How Political Power and Capital Captures a Regulatory Authority: Turkey’s Radio and Television Supreme Council
Akduran Erol, Özgün
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ECPR General Conference22 – 26August2022, University of InnsbruckPanel Towards de-specialization : politicisation and coordination of regulationCode: VIR371Section Regulatory Governance at the crossroads: old and new challengesDate, Time and LocationThursday 16:15 - 18:00 (25/08/2022)How Political Power and Capital Captures a Regulatory Authority: Turkey’s Radio and Television Supreme CouncilÖzgün Akduran ErolYunus YiğitAbstractIndependent regulatory authorities are expected to act as apolitical agents to prevent market failures in the sector they regulate. However, according to political signal theory, regulatory authorities cannot escape the interventions and control of the political power. In addition, according to capture theory, regulation is designed and operated for the benefit of dominant capital groups in the sector. This article applies both theories to the case of Turkey’s radio and TV sector. Based on, document analysis, and interviews, we claim that the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council is a unique case of a supposedly independent authority being captured by both the political power and dominant capitalist groups in the sector by limiting its administrative and financial autonomy. Our findings show that the close relations between capital groups and important political figures, which have been clear since the the sector was first liberalized, have helped these groups gain a privileged position in Turkey’s media sector.
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