 12, 1965. When the last emigrants boarded the plane, some others who preferred to remain in Afghanistan said that they gave up staying there. They started crying, asking that they also be included as emigrants. Kaya Topeiri said that it was normal to be fooled by propaganda. He said they would try to help those who were staying. Cantürk was asked to work for the acceptance of these persons. Hence, he introduced two prominent remnants to Toperi, said farewell to them, and boarded the plane. Some time after its departure, the aircraft landed at the Tehran Airport and refueled. Some minutes later, it landed again at the Tehran Airport due to a propeller malfunction. Thanks to the early recognition of this danger, a disaster was avoided.

After staying spending a night in Tehran for a day or two, Cantürk and the third group were transferred to Ankara on October 14 with another plane.<sup>39</sup> After the meal and other necessities were cleared, their names and surnames were confirmed at the Ankara Airport. Incoming families were given new surnames. After this process was over, the group journeyed to Kayseri by bus. When they arrived in Kayseri,

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<sup>39</sup> The first group departed Kabul on October 8, 1965, and the second one departed on October 10. These groups did not have an airplane accident.

they were placed in the Meydan Hotel in Düvenönü. Two groups that had arrived early were placed in hotels named Sivas and Sakarya.

The daily food needs of the group were met by the Kayseri Soil Settlement Bureau along with their subsistence and other needs. On the other hand, the arrival of the Eastern Turkestanis was reported to the public every hour on the Ankara Radio. People came to visit them from the surrounding provinces and counties. Eastern and Western Turkestani peoples, who had come to Turkey and settled in Adana, Izmir, Nevşehir, Istanbul, Ankara, Niğde, Aksaray, and Konya, and other immigrant Turks also visited them. In all three hotels, there were journalists of the Soil Bureau and the Police Service. They were allowed to visit after the police performed identity checks.

October 29 was the Republic Day of Turkey. This was the first time the immigrant Turks participated in the national holiday celebrating the free Turkish State. Everyone, young and old, participated in the parade wearing their national costumes, and older people stood at the front. After the parade, they took souvenir photos in the park on the square. Local and foreign members of the press also took photographs. Photos of that day are available in Mehmet Cantürk's archive.<sup>40</sup> Nuh Mehmet Küçükçalık, the mayor at the time, and nationalists have shown interest in them.

These immigrants, who had to leave their homelands in Eastern Turkestan because of the Chinese occupation, fled to Afghanistan on a 120-day trek on foot. While in Afghanistan, the Eastern Turkestanis applied to emigrate to Turkey through the Eastern Turkestan Immigrants Association in Istanbul. Thereupon, the Association placed 118 families in Turkey. This work was carried out as a result of the efforts of the Association's Chairman İsa Yusuf Alptekin and assistant lawyer İlhan Musabay.<sup>41</sup> With the efforts of both the Government of Turkey and lawmakers such as Dr. Faruk Sukan, Eastern Turkestan refugees were brought to Turkey as emigrants. The necessary appropriation for them was put in the 1964 fiscal year budget. Despite the adoption of 118 families, only 71 emigrant families were brought from Afghanistan to Turkey. The other families stayed in Afghanistan. The 71 families that came to Turkey were brought to Ankara by aircraft belonging to Afghan Airlines, for which

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<sup>40</sup> Fig. 1 (See p. 151).

<sup>41</sup> Fig. 2 (p. 152); Akman, "Uyghur Immigrants," 53.



the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees paid the transportation costs.<sup>42</sup> Eastern Turkestani peoples arrived in Turkey on October 11, 13, and 16.<sup>43</sup> The Eastern Turkestan Immigrants Association worked to bring the remaining 165 people who had stayed in Afghanistan. On May 11, 1965, it submitted an application for this to the Prime Minister's Office of Turkey. Subsequently, on September 26, 1965, the Association applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the result of the work of the Minister of Village Affairs (Sabit Osman Avcı) and the President of the Eastern Turkestan Immigrants Association (İsa Yusuf Alptekin), the emigrants were then brought to Turkey.

The construction of immigrant houses in the Kayseri Province center was initiated with the intention of bringing Eastern Turkestani immigrants home. İsa Yusuf Alptekin frequently visited Ankara to settle immigrants in Turkey.<sup>44</sup> The undertakings have yielded results.

The families were taken to the immigrant house buildings of the Ministry of Village Affairs in the Akköprü area of the Varlık Neighborhood, Ankara, and were hosted for three days. Immigrants toured Ankara for three days and then moved to Kayseri on November 8, 1967, with buses provided by the Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent).<sup>45</sup> The government placed them in a hotel until houses were built in Kayseri. The immigrants were then placed in these houses.<sup>46</sup>

After 1967, the number of those who came from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey was limited, but people have continued arriving, using their own means.<sup>47</sup> The number of Eastern Turkestanis who have taken refuge in Turkey has been limited to 10 to 15 families; however, it is increasing day by day.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ömer Kul, haz., *Esir Doğu Türkistan İçin: İsa Yusuf Alptekin'in Mücadele Hatıraları (1949–1980)* (Ankara: Berikan Yayınevi, 2007), 2: 550.

<sup>43</sup> *Milliyet*, 10 Ekim 1965. Without specifying the source, Göde gives these dates as October 8, 10, and 12, and he states that 370 people in 104 families arrived, that they stayed in the hotels from October 12, 1965 to November 16, 1966, and that then they were placed in their houses. Kemal Göde, "Dünden Bugüne Kayseri'ye Gelen Uygur Türkleri," *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi*, sy. 71 (1992): 48.

<sup>44</sup> Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 551–56.

<sup>45</sup> For immigrants' programs in Ankara, see Kul, *Esir Doğu*, 2: 555–56.

<sup>46</sup> Fig. 3.

<sup>47</sup> For an example of two families who escaped from Communist China, see Fig. 4.

<sup>48</sup> For immigrants from Eastern Turkestan to Turkey since 1967, see Akman, "Uygur Immigrants," 53 etc.

## ATTACHMENTS (Please refer to pages 151–155)

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## List of the Chinese Characters

Balong	巴隆	Xinji tongxianghui	新籍同鄉會
Bao'erhan	包爾漢	Yang Zengxin	楊增新
Balikun (Barköl)	巴里坤	Yu'erhun (Yu'erhong)	魚兒紅/魚兒渾
Beitashan	北塔山	Zhang Zhizhong	張治中
Chongqing	重慶		
Gansu	甘肅		
Dihua	迪化		
Gasikule (Gasköl)	尕斯庫勒		
Guoshiguan	國史館		
Han Jinbao	韓進寶		
Jin Shuren	金樹仁		
Ma Bufang	馬步芳		
Ma Bukang	馬步康		
Ma Lingyun	馬凌雲		
Qianhu zhang	千戶長		
Qinghai	青海		
Salishi	薩力士		
Sanqu geming	三區革命		
Sheng Shicai	盛世才		
Song Xilian	宋希濂		
Suzhou	肅州		
Taiji (täyzhǐ)	台吉		
Tao Zhiyue	陶峙岳		
Xiangyue	鄉約		





ATTACHMENTS OF CHAPTER 2

(All attachments except Fig. 9–10 are from author's personal archive.)



**Fig. 1:** İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra at their arrival in Ankara for the admission of immigrants to Turkey (January 1952).

25/2-53.

ك

هسته م سايملى. سؤيملىك. دوستاز. دۇنى راھبارموز  
 عايسا بەك جىنا بى عالمىلار دىگىز عابا  
 جىنا بىلىزغا استان السره تىن جانسىز داۋىسەن. ساغنا  
 سالا مەدە رىمىز دى كوندۇبى قالا موز. قۇا جانىم. جەككەنىك  
 كىشە نە قارداش رىمىز دىك دەن سالا ما تىگىن اللە دان  
 سۇراپ قالا موز.  
 جىنا بىلىز دىك شاتتىق كورمى موى قالا مىگىز دىك  
 نىزىلداۋ مەن 53-25/2-1953. كوفى جانىغان قاتتىق دى دىر جىمىل  
 25/2-1953. كوفى تاپسىرىپ الەب ما ز مۇننا تولۇق تۇسىندەك.  
 قوۋا شى شاتتىق داۋىسەن كارىيا لا رىمىز صىك جابىسا  
 باقتى راقات تۇرمىش شىندە كۆن كە شىرسەت. دە تىن  
 دۇعا لى رى سىستە مە كىتە.  
 بۇل سىستان بولەلى مۇھا جىرلە دىگىز تۇتەك ل / اما نىقتا .  
 شاتتىق كوكىل. باقتى راقاتقا كە تىب بارا جاباقتا. قۇا تالىم.  
 تارىپىيا سىستە رىنە تۇتەك ل كىرىسىپ . كۆن شىندە . بىر تىنە . ار .  
 پىتە رىنە ن بىسلىغان وقتۇ كىتە تارىن و قىب شىنەب دۇشقان تۇستاي  
 اۋە لەن اسىپ نفا دۇشقان . زۇ مەرىق . تايى كە تىب بارا جاباقتۇ دا .  
 ارىنە بۇل تاپسىرىق قولىمىزغا كەلمۇنە . اللە . جىنا بىلىز .  
 دىك كورسە تىگىن جبار داھىگىز . كەننە ولە دۇنياغا شىنەبىنە مەككىز دەن  
 شىغا ما جىمىز . جىنا بىلىز دەن شىا شىلغان . كەندەك شىا شىۋى  
 دە بى سالا موز .  
 2-25 تو كى

Fig. 2: Letter of thanks by Kazakh Turks named Ömer, Kaynaş, and Tökeş, dated February 25, 1953.

عمومی قولی دره یراش پیر شیخ لوی دره  
معلوم بود که با اسلحه و دو چاقو  
افند نام یک کارکنان و روش مالون  
بویسینه قوه المریزین نامک شورون  
ایستی پتکونه و قلدیق مافشورون  
بر شیخیزن سورادی، بو اوچوت  
هیچ بیر اندیشه قبله ندان و مدلتون  
تا دستور دیب رتیکو، نکشوروش  
پتکانه دیا کیرن قونو طرفه حرام  
بر پایه دور 29/10

17

Fig. 3: Mehmet Emin Buğra's written note dated September 29, 1953 to temporarily hand over weapons to the authorities during a search of the convoy.

23- آقئور 21 1952 ده

محمد حبيب احمد جامع طبعا صدقار محمد عبده الطيوع جامع حامد جامع باسئوئو  
 ابيرون ن بولون بركوئو لارئيئو اسم سئوئو مبلخ بيلا

1	حبيب احمد جامع	2200-0-0
2	علي جامع	100-0-0
3	توردي جامع طباط	225-0-0
4	ويان جامع صرافي	10 ريال
5	عبدئيئو جامع	50-0-0
6	قزاق قوئو جامع	50-0-0
7	تودي جامع صرافي	25-0-0
8	عالم جامع قزاق	20-0-0
9	تام جي قسمة	10 ريال
10	خارو جامع قزاق قوئو	10-0-0
11	اتر جامع مبالئيئو	95-0-0 ريال
12	عبدالعزيز جامع صرافي	25-0-0
13	البراق جامع قزاق	25-0-0 ريال
14	مير جامع قزاق	10-0-0
15	سئوئو جامع قزاق	10-0-0 ريال


Saudi Arabistandaki kempçilerin kempçe gelen kasak kempçileri için topladığı para.

Fig. 4: A list of the money collected by Eastern Turkestanis in Saudi Arabia despite their own difficult economic circumstances.



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Fig. 5: Letter from "the Eastern Turkistani Qaziq [sic] Refugees Association" in Peshawar to Alptekin dated September 2, 1953.



Central Institute of Education,  
University of Delhi,  
35 Trobyn Road, Delhi-6,  
November 14th, 1954.

To  
Mr. Mohamed Amin Bugre,  
& Members of  
Chinese Turkestan Refugees Committee,  
Srinagar, Kashmir.

My dear Mr. Amin and friends;

I am glad to inform you that the CHINA MAINLAND FAMINE RELIEF ASSOCIATION (中國大陸災胞救濟總會) came to know the difficult conditions of some of our country men in Kashmir, Bombay and Delhi, and decided in a meeting to express their sympathy by sending a number of relief gifts to the 140 refugees whose names appear in a list given to the Association. According to this list, there are 105 in Bombay, 130 in Kashmir and 5 in Delhi, who are to receive the gifts. The Indian Red Cross Society has kindly consented the responsibility of distributing these gifts to the persons concerned.

The Indian Red Cross Society had sent to their bankers the draft of  $\text{₹} 2,866$  (US) from the China Mainland Famine Relief Association for collection. As soon as the amount is credited to the account of the Red Cross, the gifts will be ready for distribution. Each gift given to an individual in the list will amount to a sum equivalent to  $\text{₹} 11.94$  (US).

As the name list given by the China Mainland Famine Relief Association is in Chinese, the Indian Red Cross Society wished to have it also typed in ENGLISH. As I think that the original list of names from Srinagar and Bombay might be first supplied by your Committee, herewith I am sending you two copies of the name list in Chinese and hope that you will get these names in ENGLISH or in list. You will please notice that the names are numbered in order, so that the first 105 belong to Bombay and the numbers between 106 to 235 belong to Srinagar, Kashmir. The remaining five, 236 to 240 belong to Delhi.

I am sure that your Committee will help to have the name list in English and send it back at your earliest convenience, so that the Red Cross may use it in time of distribution of the aforesaid gifts.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

*Liang-Chao Chia*  
(Liang-Chao Chia)

Fig. 6: An example of the correspondence conducted on the issue of finances showing the total amount of 2,866 USD received from the "Chinese Mainland Relief Association."




Fig. 7: Letter from Hüseyin Teyci to İsa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra (January 6, 19..., date cannot be read).






Fig. 8: A Kazakh immigrant convoy (Kashmir, 1951).



14595

Doğu Türkistan'dan Hindistan'a iltica eden (350) Türk ile ayrıca Hindistan, Pakistan ve Suudi Arabistan'a sığınmış olan beş bin Türk'den ( 1500 ) kişi olmak üzere ceman ( 1850 ) Türkün iskânli göçmen olarak yurdumuza kabulleri; Devlet Bakanlığınının 10/3/-1952 tarihli ve 3232-C-3035/12765 sayılı yazısı üzerine; Bakanlar Kurulunca 13 / 3 /1952 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

CUMHURBAŞKANI

*C. Zorlu*

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030

Başbakan *A. M. ...*  
Devlet Bakanı Başbakan Yardımcısı *S. ...*  
Devlet Bakanı -----  
Adalet Bakanı *A. M. ...*  
Millî Savunma Bakanı *M. ...*  
İçişleri Bakanı ve Dev. B. V. *H. ...*  
Dışişleri Bakanı *F. ...*  
Maliye Bakanı *H. ...*  
Millî Eğitim Bakanı *S. ...*  
Bayındırlık Bakanı *H. ...*  
Eko. ve Ticaret Bakanı *M. ...*  
Sa. ve So. Y. Bakanı *S. ...*  
C. ve Tekel Bakanı *S. ...*  
Tarım Bakanı *H. ...*  
Ulaştırma Bakanı *H. ...*  
Çalışma Bakanı *M. ...*  
V. İşletmeler Bakanı V. *M. ...*

Fig. 9: The decision of Council of Ministers of Turkey with regard to the people who were accepted as immigrants from Eastern Turkestan and granted residence permits.\*

\* Cumhurbaşkanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Fon Kodu 30.. 18.1.2., Yer Nr. 128. 19.6.

02.08.1952, Milliyet, Sayfa 3

### Çin Türkistanından 103 kişilik bir kabile geliyor

Srinagar, 1 (AP) — Batı Tibeti aşmak suretiyle Çin Türkistanı ve Moğolistan'dan buraya varan 103 Müslüman aşiret mensubunun ilk grubu yakında Türkiye'ye hareket edecektir. Keyfiyet kabile ve aşiret reisi Hüseyin Tağı tarafından bildirilmiştir. Aşiret reisinin ifadesine göre, Türkiye 1850 Müslüman mülteciyi kabul muvafakat etmiştir.

28.10.1952, Milliyet, Sayfa 3

### Türkiye'ye 103 kazak geliyor

Londra, 27 (Nafen) — Komünist rejimi yüzünden memleketlerini terk etmiş olan Müslüman kazaklardan 103 kişilik bir kabile Türkiye'ye yerleşmek üzere Keşmir'den hareket etmişlerdir.


Bu kazaklar, aşiret reisi Hüseyin Tağı'nın reisiği altındadırlar.

Bu Müslüman kazaklar senelerden beri hicret yollarındadırlar. Bunlar, komünizm merkezi Aşyaya, buldukları yerlere geldikleri zaman oradan hicret etmişler ve Çin Türkistanına Sinkiang'a gelerek yerleşmişlerdir. Fakat 1949 senesinde komünistler Sinkiang eyaletine de gelince bu Müslüman kazaklar komünist idaresi altına girmektense yeniden hicretine göze almışlar ve yola koyulmuşlardır.

Bu Müslüman kazaklar din ve din itibarıyla Türklerden farkı olmadığından, Türk hükümeti tarafından Türkiye'de yerleşmek üzere davet edilmişlerdir.

Fig. 10: News of the mass immigration in Turkish newspapers.

ATTACHMENTS OF CHAPTER 6



**Fig. 1.** Pictures of the Eastern Türkistanis who attended the Republic Day (October 29) in Kayseri with their local clothes. These pictures are from Mehmet Cantürk's archive.



T. C.  
DIŐIŐLERİ BAKANLIĐI

Kons. ve Muh. H. Dairesi Gn. Md.  
No: 567.006 Kons/3 - 3 F C  
Konu : Afganistan'a iltica eden  
DoĐu Trkistanlı soydaŐlarımızın Hk.

Ankara  
19/10/1963  
12-10-63

DOĐU TRKİSTAN GÇMENLER CEMİYETİ  
BAZAZİT TİYATRO CADDESİ  
AYDIN SARAY No.119  
İSTANBUL

Hiz  
BaŐbakanlıĐa gnderilen 12.9.1963 tarihli yazı.  
Komünist Çin'den Afganistan'a iltica eden 600  
kadar DoĐu Trkistanlı soydaŐlarımızın durumu ile BakanlıŐımız  
yakından ilgilanmekte olup bu konuda İĐiŐleri BakanlıĐı, İmar ve İŐkn BakanlıĐı ve Kbili BykeliliĐimizle yazıŐma  
devam etmektedir. Alınacak karŐılık ayrıca bildirilecektir.  
BaŐbakanlıĐa gnderdiĐiniz yazıya karŐılık seln-  
larla bildiririm.

DIŐIŐLERİ BAŐATI V.Y.  
EHAN FETİC OZAN  
Konsolr, 1. Hukuk  
Dairesi Genel Mdr

İMAR ve İŐKEN BAKANLIĐI  
Toprak ve İŐkn İĐleri  
Genel MdrlĐ

24-10-63

Őubesi: 2  
3237/275-3615/28606  
Konu: Komünist Çin'den  
Afganistan'a hicret  
eden DoĐu Trkistanlı-  
lılar Hk.

ANKARA  
24 Ekim 1963  
24-10-63

İstanbul ValiliĐine

Komünist Çin'den Afganistan'a hicret eden ve Trk Irkından bu-  
lunan 600 kiŐinin yurdumuza gçmen olarak kabulleri hakkında Bazazit  
Tiyatro Caddesi Aydın Saray No:119 da DoĐu Trkistan Gçmenler Cemiyeti  
BaŐkanı İsa Yusuf Alptekin imzasıyla BaŐbakanlıĐa verilip bir rne-  
Đi BakanlıŐımıza gnderilen 12/9/1963 tarihli dilekesi tetkik edildi  
Adı geen Trkistanlı soydaŐlarımızın gçmen olarak yurdumuza  
kabl hususunda ĐiŐleri BakanlıĐı ile muhabere edilmekte olup hası  
olacak duruma gre gereĐi yapılacaktır.  
Keyfiyetin dilekesine ceraben Cemiyet BaŐkanlıĐına tebliĐini  
rica ederim.

Ahmet AkŐit  
Genel Mdr Yardımcısı  
İmar ve İŐkn Bakanı Y.

Aslı gbidir.  
6/11/1963  
5-b

T.C.	
İMAR ve İSKAN BAKANLIĞI	
İ S T A N B U L	
Toprak Ve İskân Müdürlüğü	İ S T A N B U L
640/4160	24.2.1964
Eüro :2	
Konu :İsa Yusuf Alptekin Hk.	
Eminönü Kaymakamı Karo	
<p>Meyazıt, Tiyatro Caddesi aydın Saray No:119 da Doğu Türkistan Göçmenler Cemiyeti Başkanı İsa Yusuf Alptekin İmar ve İskan Bakanlığına 11/1/1964 tarihli mektupla müracaat ederek kızıl Çin zulmünden kurtulmak amacıyla yurtlarını terkleyip Afrikanistana hicret eden ve Türk İrkından bulunan 600 Soydaşımızın İskanlığıöçmen olarak Ara Yurda Kabullerini istemiştir.</p> <p>İmar ve İskan Bakanlığınca cevaban alınan 16/2/1964 tarih ve Toprak ve İskan İşleri Gn. Md. 37-275-443/5167 sayılı emirde, Emis konusu soydaşlarımızın Yurda Gelmelerini temin için şereкли işlem yapılmakta olduğu bildirilmiş ve keyfiyetten adı geçene bilgi verilmesi emredilmiştir. Keyfiyetin bu suretle kendisine tebliğiyle tetellügü kadının gönderilmesini rica ederim.</p>	
	Lütfi Bilgin Vali Muavini
İC:19/4160	İstanbul Valisi Y. rine
24/2. M.U.	

Fig. 2. Examples of correspondence for immigrants. These documents are from Ömer Kul's private archive.

**T. C.**  
**B A Ş B A K A N L I K**  
**K A R A R L A R V E K A R A R L A R Y E T K İ R D A İ R İ S İ**

**KARARNAME**

Sayı : 6 / 9911

**EMİ**

1968 yılı inşaat programına alınmış olan ve eksiltme veya pazarlık suretiyle ihalesi mümkün olmayan Ankara ve Tuzla'daki göçmen kabul ve yetiştirme merkezleri, Zeytinburnu'daki göçmen misafirhanesi, Muğ İlindeki eğitim merkezi ile Doğu Türkistan'dan yurdumuza gelmiş bulunan göçmenler için Eskişehir'de yaptırılacak miskenlerin (1968 mali yılına mühacir olmak ve muktezi mülkemesi 3/12711 sayılı Kararmemeye ilişkin yönetmelik emsallerına göre sağlanmak şartıyla) inşaat işlerinin emaneten yaptırılması; Maliye Bakanlığının uygun mütalâasına dayanan Kçy İşleri Bakanlığının 3/4/1968 tarih ve 2171/10397 sayılı yazısı üzerine, 2490 sayılı Kanunun 50 nci maddesinin (E) fıkrasına göre, Bakanlar Kurulunca 27 / 4 /1968 tarihinde kararlaştırılmıştır.

CUMHURBAŞKANI V.

*[Signature]*

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	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
	Adliye Bakanı:	Mülkiyet Bakanlığı:	İçişleri Bakanlığı:	Dışişleri Bakanlığı:	Maliye Bakanlığı:
	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
	Mülkiyet Bakanlığı:	Beynül milletler Bakanlığı:	Ticaret Bakanlığı:	Sık ve Sık Y. Bakanlığı:	Emek ve Tabii Kay. Bakanlığı:
	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
	Tarım Bakanlığı:	Ulaştırma Bakanlığı:	Çalışma Bakanlığı:	Sağlık Bakanlığı:	Emek ve Tabii Kay. Bakanlığı:
	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>
	Turizm ve Yabancılar Bakanlığı:	İmar ve Şeh. Bakanlığı:	Köy İşleri Bakanlığı:		
	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Signature]</i>		

Fon No: 30 18 1 2 - Kulu No: 218 - Dışiş. No: 30 - Sıra No: 6

Fig. 3. An example of the decisions of the Council of Ministers on the materials needed for the construction of post-migration houses (1967).\*

\* Cumhurbaşkanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, Fon Kodu. 30.. 19. 1.2., Yer Nr. 218. 30.6.

30.03.1967, Milliyet, Sayfa 3

## Kızıl Çin'den kaçan 2 Türk ailesi geldi

Kızıl Çin'den kaçan iki Türk ailesi dün Beyrut üzerinden uçakla şehrimize gelmişlerdir. 13 kişilik iki ailenin reisleri 10 yıldan beri Türkiye'ye gelmek için çaba gösterdiklerini ve nihayet bu müjdeliye kazandıklarını söylemişlerdir.

Aslen Türkistanlı olan iki aile 1957 yılında Türkiye'ye kaçmaya karar vermişlerdir. 1957 yılında Tokyo Büyükelçiliği ile temas geçmeye muvafak olan ailelerin Türkiye'ye gelme haklarını Kızıl Çin yetkilileri tarafından öğrenilmiş ve aile Reisleri olan Ethem Zekirhan ile Nimet Kamil tevki edilmiştir. Ethem Zekirhan 5 yıl, Nimet Kamil ise 4 yıl hapisle kaldıktan sonra tahliye edilmişlerdir.

Tahliyeden sonra kaçma kararlarını 20 gün önce gerçekleştirebilen aileler Sanghaya'dan Beyrut'a geçmeye muvafak olmuşlardır.

Ellerinde pasaport yerine Tokyo Büyükelçiliğinin verdiği kağıtlar bulunan Ethem ve Nimet Sanghaya geçiş ve oradan kaçış yollarını açıklamamışlardır.

Fig. 4. The news reporting the migrants' arrival in Turkey in the newspaper *Milliyet*, dated March 30, 1967.





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**Emigrants/Muhacir from Xinjiang to Middle East during 1940-60s**

**Edited by Jin NODA and Ryosuke ONO**

